RESIKO MORAL HAZARD PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH DI INDONESIA

The problems of Principal-Agent often occurred in financing scheme of Islamic banking as the effect of imbalance information between Shahibul Maal and Mudharib are adverse selection and moral hazard. Providing adequate information and determining optimum sharing schemethat meet the utility of Islamic banking and client can reduce the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard. Even though financial product is highly risked, yet it can be reduced by optimizing sharing scheme and thus the financial amount can be increased. Furthermore, the effective supervision of the corporation as a control management is necessary to minimize financial risk. Then, Good Corporate and Good Governance (GCG) Principles must be implemented in Islamic banking as a consequence of public responsibility in running the bank according to shariah principle based on Al-Qur’an, Hadith, and Ijmā

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AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽

10.32678/alqalam.v33i1.384 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 33 (1) ◽

pp. 46

Author(s):

Aswadi Lubis

Keyword(s):

High Risk ◽

Asymmetric Information ◽

Human Resources ◽

Moral Hazard ◽

Adverse Selection ◽

Agency Problem ◽

Agency Problems ◽

Islamic Banking ◽

The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

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The Importance of Good Customer Ethics in Improving The Financing Portion of Mudharabah

Global Review of Islamic Economics and Business ◽

10.14421/grieb.2016.041-02 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 4 (1) ◽

pp. 015

Author(s):

Khotibul Umam

Keyword(s):

Asymmetric Information ◽

Business Ethics ◽

Moral Hazard ◽

Adverse Selection ◽

Profit Sharing ◽

Islamic Banking ◽

Islamic Bank ◽

Bank Financing

Mudharabah is a partnership contract (reputation agreement) in which one party (shahibul maal) will give his property to another party (mudharib) as productive business capital with profit sharing between the owner of the funds/capital based on the agreed ratio in advance. In practice, the application of financing mudharabah is not easy to be implemented in Islamic banking because financing mudharabah will make the asymmetric information between the customer and Islamic banking. Mudharabah client have more information than Islamic banking about all of that business. Asymmetric information sometimes can make the costumer do the moral hazard and adverse selection acts with the result that Islamic banking didn't take that risk and make the distribution of mudharabah financing portion becomes very small when compared to the total number of Islamic bank financing. Mudharabah Customers must have a good business ethics and always have advanced principle of honesty, trustworthy and transparent in managing shahibul maal funds in orther to they can minimize the risk of financing mudharabah and make Islamic banking be confident to grant the decision of financing mudharabah.

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Adverse selection and moral hazard in the provision of clinical trial ancillary care

Health Economics Policy and Law ◽

10.1017/s1744133112000072 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 8 (2) ◽

pp. 225-234 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Michael R. Richards ◽

Lorens A. Helmchen

Keyword(s):

Clinical Trial ◽

Moral Hazard ◽

Medical Care ◽

Adverse Selection ◽

Financial Risk ◽

Third Party ◽

Care Utilization ◽

Insurance Benefit ◽

Ancillary Care ◽

Study Participants

AbstractAs more and more clinical trials are conducted in developing countries, concerns arise about non-trial medical care available to study participants. Recent work argues for ancillary care – medical care not part of the clinical trial per se – to be formally incorporated into these studies. Although the provision of ancillary care is often justified on ethical grounds, a number of crucial implementation issues remain unresolved, including its scope, duration and financing. Drawing on lessons from health insurance benefit design, we highlight two overlooked challenges for ancillary care adoption – adverse selection and moral hazard – and offer recommendations that could attenuate their consequences. Specifically, adverse selection and moral hazard could be reduced by offering a choice between ancillary medical care and monetary compensation or rewarding low ancillary care utilization. Alternatively, researchers’ financial risk due to ancillary care could be shifted to a third-party insurer. Recognizing participants’ behavioral responses to prospective offers of ancillary medical care would allow funders and research teams to forecast the demand for ancillary care more accurately and to prepare for its provision more adequately.

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