scholarly journals Aspects related to the interconnection between music and the human brain. Scientific discoveries and contemporary challenges

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 224-241
Author(s):  
Rosina Caterina Filimon

Abstract A new scientific discipline, neuromusicology, connects the scientific research of music and that of the nervous system, in particular of the brain. It studies the effects of music on the brain; the present paper relates to this particular field. Initially, the right hemisphere was associated with the process of music reception and it was considered that the activation of the left hemisphere was the responsibility of language. Neuroimaging, however, demonstrates that the elements of musical language activate various brain areas in both hemispheres, simultaneously generating the perception of music and emotions. Research in the field of psychoacoustics has revealed that listening to music triggers the production of neurotransmitters in the body that relieve pain, reduce stress and anxiety. Another effect determined by listening and studying music is the structural changes that occur at brain level due to brain neuroplasticity. Pathological changes at brain level have consequences in perception and influence all human activities. Disease alters the artistic creativity of people suffering from various pathologies, biographies of many artists proving that neurological diseases influenced their artistic activity. Decoding the functioning of the brain in the presence of music and its effects on brain activity make it possible to use music therapy as a complementary method to medical treatment. The harmful effects of the current Covid-19 pandemic on the brain are obvious and are already reported in completed or ongoing research studies. The adoption of music as a therapeutic tool in the current global epidemiological crisis highlights its undeniable qualities in multiple pathologies and updates its mental and somatic benefits, complementary to medicine. All this provides an important drive in the reassessment and reconfiguration of the need to amplify the interference strategies between the field of music and that of medicine, implicitly that of neurology.

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-26
Author(s):  
Hans Goller

Neuroscientists keep telling us that the brain produces consciousness and consciousness does not survive brain death because it ceases when brain activity ceases. Research findings on near-death-experiences during cardiac arrest contradict this widely held conviction. They raise perplexing questions with regard to our current understanding of the relationship between consciousness and brain functions. Reports on veridical perceptions during out-of-body experiences suggest that consciousness may be experienced independently of a functioning brain and that self-consciousness may continue even after the termination of brain activity. Data on studies of near-death-experiences could be an incentive to develop alternative theories of the body-mind relation as seen in contemporary neuroscience.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Alexandra Anagnostopoulou ◽  
Charis Styliadis ◽  
Panagiotis Kartsidis ◽  
Evangelia Romanopoulou ◽  
Vasiliki Zilidou ◽  
...  

Understanding the neuroplastic capacity of people with Down syndrome (PwDS) can potentially reveal the causal relationship between aberrant brain organization and phenotypic characteristics. We used resting-state EEG recordings to identify how a neuroplasticity-triggering training protocol relates to changes in the functional connectivity of the brain’s intrinsic cortical networks. Brain activity of 12 PwDS before and after a 10-week protocol of combined physical and cognitive training was statistically compared to quantify changes in directed functional connectivity in conjunction with psychosomatometric assessments. PwDS showed increased connectivity within the left hemisphere and from left-to-right hemisphere, as well as increased physical and cognitive performance. Our findings reveal a strong adaptive neuroplastic reorganization as a result of the training that leads to a less-random network with a more pronounced hierarchical organization. Our results go beyond previous findings by indicating a transition to a healthier, more efficient, and flexible network architecture, with improved integration and segregation abilities in the brain of PwDS. Resting-state electrophysiological brain activity is used here for the first time to display meaningful relationships to underlying Down syndrome processes and outcomes of importance in a translational inquiry. This trial is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier NCT04390321.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paddy Ross ◽  
Beatrice de Gelder ◽  
Frances Crabbe ◽  
Marie-Hélène Grosbras

AbstractEmotions are strongly conveyed by the human body and the ability to recognize emotions from body posture or movement is still developing through childhood and adolescence. To date, there are very few studies exploring how these behavioural observations are paralleled by functional brain development. Furthermore, there are currently no studies exploring the development of emotion modulation in these areas. In the current study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare the brain activity of 25 children (age 6-11), 18 adolescents (age 12-17) and 26 adults while they passively viewed short videos of angry, happy or neutral body movements. We observed that when viewing bodies generally, adults showed higher activity than children bilaterally in the body-selective areas; namely the extra-striate body area (EBA), fusiform body area (FBA), posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and amygdala (AMY). Adults also showed higher activity than adolescents, but only in right hemisphere body-selective areas. Crucially, however, we found that there were no age differences in the emotion modulation of activity in these areas. These results indicate, for the first time, that despite activity selective to body perception increasing across childhood and adolescence, emotion modulation of these areas in adult-like from 7 years of age.Conflict of InterestThe author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-83
Author(s):  
Jonas Gonçalves Coelho

Many neuroscientific experiments, based on monitoring brain activity, suggest that it is possible to predict the conscious intention/choice/decision of an agent before he himself knows that. Some neuroscientists and philosophers interpret the results of these experiments as showing that free will is an illusion, since it is the brain and not the conscious mind that intends/chooses/decides. Assuming that the methods and results of these experiments are reliable the question is if they really show that free will is an illusion. To address this problem, I argue that first it is needed to answer three questions related to the relationship between conscious mind and brain: 1. Do brain events cause conscious events? 2. Do conscious events cause brain events? 3. Who is the agent, that is, who consciously intends/chooses/ decides, the conscious mind, the brain, or both? I answer these questions by arguing that the conscious mind is a property of the brain due to which the brain has the causal capacity to interact adaptively with its body, and trough the body, with the physical and sociocultural environment. In other words, the brain is the agent and the conscious mind, in its various forms - cognitive, volitional and emotional - and contents, is its guide of action. Based on this general view I argue that the experiments aforementioned do not show that free will is an illusion, and as a starting point for examining this problem I point out, from some exemplary situations, what I believe to be some of the necessary conditions for free will.Key-words: Agent brain, conscious mind, free will, Libet-style experiments.


Genes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Gegenhuber ◽  
Jessica Tollkuhn

Females and males display differences in neural activity patterns, behavioral responses, and incidence of psychiatric and neurological diseases. Sex differences in the brain appear throughout the animal kingdom and are largely a consequence of the physiological requirements necessary for the distinct roles of the two sexes in reproduction. As with the rest of the body, gonadal steroid hormones act to specify and regulate many of these differences. It is thought that transient hormonal signaling during brain development gives rise to persistent sex differences in gene expression via an epigenetic mechanism, leading to divergent neurodevelopmental trajectories that may underlie sex differences in disease susceptibility. However, few genes with a persistent sex difference in expression have been identified, and only a handful of studies have employed genome-wide approaches to assess sex differences in epigenomic modifications. To date, there are no confirmed examples of gene regulatory elements that direct sex differences in gene expression in the brain. Here, we review foundational studies in this field, describe transcriptional mechanisms that could act downstream of hormone receptors in the brain, and suggest future approaches for identification and validation of sex-typical gene programs. We propose that sexual differentiation of the brain involves self-perpetuating transcriptional states that canalize sex-specific development.


2000 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Berti ◽  
Francesca Frassinetti

Far (extrapersonal) and near (peripersonal) spaces are behaviorally defined as the space outside the hand-reaching distance and the space within the hand-reaching distance. Animal and human studies have confirmed this distinction, showing that space is not homogeneously represented in the brain. In this paper we demonstrate that the coding of space as “far” and “near” is not only determined by the hand-reaching distance, but it is also dependent on how the brain represents the extension of the body space. We will show that when the cerebral representation of body space is extended to include objects or tools used by the subject, space previously mapped as far can be remapped as near. Patient P.P., after a right hemisphere stroke, showed a dissociation between near and far spaces in the manifestation of neglect. Indeed, in a line bisection task, neglect was apparent in near space, but not in far space when bisection in the far space was performed with a projection lightpen. However, when in the far space bisection was performed with a stick, used by the patient to reach the line, neglect appeared and was as severe as neglect in the near space. An artificial extension of the patient's body (the stick) caused a remapping of far space as near space.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 399-403
Author(s):  
V. V. Sychev ◽  
V. N. Sychev ◽  
N. V. Shatrova

According to some authors, changes in the electroencephalogram (EEG) in the absence of clinical paroxysmal manifestations should be considered as subclinical epileptic manifestations. Verification of this hypothesis on the basis of the auto-spectral Fourier analysis of the EEG was the purpose of this work. Were examined in 27 women, mean age of 35.4±2.48 years, right-handed, without paroxysmal clinical and EEG manifestations (first group) and 25 women, mean age of 36.2±2.17 years, right-handed, without paroxysmal clinical manifestations, but with epileptiform activity on EEG (second group). In the second group were registered the increase in faverage of the brain EEG (p<0.001), while was increased faverage both of the left and right hemisphere (p<0.01). Zonal peculiarities of bioelectric activity of a brain of the second group surveyed was a significant increase in faverage EEG in all investigated leads (p<0.01), resulting in total liquidation of zonal differences (p>0.05). The results of the analysis allowed to conclude that the registration of the EEG epileptiform paroxysmal phenomena without clinical manifestations should be considered as a subclinical stage of epilepsy.


Author(s):  
Stephen Gaukroger

Phantom limbs pose a philosophical problem about the location of pains. The work of Descartes first used them to make a philosophical point about the brain in relation to the body. They have traditionally been thought of as being due to nerve endings on the pathway to the original limb being activated. However, it was subsequently discovered that the phenomenon occurs even when the spinal chord is severed, suggesting that it is rather a question of brain activity, part of a neurosignature through which the brain indicates the body is one’s own. More recent resarch suggests involvement not only of the sensory systems but also the parietal cortex and the limbic system, which is concerned with emotion and motivation.


Author(s):  
Bettina Bläsing

This chapter is based on the view that dancing can promote positive feelings and energy. Even watching others dancing—on stage, in a movie, or in a club—can improve feelings of wellbeing. With reference to relevant literature, it explores how the brain links action with perception, and how technical challenges are resolved in investigating brain activity in dance observers. Early studies using neuroimaging techniques are discussed, and comparisons are drawn with recent studies in neuroaesthetics. Findings from these studies suggest that brain scientists can learn from dancers and dance spectators about action–perception coupling and the integration of movement, cognition, and emotion. Conclusions are drawn regarding how dancing, and dance viewing, stimulates the parts of our brains that are involved in whole-body motor action as well as social, communicative, and creative tasks, and can elicit positive emotional reactions, contributing to wellbeing. Implications are discussed for choreography, dance training, education, and rehabilitation.


1912 ◽  
Vol 58 (242) ◽  
pp. 465-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivy Mackenzie

In bringing forward some evidence which would point to the biological course followed by some forms of nervous disease to be considered, I would first of all accept as a working hypothesis two generalisations which apply to all forms of disease. The first of these generalisations is that there is essentially no difference in kind between a physiological and a pathological process. The distinction is an arbitrary one; the course of disease is distinguished from that of health only in so far as it tends to compromise the continuation of a more or less perfect adaptation between the organism and its surroundings. There is no tendency in Nature either to kill or to cure; she is absolutely impartial as to the result of a conflict between organisms and a host; and it is a matter of complete indifference to her as to whether toxins are eliminated or not. In the same way diseases of the mind are the manifestation of a perfectly natural relation of the organism, such as it is, to the environment. If the mental processes are abnormal, it goes without saying that the brain must be acting abnormally whether the stimuli to abnormal action originate in the brain itself or in some other part of the body. For example, if a child with pneumonia be suffering from delirium and hallucinations, as is not infrequently the case, this must be considered a perfectly natural outcome of the relation of the brain to its environmental stimuli outside and inside the organism. The actual stimuli may originate in the intestine from masses of undigested food and the stimuli may play on the brain rendered hypersensitive by the toxins from the lungs; the process and its manifestations, as well as the final outcome, are matters in which nature plays an impartial part. It cannot be admitted that there is any form of nervous disease which does not come under this generalisation. It has been argued by some authorities that because insidious forms of insanity are marked only by the slightest variation from the normal course of mental life, and that because the mental abnormalities are only modifications, and often easily explainable modifications, of normal mental processes, that the so-called insanity originates in these processes, and not in the material substratum of the organism. The fallacy of such an interpretation is obvious; it is tantamount to saying that slight albuminuria is the cause underlying early disease of the kidneys, or that a slight ódema may have something to do with the origin of circulatory disease. It is only natural that in the milder forms of mental disease the abnormal manifestations of brain activity should resemble normal mental processes; and even in the most advanced forms of mental disease there must be a close resemblance between abnormal ideation and conduct and perfectly normal ideation and behaviour. Even in advanced cases of Bright's disease the urinary elimination is more normal than abnormal; the abnormal constituents do not differ so much in kind as in degree from those of urine from healthy kidneys. It is not to be expected that in kidney disease bile or some other substance foreign to the organ would be the chief constituent of the eliminated fluid. The signs of insanity in any given case are the natural products of normal brain action mingled with the products of abnormal action. This does not, of course, preclude the possibility that under certain circumstances these abnormal products, such as delusions, hallucinations and perverted conduct, may not themselves be the direct stimuli to further abnormalities. The suicidal character of pathological processes is well seen in other organs of the body. A diseased heart, for example, is its own worst enemy; it not only fails to supply sufficient nutrition to the rest of the organism, but it starves itself by its inability to contract and expand properly, thereby increasing its own weakness. In the same way, certain phenomena of abnormal brain processes are in all probability due to the recoil on the brain of its own abnormal products in the matter of ideation and conduct.


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