scholarly journals Exclusive Distribution and Non-Compete Clause in Trade: Transnational Agreements in European Union and United States

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 141
Author(s):  
Noona Hanni
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
The Us ◽  
Dominant Market Position ◽  
Eu And Us ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Block Exemption

Exclusive distribution agreements are commonly used in both European Union (EU) and United States (US) markets to ensure the efficient distribution of products and services. This article compares the competition legislation in the EU and US and focuses on the differences in the treatment of vertical agreements. This topic is addressed also from an economic perspective and focuses on the possible abuse of dominant market position by international multisectoral companies. This article focuses on the following legal and economic questions: how do competition legislations regulating vertical agreements differ in EU and US and, what kind of possible effects do transnational exclusive distribution agreements have on international trade and competition. In EU law exclusive distribution agreements, even those which include a non-compete obligation limited to five years, are considered as lawful restrictions on competition as long as they fulfil certain criteria listed in the Block Exemption Regulation. EU competition law recognizes the terms of block exemption and ‘safe haven’, whereas the US antitrust law does not regulate any exemptions to vertical restraints. Vertical restraints are interpreted in the US common law of antitrust in the light of the principle of Rule of Reason. An important difference in these jurisdictions is the definition of relevant markets, which is taken into consideration when evaluating the legality of a vertical agreement under competition law. Both jurisdictions emphasize the market power of the producer, but the allowed percentage of market share varies between EU and US and only EU legislation gives emphasis to the market power of the distributor. These differences in competition legislations regulating vertical agreements can lead to conflicts when interpreting the legality of a distribution agreement. The definition of relevant product markets might lead to big international multisectoral companies abusing their dominant position by entering into exclusive arrangements.

A Giant Problem: The Influence of the Chicago School on Australian Competition Law, Economic Dynamism and Inequality

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 696-714 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Triggs ◽  
Andrew Leigh
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Chicago School ◽  
The United States ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Competitive Process ◽  
Growing Body

Australia has a competition problem: there is not enough of it. Our industries are concentrated. Our markets show signs of weak competition. The way Australia’s courts, parliamentarians and regulators think about competition is partly to blame. Although it has been less influential in Australia than in the United States, the Chicago School’s views on competition have shaped our laws, policies and enforcement practices. The Chicago School views market concentration as a virtue more than a vice. The School contended that barriers to entry are negligible, market power is temporary, most mergers are good, vertical restraints and predatory pricing are either benign or efficient. The growing body of research and experience, however, shows that the Chicago School’s faith in the ability of markets to self-correct and deliver competitive outcomes was misplaced. There is a strong progressive case for repositioning how we think about competition. Focusing more on the competitive process, the structure of markets and the incentives those structures create for firms will play an important role in reducing inequality.

scholarly journals The Trend of Scientific Productivity of Chinese, EuropeanUnion, and United States Universities and Private Companies: Does the Future Belong to E-Technology Companies?

Publications ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
Mauro G. Carta ◽  
Matthias C. Angermeyer ◽  
Silvano Tagliagambe
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Scientific Productivity ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Private Companies ◽  
American Universities ◽  
The Us ◽  
Parametric Statistics ◽  
The Eu

The purpose is to verify trends of scientific production from 2010 to 2020, considering the best universities of the United States, China, the European Union (EU), and private companies. The top 30 universities in 2020 in China, the EU, and the US and private companies were selected from the SCImago institutions ranking (SIR). The positions in 2020, 2015, and 2010 in SIR and three sub-indicators were analyzed by means of non-parametric statistics, taking into consideration the effect of time and group on rankings. American and European Union universities have lost positions to Chinese universities and even more to private companies, which have improved. In 2020, private companies have surpassed all other groups considering Innovation as a sub-indicator. The loss of leadership of European and partly American universities mainly concerns research linked to the production of patents. This can lead to future risks of monopoly that may elude public control and cause a possible loss of importance of research not linked to innovation.

Germany's relations with the United States and China from a strategic triangle perspective

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Biba
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Power ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Bilateral Relations ◽  
Puzzle Piece ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World ◽  
Angela Merkel

Abstract As the Sino-American Great Power competition continues to intensify, newly-elected US President Joe Biden's administration now seeks to enlist the support of its allies and partners around the world. As Europe's largest economy and a, if not the, leading voice within the European Union, Germany represents an important puzzle-piece for Biden. But Germany, at least under outgoing chancellor Angela Merkel, has been reluctant to take sides. It is against this backdrop that this article looks into Germany's past and present trilateral relationships with the US and China through the theoretical lens of the so-called strategic triangle approach. Applying this approach, the article seeks to trace and explain German behaviour, as well as to elucidate the opportunities and pitfalls that have come with it. The article demonstrates that Germany's recently gained position as a ‘pivot’ (two positive bilateral relationships) between the US and Chinese ‘wings’ (positive bilateral relations with Germany and negative bilateral relations with each other) is desirable from the perspective of the strategic triangle. At the same time, being pivot is also challenging and hard to maintain. Alternative options, such as entering a US–German ‘marriage’ directed against China, are also problematic. The article therefore concludes that Germany has tough decisions to take going forward.

17. Competition Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 717-778
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Third ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Eu

This chapter assesses the EU competition law on private undertakings. The relevant Treaty section is here built upon three pillars. The first pillar deals with anticompetitive cartels and can be found in Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The second pillar concerns situations where a dominant undertaking abuses its market power and is found in Article 102. The third pillar is unfortunately invisible, for when the Treaties were concluded, they did not mention the control of mergers. This constitutional gap has never been closed by later Treaty amendments, yet it has received a legislative filling in the form of the EU Merger Regulation.

Precaution, Proportionality, and Cost/Benefit Analysis: False Analogies

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Rose–Ackerman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Precautionary Principle ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
The United States ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
The Us ◽  
Proportionality Principle

The Politics of Precaution by David Vogel, and the edited volume, The Reality of Precaution each compare the United States with Europe over a range of regulatory areas. Vogel claims that the US and Europe changed places in recent years with Europe becoming more precautionary than the US. The edited volume covers a wider range of topics and finds that the results are mixed. The evidence of diversity in the edited volume appears convincing, but this essay argues that both volumes too narrowly focus on the precautionary principle. Rather it argues for a broader context that confronts precaution both with the proportionality principle, which is a mainstay of European Union law, and with the limitations of cost/benefit analysis and Impact Assessment. It unpacks the normative underpinnings of these concepts to suggest a broader frame for policy analysis.

scholarly journals Market Power Abuse in EU And UK: A Review of Consumer Detriment Issues

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 27-46
Author(s):  
Afroza Bilkis ◽  
Supravat Halder
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Active Participation ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Fair Competition ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Status

When a dominant company exploits its market power and that harms fair competition in the marketplace, average consumers remain in the most vulnerable condition having vital influence on but no active participation in the functioning of the market. The actions of a business that has market power can have serious effects on the operation of a market. An undertaking in a dominant position may use its market power in several ways, the most common being exploiting consumers by artificial scarcity and increasing prices. Moreover, there may be diverse interpretation as to the nature of an undertaking while considering market power abuse cases for the purposes of European Union (EU) Competition law. It is significant to consider the status of consumers in a market to see if dominant entities are abusing their powers and therefore test the level of commercialization.Northern University Journal of Law Vol.IV 2013; p.27-46

scholarly journals Food safety and food imports in Europe: the risk of aflatoxins in pistachios

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Xiong
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Food Safety ◽  
The United States ◽  
Aflatoxin Contamination ◽  
Income Effect ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Food Imports

The United States has surpassed Iran as the largest pistachio exporter to the European Union. Both lower prices and a less frequency of aflatoxin contamination have contributed to the success of the US pistachio industry. Using EU monthly imports and food safety alerts data, we estimate EU demand for US and Iranian pistachios. We find that EU demand for US pistachios is price-inelastic but the demand for Iranian pistachios is price-elastic. We also find that the income effect is positive for US nuts but negative for Iranian nuts. Most importantly, we find that EU imports of US pistachios decrease with aflatoxin alerts traced back to the US but increase with contamination incidents originated from Iran.

European ‘Citizenship’: In its Own Right and in Comparison with the United States

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 357-394
Author(s):  
Thomas C Fischer
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fourteenth Amendment ◽  
The State ◽  
European Citizenship ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Constitution

The fourteenth amendment to the US Constitution, adopted in 1868, provides in relevant part: ‘All persons born or naturalised in the United States … are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.’ A similar passage in the Treaty of European Union (TEU or Maastricht), Article 8 (now Article 17(1)), declared: ‘Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.’

scholarly journals WTO Negotiations on Market Access in Agriculture: a Comparison of Alternative Tariff Cut Proposals for the EU and the US

2004 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Christophe Bureau ◽  
Luca Salvatici
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Market Access ◽  
The United States ◽  
Import Demand ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Agricultural Commodity ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Eu

Abstract This paper provides a summary measure of the possible new commitments in the area of agricultural market access undertaken by the European Union and the United States, using the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) as the tariff aggregator. We take the 2001 bound tariffs as the starting point and attempt to assess how much liberalization in agriculture could be achieved in the European Union and the United States as a result of the present negotiations. We compute the index for 20 agricultural commodity aggregates under the actual commitments assuming a specific functional form for import demand. We compare the present levels of the TRI with three hypothetical cases: a repetition of the same set of tariff cuts commitments of the Uruguay Round according to a EU proposal prior to the 2003 WTO ministerial meeting, a uniform 36% reduction of each tariff, an harmonization ( "Swiss" ) formula based on the initial US proposal.

scholarly journals The Approach to Safety of Children’s Toys in United States and European Union: A Comparative Study

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 126
Author(s):  
Rahmah Ismail ◽  
Wan Amir Azlan Wan Haniff ◽  
Suzanna Mohamed Isa ◽  
Rozlinda Mohamed Fadzil ◽  
Syed Sagoff AlSagoff ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Product Recalls ◽  
Scientific Database ◽  
Safety Standards ◽  
The Us ◽  
European Standards ◽  
American Society

Following the ‘Year of Recall’ in 2007 which saw greatest number of children’s toys product recalls from United States of America (US) and European Union (EU) markets, both regions instituted new legislations governing children’s products: the US Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA 2008) and EU 2009 Toy Safety Directive. This article analyses the approaches to safety of toys adopted in US and EU in light of the potential for cross-jurisdictional use of the framework. This qualitative research utilizes secondary data gained from scientific database analysis and library research, including documents and precedents on toys safety. These data were analyzed by using legal interpretation and comparative assessment. The study finds key features of each jurisdiction as well as notable similarities and differences in terms of regulations, safety standards used such as International Organization for Standardization (ISO 8124); The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM F963); and European Standards (EN 71). Further, two competing systems, each with its own reigning global governor namely, Third-Party Assessor (3PA) supported by the US and Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity System (SDOC) adopted by the EU, were assessed. When both systems were put into an evaluation, the extra third-party inspection for issuing certificate on the product based on 3PA enable to provide important protection to consumers over the SDOC system.

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