scholarly journals Establishment And Enforcement of Sovereignty in Hoang Sa And Truong Sa Areas of The State of Vietnam From After The Patenotre Convention (1884) to the Event of April 30, 1975

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nguyen Ba Dien

The article summarizes the establishment and implementation of sovereignty over the two areas (archipelagoes) of Hoang Sa and Truong Sa by the State of Vietnam through the operation of the French colonial government - representing Vietnam simultaneously with activities the sovereignty exercise of the dynasties and government of Vietnam in important historical period: from the Patonot Treaty to April 30, 1975. The article affirms: the state of Vietnam, through during the periods, the two regions of islands (archipelagoes), Hoang Sa and Truong Sa, were actually, publicly and continuously occupied. Hoang Sa and Truong Sa have never been in Chinese territory. The Chinese occupation of the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa islands of Vietnam is a serious violation of international law, constituting an international crime, is worthless. Keywords: State of Vietnam, sovereignty enforcement, France, China, Paracel Islands, Truong Sa. References: [1] Hiệp ước Patenotre, https://ia802604.us.archive.org/19/items/laffairedutonkin00dipluoft/laffairedutonkin00dipluoft.pdf[2] Nguyễn Bá Diến, Yêu sách “đường lưỡi bò” phi lý của Trung Quốc và chủ quyền của Việt Nam trên Biển Đông, Sách chuyên khảo, NXB thông tin và Truyền thông, 2015, tr. 308-312[3] http://ict-hcm.gov.vn/tin-tuc;jsessionid=B6AAE49F8545508B4C9B92B452F8564C?chu-quyen-hoang-sa-va-truong-sa-cua-viet-nam-thoi-phap-thuoc&post=MTMg2ODA2OTk1NQ[4] Chemillier-Gendreau, Monique (2000) (Bản gốc tiếng Pháp 1996], Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands (Chủ quyền đối với quần đảo Hoàng Sa và Trường Sa), Springer, ISBN 978-9041113818, [5] Journal Officiel de l'Indochine 25 Septempre 1933, trang 7784.[6] Chemillier-Gendreau, Monique (2000) [Bản gốc tiếng Pháp 1996], Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands [Chủ quyền đối với quần đảo Hoàng Sa và Trường Sa], Springer, ISBN 978-9041113818, tr. 46[7] “White Paper on the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands (1975). Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Republic of Vietnam. Truy cập ngày 7/9/2012. Lưu trữ bởi WebCite®http://www.webcitation.org/6BiTGZQB).[8] Trần Đăng Đại (1975), “Các văn kiện chính thức xác nhận chủ quyền Việt Nam trên hai quần đảo Hoàng Sa và Trường Sa từ thời Pháp thuộc tới nay”, Tập san Sử Địa, 29 (Sài Gòn: Nhà in Văn Hữu)[9] “Quần đảo Trường Sa thuộc tỉnh Bà Rịa (1933)”. Trang thông tin điện tử về Biên giới lãnh thổ. Truy cập ngày 15 tháng 8 năm 2012. Lưu trữ bởi WebCite® vào ngày 13 tháng 11 năm 2012 (http://www.webcitation.org/6BiTGZQB)[10] https://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quần đảo Trường Sa[11] Hiệp ước San Francisco, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20136/volume-136-I-1832-English.pdf[12] Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Paper: The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran 1943, Washington D.C, United States, G.P.O, 1961, pp. 448-449; Lazar Focsaneanu: “Các hiệp ước hòa bình của Nhật Bản”, Niên giám luật quốc tế của Pháp, 1960, tr. 256.[13] Review of International Situation, China Publishing Co, Taipei 1956, pp 22-23.[14] The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943, The Foreign Relations of the United States, Washington D.C, 1961.[15] Monique Chemillier- Gendreau, Chủ quyền trên hai quần đảo Hoàng Sa và Trường Sa, NXB. Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội-1998, tr.136.[16] Công văn N 5454 của Cao ủy Pháp tại Đông Dương gửi Paris, ngày 3.6.1946. Lưu trữ Bộ Ngoại giao Pháp, AO 44 - 45, Hồ sơ 214 ( Tiếng Pháp), tr.1.[17] J.P. Ferrier, “Tranh chấp các đảo Hoàng Sa và vấn đề chủ quyền trên các đảo không người ở” ( Tiếng Pháp). Niên giám của Pháp về luật quốc tế, 1975, tr.191[18] Heinzig Dieter, Các đảo tranh chấp trên biển Nam Trung Hoa,Wesbaden, Otto Harrassowith và Viện các vấn đề châu Á ở Hamburg, 1976, tr.35.[19] Nguyễn Quang Ngọc, Chủ quyền của Việt Nam ở Hoàng Sa, Trường Sa tư liệu và sự thật lịch sử, NXB Đại học Quốc gia Hà Nội, 2017, tr. 299[20] https://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quần đảo Trường Sa[21] Nguyễn, Nhã (2002), Quá trình xác lập chủ quyền của Việt Nam tại quần đảo Hoàng Sa và Trường Sa (Luận án tiến sĩ), Trường Đại học Khoa học Xã hội và Nhân văn (Đại học Quốc gia Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh), tr. 109[22] Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Peace Treaty with Japan, U. N. Treaty Series, Volume 136, p. 46.[23] Decree no.174-NV from the presidency of Ngô Đình Diệm, Republic of Vietnam (VNCH), redistricting the Paracel Islands as part of Quảng Nam Province effective 07-13-1961. Paracels were previously part of Thừa Thiên (Huế) Province since 03-30-1938, when redistricted by the government of French Indochina. Decree dated 07-13-61.[24] “Một số văn kiện xác nhận chủ quyền của Việt Nam trên hai quần đảo Hoàng Sa và Trường Sa từ thời Pháp thuộc đến trước 30/4/1975 - Kì 3”. Cục Thông tin Đối ngoại (Việt Nam) , 16 tháng 4 năm 2012. Truy cập ngày 31 tháng 10 năm 2012. Lưu trữ bởi WebCite® tại http://www.webcitation.org/6BiTGZQB.[25] Tuyên cáo của Bộ Ngoại Giao Việt Nam Cộng hòa về hành động gây hấn của Trung Cộng (19.1.1974) http://www.nguyenthaihocfoundation.org/lichsuVN/tuyenbo_vnch.htm[26] Tuyên bố của Chính phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa ngày 14 tháng 02 năm 1974). Nguồn: http://www.nguyenthaihocfoundation.org/lichsuVN/tuyenbo_vnch.htm [27] White Paper on the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands, Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Saigon, 1975, http://nguyenthaihocfoundation.org/lichsuVN/hsts1.htm.    

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-95
Author(s):  
Priscilla Roberts

During the 1980s, an interlocking complex of U.S. non-governmental organizations (the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Asia Society, and the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations) gradually built up contacts with Chinese elites. By mid-decade, the National Committee and the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs began a series of “U.S.-China Dialogues” in which influential figures from both sides met alternately in Beijing and the United States, supposedly informally, to discuss the state of Sino-American relations. Though the outcome of the protests at Tiananmen in June 1989 shocked them, American China-watchers consciously decided that contacts and efforts at communication and understanding must continue. At the Fourth U.S.-China Dialogue meeting in Beijing in early 1990, the American and Chinese participants assumed radically different positions, with the Chinese complaining bitterly about U.S. interference in China’s internal affairs. However, as the meeting ended, both sides agreed that, while there had been little agreement, such contacts and dialogues were valuable and must continue.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 242-243

There is given below a brief general statement of the type of treaty envisioned by the United States Government as proper to end the state of war with Japan. It is stressed that this statement is only suggestive and tentative, and does not commit the United States Government to the detailed content or wording of any future draft. It is expected that after there has been an opportunity to study this outline, there will be a series of informal discussions designed to elaborate on it and make clear any points which may be obscure at first glance.


1944 ◽  
Vol 38 (5) ◽  
pp. 913-930 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter H. C. Laves ◽  
Francis O. Wilcox

Looking at the post-war period, it seems obvious that the government of the United States will give more attention to foreign affairs than it has in any comparable period of American history. How can the machinery for conducting foreign relations best be organized to meet these increasing responsibilities?The conduct of foreign relations in the modern world is no simple matter. Technical experts, intelligence systems, ability to negotiate, national political stability, a large and loyal staff of public servants—these are but some of the national requisites for effective participation in world affairs. The mobilization and organization of the best staff resources in the country, the negotiation of national policies, and then of international agreements, constitute a formidable task under any system of government.The conduct of foreign relations is, of course, easiest in a completely authoritarian state. It is made immeasurably more difficult by any division of authority. In most non-authoritarian governments, some division of authority has been found desirable, even at the expense of occasional awkwardness of procedure, because thereby the dangers of usurpation of power are minimized. The United States has gone farther than any democratic country in dividing responsibility in foreign affairs. Not only is there the usual distinction between legislative and executive authority, but the independence of the two branches has been so far underlined that the achievement of over-all government policies (as distinct from legislative and executive policies) is extremely difficult unless the party relationships are just right between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.


1966 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 268-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Detlev F. Vagts

For 167 years the shadow of the Logan Act has fallen upon those Americans who trespass on the Federal monopoly of international negotiations which it creates. In theory, up to three years’ imprisonment and a $5,000 fine await those Americans who, without authority, communicate with a foreign government intending either (a) to influence that government with respect to a controversy with the United States or (b) to defeat the measures of the United States. Though only one indictment and no trial have taken place under the Act, who can tell when a new Administration, thinner skinned or harder pressed than its predecessors, may in its irritation call into play this sleeping giant? Now, at a time when domestic opposition to certain aspects of our foreign policy has reached a pitch unknown for many years, it would be well to reflect upon this curious product of the confluence of criminal law and foreign relations law before we are in fact confronted by a test of its strength. All could be the losers from an unpremeditated encounter—the defendant by finding himself, perhaps to his very great surprise, the first person subjected to the Act’s severe criminal penalties, the Government by finding itself stripped of its long accustomed protection by a ruling that the statute as it now reads is unconstitutionally vague or restrictive of free speech. Despite its long desuetude as a criminal statute, the Act represents a principle which I cannot help but think is, at its core, a salutary one; that America in sensitive dealings with other governments “speaks with one voice.” It embodies the concept of bipartisanship, that quarrels about foreign relations are fought out domestically and not with the adversary. It deters sometimes very ill-advised attempts to take the conduct of foreign affairs into foolish and unauthorized hands. On the other hand, it cuts into freedoms which we regard as having the highest value, and many of the situations in which its use has been suggested clearly involve no danger that would justify such a restraint.


2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 223-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW JOHNSTONE

The eve of World War II saw the development of direct connections between public relations experts and issues of foreign affairs in the United States. Public relations professionals assisted both internationalists and noninterventionists to spread their arguments across the nation, helping them to hone their messages, to organize, and to raise money. All of the main citizens’ organizations created during this period sought public relations assistance in the face of growing popular awareness of global events, and with an awareness of the need for public relations counsel in the face of an increasingly measurable concept of public opinion.


Author(s):  
Curtis A. Bradley

This chapter considers what is potentially encompassed by the term “foreign relations law,” and what it means to think about it as a distinct field of law that can be compared and contrasted across national jurisdictions. The term “foreign relations law” encompasses the domestic law of each nation that governs how that nation interacts with the rest of the world. Many issues of foreign relations law concern allocations of authority between political actors, such as the authority to represent the nation in diplomacy, to conclude and terminate international agreements, to recognize foreign governments and their territories, and to initiate or end the use of military force. But foreign relations law also encompasses issues relating to the role of the courts in transnational cases, such as whether certain issues are “nonjusticiable” and thus subject entirely to political branch determination, whether courts should take into account considerations of international comity when interpreting and applying domestic law, and whether and to what extent courts can apply international law directly to decide a particular case. The chapter describes the historical development of foreign relations law as a field of study within the United States and considers why it has not been treated as a field in many other countries. The chapter concludes by highlighting a central question for foreign relations law, which is the extent to which it should be treated differently than other types of domestic law—referred to in the United States as a debate over “foreign affairs exceptionalism.”


2020 ◽  
pp. 471-496
Author(s):  
Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov

This chapter assesses the formal constitutional framework of authorization of foreign deployments of uniformed personnel, both formed units and individual service members. The initial volume of the Fourth Restatement of Foreign Relations Law does not ponder general matters of separation of powers and specifically in the realm of foreign affairs and national security. Apparently, this discussion is left to subsequent installments. The Third Restatement briefly addressed the separation of powers in foreign relations, in particular referring to the “continuing controversy as to whether the President can deploy the forces of the United States on his own authority for foreign policy purposes short of war, and, if so, whether that authority is subject to Congressional control. Nor is it agreed to what extent Congress can control decisions of the President as Commander in Chief in the conduct of wars authorized by Congress.” The United States is not unique in that respect, and similar controversies, whether in law or in practice, may and do occur in other jurisdictions. This chapter offers a comparative perspective, drawing from experiences of the Russian Federation and its predecessor, the Soviet Union and its heirs.


1962 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 633-684 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard B. Bilder

As “house counsel” to the Department of State, the Office of the Legal Adviser exerts a major influence on the views and policies of the United States Government concerning matters of international law.


1909 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-162
Author(s):  
Gaillard Hunt

During the interval between the inauguration of the President and the formation of the Executive Departments, the old Departments performed such executive duties as were indispensable. On July 11, 1789, for example, “ by the hands of Mr. Jay,” Washington sent to the Senate for ratification a consular convention with France. On July 22 the Senate — Resolved, that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs under the former Congress be requested to peruse the said convention and to give his opinion how far he conceives the faith of the United States to be engaged, either by former agreed stipulations or negotiations entered into by our minister at the court of Versailles, to ratify in its present sense or form the convention now referred to the Senate.


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