scholarly journals Aviation in the development and defense of the Arctic during the 1920s: military plans, science, propaganda, and fiction

Author(s):  
Andrei Aleksandrovich Mikhailov ◽  
Anastasiya Aleksandrovna Fisheva

This article examines the competition for the Arctic territories between the polar regions that unfolded in the 1920s, which required active development of these lands involving airplanes and airships. At that point, of primary import was the layout of trans-Arctic airways and deployment of flight support facilities in the Arctic territories, with the accompanying use of aviation for ice reconnaissance and rescue expeditions. Special attention is given to the study of the Soviet and international experience in elaboration and implementation of programs on the military and economic development of northern territories. The topic of consistent development of the Arctic involving aviation and aerostatics is reflected not only in scientific and economic programs, but also in state propaganda, publicistic writing and literary works. The novelty of this research consists in the comprehensive approach towards the problems of involving aviation in the Soviet Union during the 1920s for the development of the Arctic, and simultaneously, building the military capacity of the state, and collective perception of the ideas of the development of Arctic territories and aviation. The conclusion is made that the processes of development of polar aviation and division of Arctic territories were the so-called catalyst for each other, which by the early 1930s allowed the Soviet Union to consolidate its position of in the Arctic. The authors’ special contribution lies in examination of various genres of the press as a particular group of sources that had an ideological influence upon public consciousness.

1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 693-708 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAFAEL REUVENY ◽  
ASEEM PRAKASH

The breakdown of the Soviet Union surprised most scholars of international relations, comparative politics, and Soviet politics. Existing explanations attribute the breakdown of the Soviet Union to the reformist leadership of Gorbachev, and/or to systemic factors. These explanations do not focus on the key contribution of the war in Afghanistan. This is surprising since many scholars view wars as key causal factors in empire breakdown and regime change. We argue that the war in Afghanistan was a key factor, though not the only cause, in the breakdown of the Soviet Union. The war impacted Soviet politics in four reinforcing ways: (1) Perception effects: it changed the perceptions of leaders about the efficacy of using the military to hold the empire together and to intervene in foreign countries; (2) Military effects: it discredited the Red Army, created cleavage between the party and the military, and demonstrated that the Red Army was not invincible, which emboldened the non Russian republics to push for independence; (3) Legitimacy effects: it provided non-Russians with a common cause to demand independence since they viewed this war as a Russian war fought by non Russians against Afghans; and (4) Participation effects: it created new forms of political participation, started to transform the press/media before glasnost, initiated the first shots of glasnost, and created a significant mass of war veterans (Afghansti) who formed new civil organizations weakening the political hegemony of the communist party.


2018 ◽  
pp. 406-422
Author(s):  
Elena V. Barysheva ◽  

This article studies radio broadcasts of celebratory demonstrations of workers in 1920-30s as a form of ideological influence on the public consciousness. Audio-culture, as a most wide-reaching and accessible form of mass media, had a significant impact on the audience from 1918 to 1920-30s. Radio played an important role in the solution of ideological tasks, rendering figurative and verbal influence on the masses in the Soviet Union. Explaining and spreading the changes that took place in the life and the politics of the nation, the radio created a unified space of communication. Running commentary as a communication had its rules and limitations, which had developed in the first decades of the Soviet power. Discourse stereotypes had in due course resulted in emergence of a ritualistic form of reporting similar to demonstrations and parades themselves. The genre developing, many clich?s and hackneyed phrase appeared that were to impress propaganda slogans and appeals on the listeners and to inspire emotions. Now these slogans were accessible to everyone, as reproducers were installed in the streets of cities and villages and pervaded communal flats. Event reporting intensified the emotional state of the audience, giving an impression of true popular enthusiasm. In radio reports from official festive events, message of the power inducing socio-political consolidation of the society was obvious. The research analyzes drafts of a radio program script on festive demonstration of November 7, 1939 stored in the Russian State Archive of Literature and Art (Yu. K. Olesha fond). The writer’s notes indicate that the preliminary censorship and self-censorship did not allow for improvisation.


1999 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 537-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vally Koubi

Because of the nature of modern weapons, significant innovations in arms technology have the potential to induce dramatic changes in the international distribution of power. Consider, for example, the “strategic defense initiative” (SDI), a program initiated by the United States in the early 1980s. Had the program been successfully completed, it might have led to a substantial devaluation of Soviet nuclear capabilities and put the United States in a very dominant position. It should not then come as a surprise that interstate rivalry, especially among super powers, often takes the form of a race for technological superiority. Mary Acland-Hood claims that although the United States and the Soviet Union together accounted for roughly half of the world's military expenditures in the early 1980s, their share of world military research and development (R&D) expenditures was about 80 percent. As further proof of the perceived importance of R&D, note that whereas the overall U.S. defense budget increased by 38 percent (from $225.1 billion to $311.6 billion in real terms) from 1981 to 1987, military R&D spending increased by 100 percent (from $20.97 billion to $41.96 billion). Moreover, before World War II military R&D absorbed on average less than 1 percent of the military expenditure of major powers, but since then it has grown to 11–13 percent. The emphasis on military technology is bound to become more pronounced in the future as R&D becomes the main arena for interstate competition.


Author(s):  
Amin Tarzi

Since its inception as a separate political entity in 1747, Afghanistan has been embroiled in almost perpetual warfare, but it has never been ruled directly by the military. From initial expansionist military campaigns to involvement in defensive, civil, and internal consolidation campaigns, the Afghan military until the mid-19th century remained mainly a combination of tribal forces and smaller organized units. The central government, however, could only gain tenuous monopoly over the use of violence throughout the country by the end of the 19th century. The military as well as Afghan society remained largely illiterate and generally isolated from the prevailing global political and ideological trends until the middle of the 20th century. Politicization of Afghanistan’s military began in very small numbers after World War II with Soviet-inspired communism gaining the largest foothold. Officers associated with the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan were instrumental in two successful coup d’états in the country. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, ending the country’s sovereignty and ushering a period of conflict that continues to the second decade of the 21st century in varying degrees. In 2001, the United States led an international invasion of the country, catalyzing efforts at reorganization of the smaller professional Afghan national defense forces that have remained largely apolitical and also the country’s most effective and trusted governmental institution.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-144
Author(s):  
Igor Yu. Kotin ◽  
Nina G. Krasnodembskaya ◽  
Elena S. Soboleva

The authors of this contribution analyze the circumstances and the history of a popular play that was staged in the Soviet Union in 1927-1928. Titled Jumah Masjid, this play was devoted to the anti-colonial movement in India. A manuscript of the play, not indicating its title and the name of its author, was found in the St. Petersburg Branch of the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences among the papers related to A.M. and L.A. Meerwarth, members of the First Russian Expedition to Ceylon and India (1914-1918). Later on, two copies of this play under the title The Jumah Masjid were found in the Russian Archive of Literature and Art and in the Museum of the Tovstonogov Grand Drama Theatre. The authors of this article use archival and published sources to analyze the reasons for writing and staging the play. They consider the image of India as portrayed by a Soviet playwright in conjunction with Indologists that served as consultants, and as seen by theater critics and by the audience (according to what the press reflected). Arguably, the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia in 1927 and the VI Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1928 encouraged writing and staging the play. The detailed picture of the anti-colonial struggle in India that the play offered suggests that professional Indologists were consulted. At the same time the play is critical of the non-violent opposition encouraged by Mahatma Gandhi as well as the Indian National Congress and its political wing known as the Swaraj Party. The research demonstrates that the author of the play was G.S. Venetsianov, and his Indologist consultants were Alexander and Liudmila Meerwarth.


Polar Record ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Summerhayes ◽  
Peter Beeching

In January-February 1939, a secret German expedition visited Dronning (or Queen) Maud Land, Antarctica, apparently with the intention inter alia of establishing a base there. Between 1943 and 1945 the British launched a secret wartime Antarctic operation, code-named Tabarin. Men from the Special Air Services Regiment (SAS), Britain's covert forces for operating behind the lines, appeared to be involved. In July and August 1945, after the German surrender, two U-boats arrived in Argentina. Had they been to Antarctica to land Nazi treasure or officials? In the southern summer of 1946–1947, the US Navy appeared to ‘invade’ Antarctica using a large force. The operation, code-named Highjump, was classified confidential. In 1958, three nuclear weapons were exploded in the region, as part of another classified US operation, code-named Argus. Given the initial lack of information about these various activities, it is not, perhaps, surprising that some people would connect them to produce a pattern in which governments would be accused of suppressing information about ‘what really happened’, and would use these pieces of information to construct a myth of a large German base existing in Antarctica and of allied efforts to destroy it. Using background knowledge of Antarctica and information concerning these activities that has been published since the early 1940s, it is demonstrated: that the two U-Boats could not have reached Antarctica; that there was no secret wartime German base in Dronning Maud Land; that SAS troops did not attack the alleged German base; that the SAS men in the region at the time had civilian jobs; that Operation Highjump was designed to train the US Navy for a possible war with the Soviet Union in the Arctic, and not to attack an alleged German base in Antarctica; and that Operation Argus took place over the ocean more than 2000 km north of Dronning Maud Land. Activities that were classified have subsequently been declassified and it is no longer difficult to separate fact from fancy, despite the fact that many find it attractive not to do so.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-70
Author(s):  
Ilia Valerievich Mametev

The article focuses on the problems of shadow economy, such as the illegal activity, as well as a legal activity hidden from the state control, which became an integral part of the life of the Soviet Union in the period of stagnation. The development of the shadow sector was connected, first of all, with the inability of the command-administrative system to take into account the demands of the population for certain goods and services. There have been examined prerequisites for the emergence of the shadow economy and the stages of its development in the society that built communism in the 1960s–1980s. The shadow economy contributed to the growth of corruption and criminalization, initiated the racket in the 1990s and significantly affected the public consciousness of the Soviet citizens and, later, the mentality of modern Russian society


Author(s):  
Jane Caplan

‘War’ focuses on German political and military strategies after the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, when Hitler could see the prize of unassailable continental dominance within reach. With Nazi power at its greatest extent in 1942, the chapter discusses the markedly different Nazi occupation regimes in the west and the east, and the turn towards defeat in 1943. Hitler’s insistence on unremitting resistance caused massive loss of life on the military and home fronts, brought to an end only with his suicide and with Germany’s official capitulation on 8 May.


2019 ◽  
pp. 35-56
Author(s):  
Elissa Bemporad

Chapter 2 explores the place that the claim of Jewish ritual murder held in interwar Soviet society. The Bolsheviks dealt a blow to the blood libel tradition by confronting aggressively the legacy of the Beilis Affair, and prosecuting those responsible for orchestrating the trial. But ritual murder accusations did not wane in Soviet society. In fact, there were numerous cases of criminal investigations of blood libels that involved investigative commissions, medical experts, the press, and the secret police. If for the Bolshevik state, the Beilis case remained the symbol of the tsarist corrupt system, written and oral references to Beilis echoed through the instances of blood libel in the Soviet Union and validated ritual murder. This chapter also examines the Jewish responses to the blood allegation, showing the assertiveness to denounce the ineptness of local authorities at bringing to justice those responsible for spreading the lie.


Worldview ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-9
Author(s):  
Steven Charnovitz

Little noticed by the press. United States trade policy is undergoing significant changes aimed at promoting the rights of workers in foreign countries—changes achieved through the use of both a carrot and a stick. The carrot, now being offered to the less-developed world, is dutyfree access to the U.S. market for qualifying products exported by countries that meet certain new criteria on bbor. The stick is a ban on imports made by forced labor— something the Reagan administration is under increasing pressure to invoke against the Soviet Union. While it is too early to gauge the success of such attempts at exercising economic leverage, they may yet become a milestone in the march of human rights.


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