scholarly journals Underestimating Lifespans? Why Longevity Risk Exists in Retirement Planning and Superannuation Policy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alison O'Connell

<p>The pace of increasing life expectancy in recent decades came as a surprise to demographers, as mortality rates unexpectedly improved at the oldest ages in developed countries. The most common policy response, although one not yet planned for New Zealand, is to increase eligibility age for the public pension. Given the complexity and uncertainty of processes driving mortality improvement, future lifespans cannot be known. However, it is questionable whether policy makers and individuals understand the extent of past and likely future lifespan increase. Available evidence suggests individuals tend to underestimate how long they may live. Population mortality forecasts are generally conservative and poorly explain longevity uncertainties. Longevity risk - the possibility that future lifespans will be longer than anticipated - threatens individuals' pre-retirement financial planning and public pension policy. This thesis examines the extent of longevity risk, its causes, significance and remedies, in these two domains, for New Zealand. The theoretical existence of longevity risk has been acknowledged, but has not been subject to critical analysis in New Zealand or elsewhere. Here, a unique generalisable methodology exploiting insights available from international mortality comparisons is designed, combining actuarial and demographic theory. After assessing the flaws in the time-dependent or period approach to measurement of life expectancy that are known in theory but underexplored in practice, the method emphasises the lifecourse or cohort approach. The three factors that determine longevity risk - plausible population lifespan prospects, the lifespan assumptions used by policy makers and individuals' subjective lifespan expectations - are identified and the relationships between them analysed for New Zealand. An interpretation of the consistency of New Zealand's past mortality trends and future projections with those of other British settler countries, supplemented by a review of the consequences of mortality variance within New Zealand, shows that plausible lifespans in New Zealand are likely to be higher than those in the official projections on which policy makers rely. The first survey to ask how long New Zealanders think they will live shows that collectively, New Zealanders are more likely to underestimate future lifespan than not, based on a variety of beliefs about mortality that are not consistent with the evidence on increasing lifespans. Longevity risk from underestimation of future lifespans is revealed in New Zealand policy making and in individual New Zealanders' retirement plans. The most likely cause is the repeated misuse of life expectancy indicators in an environment lacking public discourse about increasing longevity. A remedy would be switching from using flawed period life expectancy indicators to using cohort life expectancy or modal age at death. Using plausible estimates for future lifespans based on more optimistic estimates than the official projections most often referenced would be important but mitigate longevity risk to a lesser extent. A more extensive public debate than has been held so far about eligibility age for New Zealand's public pension would itself, if using appropriate indicators for future lifespans, provide an opportunity to address longevity risk.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alison O'Connell

<p>The pace of increasing life expectancy in recent decades came as a surprise to demographers, as mortality rates unexpectedly improved at the oldest ages in developed countries. The most common policy response, although one not yet planned for New Zealand, is to increase eligibility age for the public pension. Given the complexity and uncertainty of processes driving mortality improvement, future lifespans cannot be known. However, it is questionable whether policy makers and individuals understand the extent of past and likely future lifespan increase. Available evidence suggests individuals tend to underestimate how long they may live. Population mortality forecasts are generally conservative and poorly explain longevity uncertainties. Longevity risk - the possibility that future lifespans will be longer than anticipated - threatens individuals' pre-retirement financial planning and public pension policy. This thesis examines the extent of longevity risk, its causes, significance and remedies, in these two domains, for New Zealand. The theoretical existence of longevity risk has been acknowledged, but has not been subject to critical analysis in New Zealand or elsewhere. Here, a unique generalisable methodology exploiting insights available from international mortality comparisons is designed, combining actuarial and demographic theory. After assessing the flaws in the time-dependent or period approach to measurement of life expectancy that are known in theory but underexplored in practice, the method emphasises the lifecourse or cohort approach. The three factors that determine longevity risk - plausible population lifespan prospects, the lifespan assumptions used by policy makers and individuals' subjective lifespan expectations - are identified and the relationships between them analysed for New Zealand. An interpretation of the consistency of New Zealand's past mortality trends and future projections with those of other British settler countries, supplemented by a review of the consequences of mortality variance within New Zealand, shows that plausible lifespans in New Zealand are likely to be higher than those in the official projections on which policy makers rely. The first survey to ask how long New Zealanders think they will live shows that collectively, New Zealanders are more likely to underestimate future lifespan than not, based on a variety of beliefs about mortality that are not consistent with the evidence on increasing lifespans. Longevity risk from underestimation of future lifespans is revealed in New Zealand policy making and in individual New Zealanders' retirement plans. The most likely cause is the repeated misuse of life expectancy indicators in an environment lacking public discourse about increasing longevity. A remedy would be switching from using flawed period life expectancy indicators to using cohort life expectancy or modal age at death. Using plausible estimates for future lifespans based on more optimistic estimates than the official projections most often referenced would be important but mitigate longevity risk to a lesser extent. A more extensive public debate than has been held so far about eligibility age for New Zealand's public pension would itself, if using appropriate indicators for future lifespans, provide an opportunity to address longevity risk.</p>


Author(s):  
Ekaterina Kvasha ◽  
Tatiana Kharkova ◽  
Valeriy Yumaguzin

The article discusses long-term mortality trends (since 1956) from external causes of death in Russia. Russia has long lagged behind developed countries in this domain. The level of mortality from external causes of death remains high and its structure is still archaic with large contribution of homicides, alcohol poisoning and injuries of undetermined intent. Excess number of deaths from life tables of Russia and Western European countries is compared. It is shown that in Russia the greatest excess losses are associated with mortality from poisonings among both sexes, suicide among men and homicide among women. Mortality from external causes, along with mortality from diseases of the circulatory system, has had a significant impact on life expectancy. In general, over the period 1956-2012 the increase in mortality from external causes in the 15-64 age group reduced life expectancy by 2.6 years for males and 0.7 years for females. The decline, starting in 2003, of mortality from external causes of death has slightly reduced the gap between Russia and developed countries, bringing the current Russian level closer to those levels reached in Russia in the mid-1960s and 1980s. However, given the fluctuations of mortality from external causes, it is premature to say whether the current decline in mortality is robust.


2009 ◽  
Vol 15 (S1) ◽  
pp. 91-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison O'Connell ◽  
Kim Dunstan

ABSTRACTThe assumed rate of future mortality improvement has increased over three recent sets of the United Kingdom's national population projections. This optimism has not been so marked in countries which share ancestors with the U.K. population. New Zealand is one such country that provides a data-rich case example in which to investigate the portability of mortality trends.This paper compares mortality trends in New Zealand with those in England & Wales. Both countries seem to have a ‘golden cohort’ which enjoys faster improving mortality than people born before or after. The birth of the golden cohort in England & Wales coincided with cohort life expectancy there catching up with New Zealand's.We show that first generation migrants from the U.K. have better mortality than New Zealand born residents likely to have British ancestry. The advantage lasts into older ages, decades after migration. We hypothesise that migrants from the U.K.'s golden cohort brought with them an early life mortality improvement advantage, and additionally benefited from the healthier environment of New Zealand at middle to older ages. Further, given the recent strong mortality improvement in New Zealand, the U.K.'s assumptions for future mortality look relatively optimistic.


Stanovnistvo ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 41 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 93-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Goran Penev

Troubled historical events from the 1990s considerably influenced the latest demographic trends in Serbia (excluding Kosovo and Metohija). In the domain of mortality, these trends were reflected through the manifestation of many unfavorable changes. Such mortality changes in Serbia were relatively short-lived and considerably less pronounced than in most countries in transition, especially in comparison to some former Soviet republics. Taking into consideration the scale and duration of the general social crisis in Serbia, we could evaluate these aggravations as moderate. On the other hand, improvements of mortality trends that arose during the 1990s were considerably less pronounced than in other European countries, especially in comparison to improvements that were realized in some other countries in the second half of the 1990s. During the 1990s, the annual number of deaths as well as the crude death rates continued increasing. The crude death rate of 13.8 per 1000 in the year 2000 represents the maximum in the last 50 years. Consequently, at the end of the 20th century, Serbia (excluding Kosovo and Metohija) is above the European average according to crude mortality rates, and observed by countries, higher rates were registered only in a few former socialist countries. During the 1990s, significant changes in age-specific mortality rates were not realized. The relatively greatest decrease was in infant mortality rate (from 21.8 in 1991 to 11.7 per 1000 in 2001). Despite the unexpectedly favorable trends, Serbia is considerably behind many other European countries in which the infant mortality rate is reduced to a very low level (under 5 per 1000 live births). As for 1991 and 1992, and partly for 1993, a rapid increase of younger adult population deaths was noted. Such trends, though, did not cause considerable changes either in the total number of deaths or in the life expectancy. The mortality of older adult population (40-59) at the end of the observed decade is almost identical to the one at the beginning of the 1990s. The same trend was present in the old population (60 and over), although the mortality level of the elderly population decreased slowly (75-84) or stagnated (85+). Such a mortality trend of the old has been present in Serbia since the 1970s, which is opposed to the changes in many developed countries in which very significant results in lowering old-age mortality were achieved in the last decades. The mortality of the female population is lower in Serbia as well and the recent changes were mainly directed towards decreasing sex differences. The changes were considerably more favorable with the male population than with the female, especially when it comes to the older adult and old populations. Such trends represent a turnover in relation to the 1980s. In the year 2001 in Serbia, the life expectancy at birth for the male population was 69.7 years, and for the female population 75.1 years. In relation to 1991 the expectation of life at birth has been prolonged for both sexes (1.15 years for the men and 0.38 years for the women). Compared with the European average, the life expectancy in Serbia is 2.6 years lower for males and 5.3 years lower for females. Since the extended life expectancy from the nineties was considerably under the European average, the rank of Serbia on the European LE list was lowered. This primarily refers to the male population, while with as regards to the female population, Serbia is still in the group of 10 European countries with the shortest life expectancy at birth. No significant changes were noted in Serbia with as regards to deaths by cause. At the end of the observed period (1999-2001) the cause of death for over half of the deceased (56.1%) were the diseases of the circulatory system. In the same three-year period, neoplasm represented the cause of death for nearly every sixth person (17.6%). Similar percentages were recorded at the beginning of the period (1990-1992) as well. The next on the list of major causes of death were violent deaths, but their number was considerably lower (4.3%). Despite the armed NATO intervention lasting several months in 1999, the percentage of violent deaths remained at a low level, not only in relation to the beginning of the period (5.8%), but also in relation to the European average, and especially in relation to some former Soviet republics. The percentage of infectious and parasitic diseases was also very low (0.5%). This means that the worsening of conditions that influence the general epidemiological situation did not cause a considerable increase of deaths from this group of diseases, and also that the number of the infected and the number of deaths due to AIDS are low in Serbia. At the end of the twentieth century, the so-called symptoms and ill-defined conditions still represented a relatively large percentage (8.4%) of deaths by cause. It is, in relation to the state at the beginning of the period (6.2%), even increased, and considerably higher than in the most developed countries (about 1%). This points to the unsatisfactory quality of data on mortality, but also to the need to use the results of the analysis of mortality according to deaths by cause with caution.


2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael P Cameron ◽  
Matthew Roskruge

The population of New Zealand, along with those of other developed countries, is ageing rapidly. The rate of population ageing is unprecedented, with the number of New Zealanders aged 65 years and over projected to increase from 553,000 in 2009 to 1.07 million in 2031, and to 1.44 million in 2061 (Statistics New Zealand, 2010). Importantly, the ratio of those aged 65 years and over to those aged 15–64 is projected to increase from 0.19 (older people per person aged 15–64) in 2009 to 0.34 in 2031 and to 0.43 in 2061. This more than doubling of the ratio of older people to those in the prime working and income-earning ages represents a dramatic demographic shift which has implications for New Zealand.


Author(s):  
Peter Hoar

Kia ora and welcome to the second issue of BackStory. The members of the Backstory Editorial Team were gratified by the encouraging response to the first issue of the journal. We hope that our currentreaders enjoy our new issue and that it will bring others to share our interest in and enjoyment of the surprisingly varied backstories of New Zealand’s art, media, and design history. This issue takes in a wide variety of topics. Imogen Van Pierce explores the controversy around the Hundertwasser Art Centre and Wairau Māori Art Gallery to be developed in Whangarei. This project has generated debate about the role of the arts and civic architecture at both the local and national levels. This is about how much New Zealanders are prepared to invest in the arts. The value of the artist in New Zealand is also examined by Mark Stocker in his article about the sculptor Margaret Butler and the local reception of her work during the late 1930s. The cultural cringe has a long genealogy. New Zealand has been photographed since the 1840s. Alan Cocker analyses the many roles that photography played in the development of local tourism during the nineteenth century. These images challenged notions of the ‘real’ and the ‘artificial’ and how new technologies mediated the world of lived experience. Recorded sound was another such technology that changed how humans experienced the world. The rise of recorded sound from the 1890s affected lives in many ways and Lewis Tennant’s contribution captures a significant tipping point in this medium’s history in New Zealand as the transition from analogue to digital sound transformed social, commercial and acoustic worlds. The New Zealand Woman’s Weekly celebrates its 85th anniversary this year but when it was launched in 1932 it seemed tohave very little chance of success. Its rival, the Mirror, had dominated the local market since its launch in 1922. Gavin Ellis investigates the Depression-era context of the Woman’s Weekly and how its founders identified a gap in the market that the Mirror was failing to fill. The work of the photographer Marti Friedlander (1908-2016) is familiar to most New Zealanders. Friedlander’s 50 year career and huge range of subjects defy easy summary. She captured New Zealanders, their lives, and their surroundings across all social and cultural borders. In the journal’s profile commentary Linda Yang celebrates Freidlander’s remarkable life and work. Linda also discusses some recent images by Friedlander and connects these with themes present in the photographer’s work from the 1960s and 1970s. The Backstory editors hope that our readers enjoy this stimulating and varied collection of work that illuminate some not so well known aspects of New Zealand’s art, media, and design history. There are many such stories yet to be told and we look forward to bringing them to you.


Author(s):  
Liana MacDonald ◽  
Adreanne Ormond

Racism in the Aotearoa New Zealand media is the subject of scholarly debate that examines how Māori (Indigenous Peoples of New Zealand) are broadcast in a negative and demeaning light. Literature demonstrates evolving understandings of how the industry places Pākehā (New Zealanders primarily of European descent) interests at the heart of broadcasting. We offer new insights by arguing that the media industry propagates a racial discourse of silencing that sustains widespread ignorance of the ways that Pākehā sensibilities mediate society. We draw attention to a silencing discourse through one televised story in 2018. On-screen interactions reproduce and safeguard a harmonious narrative of settler–Indigenous relations that support ignorance and denial of the structuring force of colonisation, and the Television Code of Broadcasting Practice upholds colour-blind perceptions of discrimination and injustice through liberal rhetoric. These processes ensure that the media industry is complicit in racism and the ongoing oppression of Indigenous peoples.


Pathogens ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 191
Author(s):  
Lucia Rivas ◽  
Hugo Strydom ◽  
Shevaun Paine ◽  
Jing Wang ◽  
Jackie Wright

The rate of yersiniosis in New Zealand (NZ) is high compared with other developed countries, and rates have been increasing over recent years. Typically, >99% of human cases in NZ are attributed to Yersinia enterocolitica (YE), although in 2014, a large outbreak of 220 cases was caused by Yersinia pseudotuberculosis. Up until 2012, the most common NZ strain was YE biotype 4. The emergent strain since this time is YE biotype 2/3 serotype O:9. The pathogenic potential of some YE biotypes remains unclear. Most human cases of yersiniosis are considered sporadic without an identifiable source. Key restrictions in previous investigations included insufficient sensitivity for the isolation of Yersinia spp. from foods, although foodborne transmission is the most likely route of infection. In NZ, YE has been isolated from a variety of sick and healthy domestic and farm animals but the pathways from zoonotic reservoir to human remain unproven. Whole-genome sequencing provides unprecedented discriminatory power for typing Yersinia and is now being applied to NZ epidemiological investigations. A “One-Health” approach is necessary to elucidate the routes of transmission of Yersinia and consequently inform targeted interventions for the prevention and management of yersiniosis in NZ


1998 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Gordon

New Zealand English has evolved in the past 150 years, at a time when it is possible to find both written and spoken evidence of its development. This paper takes evidence gained from an analysis of written comments on early New Zealand English and compares this with data taken from an analysis of spoken New Zealand English obtained from recordings collected in the 1940s of old New Zealanders born in the 1850s-1890s — the period when the New Zealand accent was developing. By putting the written data beside the spoken data it is now possible to assess the accuracy of written records as a basis for the reconstruction of the earliest form of New Zealand English.


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