scholarly journals The Limits of Free Speech: Democratic Legitimacy in Canada and New Zealand

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alexander Winsley

<p>This paper explores the balancing act between freedom of expression and hate speech. It takes its cue from a recent dialogue between Ronald Dworkin and Jeremy Waldron concerning democratic legitimacy. This dialogue forms the conceptual starting point for the paper, and a detailed analysis of democratic principles will follow. Robert Post’s participatory theory of democracy is critiqued, and his recent conversion to democratic relativism is analysed. The operation of hate speech laws in Canada and New Zealand will both be assessed in order to see how both of these countries treat the issue of democratic legitimacy.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alexander Winsley

<p>This paper explores the balancing act between freedom of expression and hate speech. It takes its cue from a recent dialogue between Ronald Dworkin and Jeremy Waldron concerning democratic legitimacy. This dialogue forms the conceptual starting point for the paper, and a detailed analysis of democratic principles will follow. Robert Post’s participatory theory of democracy is critiqued, and his recent conversion to democratic relativism is analysed. The operation of hate speech laws in Canada and New Zealand will both be assessed in order to see how both of these countries treat the issue of democratic legitimacy.</p>


Politik ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sune Lægaard

The article considers the claim that absolute freedom of speech is a necessary precondition for democratic legitimacy based on a reconstruction of an argument o ered by Ronald Dworkin. e question is why free speech should be a precondition for democratic legitimacy and why it should be so extensive that hate speech laws limiting free speech should be rejected? e article accounts for the concepts of legitimacy and democracy, analyses the legitimacy argument for free speech, and discusses a number of problems with it. 


Author(s):  
Anushka Singh

On 1 February 2017 at the University of California, Berkeley, USA, mob violence erupted on campus with 1,500 protesters demanding the cancellation of a public lecture by Milo Yiannopoulos, a British author notorious for his alleged racist and anti-Islamic views.1 Consequently, the event was cancelled triggering a chain of reactions on the desirability and limits of freedom of expression within American democracy. The Left-leaning intellectuals and politicians were accused of allowing the mob violence to become a riot on campus defending it in the name of protest against racism, fascism, and social injustice. In defending the rights of the protesters to not allow ‘illiberal’ or hate speech on campus, however, many claimed that the message conveyed was that only liberals had the right to free speech....


Author(s):  
Nicholas Hatzis

The experience of suffering offence relates to a constellation of unpleasant feelings stirred up when one’s expectations of being treated in a certain way are frustrated. This chapter explores how the nature of offence matters for the way the law responds to offensive conduct. Prohibiting speech which offends poses a special problem because it clashes with the free speech principle, i.e. the idea that there is something particularly important in being allowed to speak our minds, which sets free expression apart from a general liberty claim to choose a way of life. It is suggested that when deciding what should count as properly offensive for the purpose of exercising state coercion, only a very narrow definition of offensive speech is compatible with the values underlying freedom of expression. Then, offensive speech is distinguished from hate speech. As the two are morally different, it is inappropriate to borrow arguments from the hate speech debate to justify restrictions on offensive speech.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
László Vári

Az online kommunikációs tér kínálta lehetőségekkel, illetve annak egyre terjedő használatával felértékelődött a vélemény és a kifejezés szabadságának jelentősége, a mindennapok szóhasználatával pedig a szólás- és sajtószabadság szerepe. Nemcsak azért, mert a mobil világ kiváló, eddig nem ismert lehetőségeket hordoz magában a szabadságjog gyakorlásához, érvényesüléséhez, hanem mert a digitális korban újabb, eddig ismeretlen vagy kevésbé jelentős problémák is felerősödnek. A félrevezető és álhírek, a profilfelfüggesztés, a kommenttörlés, a rágalmazás, és a gyűlöletbeszéd még sokáig lehetne sorolni azokat a problémákat, melyek egytől egyig a kifejezés szabadságának jogszerűtlen gyakorlatára vezethetők vissza. Mindezek nemcsak egyéni, de társadalmi szinten is komoly veszélyt jelentenek, így befolyásolva a demokratikus társadalmakat és azok fejlődését. Éppen ezért válik jelentőssé az a kérdés, hogy hogyan lehet a szólásszabadság sérelmére visszavezethető problémákat kiküszöbölni, és az említett kihívásokra megoldást találni. A következő oldalakon a nemzetközi és európai jogból, azok magyarázataiból és az európai joggyakorlatból kiolvasható válaszokat gyűjtjük össze, hogy rávilágítsunk a jogsértések okaira, és európai megoldásokat keressünk azok orvoslására. --- Liberty with limitations, a European guide to the rightful exercise of the freedom of expression In the digital age, in line with the opportunities of cyberspace and the increasing use of mobile communication the importance of freedom of expression, the so-called free speech and freedom of the press have become more salient. Not only because they carry new opportunities for the practice and the prevalence of freedom, but because new challenges emerge alongside new opportunities. Misleading and fake news, profile suspensions, deleted comments, defamation, hate speech and many other problems, can all stem from the violation of the freedom of opinion and expression. These violations of freedom carry dangers both at an individual and sociatal level, thus influencing the everyday life of democratic societies and their development. Therefore, the question becomes crucial: how can we fix these problems and provide the best solution to these challenges. In the following we will explore international and European law, their explanations and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in order to find European explanations behind the reasons for violations, as well as legal solutions for exercising freedom of expression. Keywords: freedom of expression, international and regional freedom of expression law, European case-law, 3rd party liability, public watchdogs, misleading and fake news, defamation, hate speech, copyright


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Ceci ◽  
Wendy M. Williams

Recent protests on dozens of campuses have led to the cancellation of controversial talks, and violence has accompanied several of these protests. Psychological science provides an important lens through which to view, understand, and potentially reduce these conflicts. In this article, we frame opposing sides’ arguments within a long-standing corpus of psychological research on selective perception, confirmation bias, myside bias, illusion of understanding, blind-spot bias, groupthink/in-group bias, motivated skepticism, and naive realism. These concepts inform dueling claims: (a) the protestors’ violence was justified by a higher moral responsibility to prevent marginalized groups from being victimized by hate speech, versus (b) the students’ right to hear speakers was infringed upon. Psychological science cannot, however, be the sole arbiter of these campus debates; legal and philosophical considerations are also relevant. Thus, we augment psychological science with insights from these literatures to shed light on complexities associated with positions supporting free speech and those protesting hate speech. We conclude with a set of principles, most supported by empirical research, to inform university policies and help ensure vigorous freedom of expression within the context of an inclusive, diverse community.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (7) ◽  
pp. 2335-2338
Author(s):  
Agim Poshka

It is believed that language policies aim to organize, encourage but sometimes even discourage language rights. Although slowly states in the Balkans started to believe that language rights could be used as a tool for creation of social cohesion, there is one aspect of language practice that is ignored but seems to cause quite negative impact, and that is hate speech. This paper investigated modes in which this dangerous tool is harming inter-ethnic and inter-cultural stability in the region. It is a long term interest to the judicial system of every country to limit the negative impact that hate speech has to certain fragile societies. The study also reflects on particular laws that aim to expand the span of freedom of speech and minimize the presence of hate speech in public life. This derogatory behavior can ultimately produce hatred and in some cases even human sacrifices. A definition that is often available in literature regarding hate speech is that “hate speech is an abusive or threatening speech or writing that expresses prejudice against a particular group, especially on the basis of race, religion, or sexual orientation”. In other words the basic concept of using language for solely communicational purpose has switched to use language to insult, intimidate, or threaten a group or an individual and is primarily based on a particular characteristic or disability. In its violent history, Europe has witnessed a considerable number of cases of human rights violations, and recent ones often get the “prefix” of hate speech. Certain domains of public speaking undoubtedly require legal measures and few societies have already designed their legal framework in order to address the issue The conditions have become even more dramatic with the introduction of social media. There are thousands of pages and blogs in which hate speech is expressed publicly. In an article published by the legaldictionary.net it states that with the advent of social media, the issue of offensive and threatening speech has become a global problem”. There are many cases in which hate speech is used as an argument of free speech. The process becomes even more challenging when the officials are expected to draw a line between where free speech ends and hate speech begins. Certain domains of public speaking undoubtedly require legal measures and as a result few societies have designed legal framework in order to address the issue and this study provides different methods and approaches are considered in the process. The study also cites a number of international cases which aim to create a greater picture of these deleterious phenomena and although there are many elements of the ethical and moral dilemma in regards to the freedom of expression it is important that we are aware of the responsibility and the impact we have when using hate speech in any public appearances.


2020 ◽  
pp. 019145372093190
Author(s):  
Kristian Skagen Ekeli

The purpose of this article is to consider the question of whether democratic legitimacy requires viewpoint neutrality with regard to political speech – including extremist political speech, such as hate speech. The starting point of my discussion is Jeremy Waldron’s negative answer to this question. He argues that it is permissible for liberal democracies to ban certain extremist viewpoints – such as vituperative hate speech – because such viewpoint-based restrictions protect the dignity of persons and a social and moral environment of mutual respect. According to Waldron, well-drafted narrow hate speech bans are not democratically illegitimate, and they do not undermine systemic democratic legitimacy – that is, the legitimacy of a democratic political system. In contrast to Waldron, I will argue that democratic legitimacy requires viewpoint neutrality to respect persons as thinking agents. I will defend a civil libertarian doctrine of viewpoint neutrality, and this doctrine requires that citizens in liberal democracies ought to have a legal free speech right to do moral wrong – that is, a legal right to express and defend any political viewpoint or idea, even if it is morally wrong to express, or expose others to, such views. It will be argued that any viewpoint-based restriction on public discourse (including narrow hate speech bans) is democratically illegitimate, and that such restrictions undermine systemic democratic legitimacy.


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