Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa

2020 ◽  
pp. 55-76
Author(s):  
Sergey Ivanov

During the universal demographic transition, the traditional type of population reproduction, characterized by high mortality and high fertility, is transformed into a type of reproduction in which both components are at a low level. The demographic transition is not taking place in a social vacuum, but under the influence of many social factors, including the growth of education and economic development. Reducing child mortality is a sine qua non for changing reproductive behavior. Declines in mortality and fertility are usually separated by long periods when population growth is accelerating. The population explosion is fading away in most countries of Asia and Latin America because they have passed the main part of the demographic transition. In Africa, the decline in child mortality began later and is still in the incipient phase. As a result, fertility, although declining in recent decades in most countries, is declining slowly and remains high. The region as a whole is in the early stage of the demographic transition: the population is growing rapidly and it is not expected to stabilize until the end of the century. Most of the economic and social consequences of rapid population growth are negative. Their conceptualization takes place within the framework of the neo-Malthusian paradigm, which made it possible to substantiate demographic policy based on family planning programs that have proven their effectiveness in different regions of the world. The negative, and sometimes disastrous, consequences of rapid population growth are particularly pronounced in Africa. Anti-Malthusianism is less inclined towards scientific argumentation, and its main goal is not pragmatic solutions to problems, but ideological proclamations, although some anti-Malthusian concepts have positive potential. The concept of the demographic dividend, developed in recent decades, makes it possible to remove the contradictions between two opposing paradigms, since it shifts the emphasis from the negative consequences of rapid population growth to the positive consequences of changes in the population age structure during the demographic transition. The demographic transition in Africa needs to be accelerated, and policies are able to do this without relying on the impractical assumptions of fast economic growth. Three interrelated factors are critical: development of education, radical reduction in child mortality and strengthening of family planning programs.

Genus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Bongaarts

Abstract A common explanation for the high fertility prevailing in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is a widespread desire for large families. This situation poses a challenge to population policy-makers in the continent. If the desired family size is high, then presumably family planning programs can only have a limited effect on fertility because these programs aim to assist women in achieving their reproductive goals. But this conclusion is based on the assumption that family planning programs do not affect the desired family size, which is questionable and is investigated here. This study examines the determinants of trends wanted and unwanted fertility in SSA using fixed-effects regressions of country-level data. The dependent variables include the total fertility rate, and its wanted and unwanted components. Explanatory variables include a family planning program score and four socioeconomic variables (women’s educational attainment, child mortality, GNI per capita, and percent urban). Data come from 103 DHS surveys in 25 countries in SSA with at least two DHS surveys between 1989 and 2019. Women’s education and family planning programs are found to be the dominant determinants of fertility decline and their effects operate by reducing both wanted and unwanted fertility. The effects of education are not surprising but the finding that family planning programs can reduce wanted fertility implies that their impact can be larger than conventional wisdom suggests. Indeed, in a few poor countries, the implementation of high-quality programs has been associated with substantial declines in wanted fertility (e.g., Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda). The mechanism through which this effect operates is unclear but likely involves media programs that diffuse knowledge about the benefits of smaller families.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evert-jan Quak

This guidance note is about how donors, can support a demographic transition in sub- Saharan Africa. The demographic transition is the evolution from high to low mortality and fertility rates, with associated changes in age structures. Countries in sub-Saharan Africa are on a trajectory of rapid population growth. Mortality rates have been declining for some time while fertility rates started to fall later and at a slower pace, resulting in high population growth. It is estimated that the population of sub-Saharan Africa will double between 2020 and 2050 to 2.5 billion. This guidance note refers to support from donors to governments in partner countries in two ways. First, support to adapt to the implications of rapid population growth. Second, support to accelerate the demographic transition. Countries in sub- Saharan Africa need to be prepared for population growth and, importantly, also for a unique “window of opportunity” that occurs when fertility rates fall consistently and at a high pace during the demographic transition. With the right investments, these countries could generate economic opportunities for growth, which in the literature is called the “demographic dividend”.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Cleland

The future size of world population depends critically on what happens in sub-Saharan Africa, the one remaining region with high fertility and rapid population growth. The United Nations envisages a continuing slow pace of fertility change, from five births per woman today to three by mid-century, in which case the population of the region will increase by over one billion. However, an accelerated decline is feasible, particularly in east Africa. The main grounds for optimism include rising international concern and funding for family planning (after fifteen years of neglect), and favourable shifts in the attitudes of political leaders in Africa. The examples of Ethiopia and Rwanda show political will and efficient programmes can stimulate rapid reproductive change.


1995 ◽  
Vol 34 (4II) ◽  
pp. 563-578
Author(s):  
Abdul Hakim

Pakistan has been experiencing rapid population growth since the second half of this century. The growth rate accelerated after the 1950s as a result of the decline in mortality coupled with sustained high fertility. The area constituting Pakistan had a population of 16.6 million in 1901, 33.7 million in 1951, and 126 million in 1994 [Hakim (1994), p. 2]. Recognising the problem of rapid population growth, Pakistan has been trying to control it through different family planning strategies and approaches since the 1960s. However, various surveys indicate that the rate of success in family planning has not been encouraging. So far, the population welfare programme has achieved a sizeable recognition of the need for family planning but the actual use of family planning methods remains limited. The use of family planning methods in Pakistan is determined by various. factors and may vary between different segments of the population according to various socio-economic, cultural, and economic factors. It is also possible that a woman does not want more children but cannot use family planning methods because of seclusion or her subordinate position in the family [Hakim (1992)]. However, the desire for children is one of the main reasons considered in this connection.


Author(s):  
Neha Thakur ◽  
Nahid Zia Khan ◽  
Narendra Rai

Background: Barabanki one of the most populous districts of Uttar Pradesh with population growth rate being much higher than the national population growth rate. The objective of this study was to gain the knowledge about awareness and contraceptive practices in married women residing in Barabanki. To identify socio-demographic factors associated with unmet needs for contraceptionand also to ascertain the participation of husband in family planning.Methods: A cross sectional study was conducted in outpatient department of Obstetrics Gynecology and Department of Pediatrics in Medical college hospital in Barabanki. 144 females were enrolled in the study during the study period of one year. They were interviewed on the basis of a pre-structured proforma. Data obtained was then analyzed.Results: A total 144 women in the age group 18-45 years participated in the study of which 53% had knowledge of contraception. More than two thirds were not using any form of contraception. The most common method of contraception was barrier method followed by Depot medroxy progesterone acetate. Copper T was least used mode of contraception. The most common source of knowledge regarding contraception was from electronic media followed by friends and family. The most common reason behind the absence of contraception was lack of knowledge of contraception and husband disapproval.Conclusions: Poor knowledge of contraception led to decreased usage of contraceptive measures. Husband participation is virtually absent in family planning leading to high fertility. In order to make our family planning programs successful we must incorporate media for wider coverage to increase awareness and husbands for better implementation.


Africa ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Price

Within demography, high fertility in sub-Saharan Africa was considered until recently to reflect a demand for children firmly rooted in indigenous social institutions, which were resistant to external forces of change. On the basis of findings from recent Demographic and Health Surveys, Caldwell et al. (1992) suggest that many of the institutional supports for high fertility in sub-Saharan Africa—such as lineage-based descent systems, polygyny, bridewealth, extended kinship structures, child fostering, and communal land tenure—are being eroded. This article considers changes in the value of children among the Kikuyu of Central Province, Kenya, and the extent to which the social institutions which have traditionally supported high fertility have persisted. Fieldwork undertaken in two ethnically homogenous communities, one rural and one peri-urban, reveals significant variation in the fertility motives and value of children in the two communities. In the rural community many of the indigenous social supports for high fertility, although modified, cohere. In the context of economic insecurity and lack of access to land (especially for women without sons), manipulation of customary kinship and marriage practices (supported by the persistence of many indigenous religious beliefs and ideologies about fertility) has become strategically important for realising fertility desires. There is, however, unmet demand for modern contraception, due largely to lack of access to and the poor quality of family planning services. In contrast, in the peri-urban community, where access to family planning services is relatively good, there has been effective legitimation of fertility regulation and the use of modern contraception is widespread. There is markedly less economic insecurity: wage labour opportunities are available, and some women have successfully challenged male control over land. Consequently, there is reduced demand for children, although a number of the indigenous cultural supports for high : fertility retain residual importance.


Ultimately, the necessity to supply food, energy, habitat, infrastructure, and consumer goods for the ever-growing population is responsible for the demise of the environment. Remedial actions for pollution abatement, and further technological progress toward energy efficiency, development of new crops, and improvements in manufacturing processes may help to mitigate the severity of environmental deterioration. However, we can hardly hope for restoration of a clean environment, improvement in human health, and an end to poverty without arresting the continuous growth of the world population. According to the United Nations count, world population reached 6 billion in mid October 1999 (1). The rate of population growth and the fertility rates by continent, as well as in the United States and Canada, are presented in Table 14.1. It can be seen that the fastest population growth occurs in the poorest countries of the world. Despite the worldwide decrease in fertility rates between 1975–80 period and that of 1995–2000, the rate of population growth in most developing countries changed only slightly due to the demographic momentum, which means that because of the high fertility rates in the previous decades, the number of women of childbearing age had increased. Historically, the preference for large families in the developing nations was in part a result of either cultural or religious traditions. In some cases there were practical motivations, as children provided helping hands with farm chores and a security in old age. At present the situation is changing. A great majority of governments of the developing countries have recognized that no improvement of the living standard of their citizens will ever be possible without slowing the explosive population growth. By 1985, a total of 70 developing nations had either established national family planning programs, or provided support for such programs conducted by nongovernmental agencies; now only four of the world’s 170 countries limit access to family planning services. As result, 95% of the developing world population lives in countries supporting family planning. Consequently, the percentage of married couples using contraceptives increased from less than 10% in 1960 to 57% in 1997.


Author(s):  
Giovanni Andrea Cornia

This chapter reviews population trends over the last two hundred years and population projections to the end of this century. In 2100 the world population will have stabilized but its geographical distribution will have substantially changed compared to 2015. The chapter then discusses the five stages of the demographic transition, and different neo-Malthusian and non-Malthusian theories of the relation between population growth and economic development. It emphasizes in particular the effects of rapid population growth on land and resource availability, human capital formation, population quality, the accumulation of physical capital, employment, wages, and income inequality. The effects of rapid population growth rate over a given period were found to change in line with the population size and density at the beginning of the period considered.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Götmark ◽  
Malte Andersson

Abstract Background The world population is expected to increase greatly this century, aggravating current problems related to climate, health, food security, biodiversity, energy and other vital resources. Population growth depends strongly on total fertility rate (TFR), but the relative importance of factors that influence fertility needs more study. Methods We analyze recent levels of fertility in relation to five factors: education (mean school years for females), economy (Gross Domestic Product, GDP, per capita), religiosity, contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR), and strength of family planning programs. We compare six global regions: E Europe, W Europe and related countries, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Arab States, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia. In total, 141 countries are included in the analysis. We estimate the strength of relationships between TFR and the five factors by correlation or regression and present the results graphically. Results In decreasing order of strength, fertility (TFR) correlates negatively with education, CPR, and GDP per capita, and positively with religiosity. Europe deviates from other regions in several ways, e.g. TFR increases with education and decreases with religiosity in W Europe. TFR decreases with increasing strength of family planning programs in three regions, but only weakly so in a fourth, Sub-Saharan Africa (the two European regions lacked such programs). Most factors correlated with TFR are also correlated with each other. In particular, education correlates positively with GDP per capita but negatively with religiosity, which is also negatively related to contraception and GDP per capita. Conclusions These results help identify factors of likely importance for TFR in global regions and countries. More work is needed to establish causality and relative importance of the factors. Our novel quantitative analysis of TFR suggests that religiosity may counteract the ongoing decline of fertility in some regions and countries.


2015 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Lee

It was a different era when Gary Becker did his groundbreaking work on the economics of fertility, during the years from the late 1950 through the early 1990s. There was great concern then about the “population explosion” due to sustained high fertility in the developing world after mortality declined following World War II. In 1968, Paul Ehrlich published “The Population Bomb” predicting disaster and mass starvation due to rapid population growth: “The battle to feed all of humanity is over. In the 1970s, the world will undergo famines – hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death. . . .” Robert McNamara, then the President of the World Bank, in 1984 said “Short of thermonuclear war itself, population growth is the gravest issue the world faces over the decades immediately ahead. If we do not act, the problem will be solved by famine, riots, insurrection and war.”


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