Moulding South African Public Opinion on Economic Cooperation with Russia

Author(s):  
Boris Gorelik ◽  

A study of over 300 articles and opinion pieces in popular and academic publications in South Africa, issued in 2016–2021, shows that South African journalists and political scientists are sceptical of large state-sponsored economic projects involving Russian state companies. Statements by the Russian partners that the current economic initiatives uphold the tradition of Soviet assistance to the anti-apartheid movement are interpreted by critics of the South African government as demagoguery and exploitation of history. Such authors assert that Russian-South African state cooperation in business led to “dodgy deals” which were concluded in the interests of South African high officials as well as entrepreneurs associated with them. South African journalists and political scientists focus on internal political and economic problems, presenting Russian initiatives as an aggravating factor. Many leading members of the ANC and the EFF have spoken in favour of cooperation with Russian state companies. Such initiatives are also often supported by the Independent Media & News publications. Collaboration between Russian private companies and their local partners does not tend to raise objections from observers in that country. South Africans welcome joint ventures with Russian participation which not only create jobs and provide advanced training to their local personnel but also contribute to import substitution by establishing manufacturing facilities in South Africa. The previous failures have not discredited trade and economic cooperation with Russia. South Africans do not seem to be opposed to Russian economic initiatives, apart from major state projects which are often scrutinised by the media. A considerable number of South Africans view Russia as an alternative to the Western influence and favour economic collaboration between our countries.

Author(s):  
Boris M. Gorelik

In recent years, Russia has sought to establish itself as an important economic partner in South Africa for the first time. Russia has ‘image’ problems that have complicated its economic interaction with South Africa. The image of Russia in the collective consciousness of South Africans is formed primarily by local journalists, politicians and public figures. However, in South Africa, there are no popular publications and websites that consistently support the government’s efforts to strengthen trade and economic cooperation with Russia. South Africans see Russian initiatives as an alternative to the Western and Chinese influence on the local economy. For South Africans, their respect for Western values, achievements and culture is balanced by their rejection of the Western political and economic hegemony. Thus, South Africans see Russia as a potential counterbalance rather than a substitute for its Western partners. Apparently, most South Africans consider economic cooperation with Russia desirable. But the failed and controversial attempts by Russian state-owned companies to participate in important government projects have make the South African public wary of such efforts. The experience of Russian private companies shows that effective cooperation with South Africa is possible if Russian businesses are prepared to work there long and methodically, adapt to the local conditions and face stiff competition from Western and Chinese firms.


2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoon Jung Park

AbstractBased on the author's PhD research, this article focuses on the fluid and contested nature of the identities — racial, ethnic, and national — of people of Chinese descent in South Africa in the apartheid and post-apartheid eras. The research focuses on the approximately 12,000-strong community of second-, third-, and fourth-generation South African-born Chinese South Africans. It reveals that Chinese South Africans played an active role in identity construction using Chinese history, myths and culture, albeit within the constraints established by apartheid. During the latter part of apartheid, movement up the socio-economic ladder and gradual social acceptance by white South Africa propelled them into nebulous, interstitial spaces; officially they remained “non-white” but increasingly they were viewed as “honorary whites.” During the late 1970s and 1980s, the South African state attempted to redefine Chinese as “white” but these attempts failed because Chinese South Africans were unwilling to sacrifice their unique ethnic identity, which helped them to survive the more dehumanizing aspects of life under apartheid.


2011 ◽  
Vol 637 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noah Tamarkin

Apartheid South Africa enacted physical, structural, and symbolic forms of violence on racially marked South Africans, and postapartheid South Africa has enacted ambitious—though also limited—laws, policies, and processes to address past injustices. In this article, the author traces the South African political histories of one self-defined group, the Lemba, to understand how the violence they collectively experienced when the apartheid state did not acknowledge their ethnic existence continues to shape their ideas of the promise of democracy to address all past injustices, including the injustice of nonrecognition. The Lemba are known internationally for their participation in DNA tests that indicated their Jewish ancestry. In media discourses, their racialization as black Jews has obscured their racialization as black South Africans: they are presented as seeking solely to become recognized as Jews. The author demonstrates that they have in fact sought recognition as a distinct African ethnic group from the South African state consistently since the 1950s. Lemba recognition efforts show that the violence of nonrecognition is a feature of South African multicultural democracy in addition to being part of the apartheid past. The author argues that the racialization of religion that positions the Lemba as genetic Jews simplifies and distorts their histories and politics of race in South Africa.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Lucas Nkosana Sibuyi

The state has played an indispensable, major role in the industrialisation of South Africa, and its transformation from an economy of agriculture and mining to one based on manufacturing and services by the 1970s. Large state-owned corporations in communications and transportation, finance, industry and power have been key to this process, which also involved an extensive (and racist form of) import substitution industrialisation (ISI) from the 1920s. The 1970s saw a shift towards neoliberal policies, first under the National-Party-led apartheid government and then under the African-National-Congress-led democratic government formed in 1994. Since the 1980s, this restructuring has profoundly affected state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including the monopoly electricity utility ESKOM, and manufacturing industries, such as the automotive sector. This thesis examines the evolution of and interaction between different areas of neoliberal policy, and their evolution over time through a consideration of the relationship between the restructuring of SOEs and manufacturing, with a focus on ESKOM and autotomotives respectively. Relying on interviews with senior officials, policymakers, union leaders and industrialists, as well as primary documents, the study examines the responses of OEMs in South Africa (BMW, Ford, General Motors, Mercedes Benz/Daimler, Nissan, Toyota and Volkswagen) to ESKOM’s actions, and analyses the root of these actions. It argues that while restructuring has been framed by a common framework, policy development and implementation is not coordinated or cohesive. ESKOM, for example, gutted investment in electricity and maintenance generation capacity to become profitable and create space for Independent Power Providers (IPPs) – neoliberal measures for which it was rewarded and lauded. This took place at a time when national policy emphasised the need to grow manufacturing and attract direct investment by creating an investor-friendly climate resting on infrastructure. It also took place when the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) rolled out highly successful plans – also praised and rewarded – to help adjust automotives to open markets; the sector grew much larger than under ISI, while other sectors like textiles collapsed. ESKOM’s measures, however, led to a rapid decline in the capacity and stability of the power system, and directly contradicted the drive to expand and globalise manufacturing, in which automotives was now the leading edge. Corruption in the utility worsened, much of it through subcontracting measures rooted in neoliberal reforms, but this did not cause the basic problems. It is argued that this situation of competing policy imperatives reflects deeper, long-term problems in the South African state, including contradictory policies, uneven capacity and a lack of coordination. For example, there was no coordination between the DTI and stakeholder departments that regulate ESKOM, being the shareholder ministry, the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) and its policy ministry, and the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE). These types of problems did not start postapartheid, and post-1994 reforms have not adequately addressed them. What exists is not a “developmental” state, as policymakers hope, but a fractured state of an intermediate type that combines “developmental” and “predatory” features in a oneparty dominant system in which lines between ruling party and state blur, and state resources are leveraged for elite class formation. Such was the case under apartheid skippered by the NP, with Afrikanerisation, and it continues today post-apartheid under the ANC with BEE. Major reforms are needed, but not just in SOE governance or budgets, as many have suggested. If we are to take the nation forward, the basic design of the state must be reformed. The state needs professionalised, coherent policy-making and implementation, proper coordination of state entities and hard decisions. It should manage high levels of public infrastructure, guarantee political stability and credit ratings, and provide policy certainty and predictability. Without big reforms it will remain a chronic underperformer.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 433-444
Author(s):  
Amanuel Isak Tewolde

Many scholars and South African politicians characterize the widespread anti-foreigner sentiment and violence in South Africa as dislike against migrants and refugees of African origin which they named ‘Afro-phobia’. Drawing on online newspaper reports and academic sources, this paper rejects the Afro-phobia thesis and argues that other non-African migrants such as Asians (Pakistanis, Indians, Bangladeshis and Chinese) are also on the receiving end of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. I contend that any ‘outsider’ (White, Asian or Black African) who lives and trades in South African townships and informal settlements is scapegoated and attacked. I term this phenomenon ‘colour-blind xenophobia’. By proposing this analytical framework and integrating two theoretical perspectives — proximity-based ‘Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT)’ and Neocosmos’ exclusivist citizenship model — I contend that xenophobia in South Africa targets those who are in close proximity to disadvantaged Black South Africans and who are deemed outsiders (e.g., Asian, African even White residents and traders) and reject arguments that describe xenophobia in South Africa as targeting Black African refugees and migrants.


Author(s):  
Michael Reddy

September 2014 marked the release of the 2013/14 crime statistics in South Africa by the National Commissioner of the SAPS and the Minister of Police. Does a sense of safety and security fill the atmosphere? Do most South Africans, investors, and tourists alike believe that the crime rate in South Africa is reflective of a war zone and that South Africa is in a quagmire that engenders irretrievable damage to the lives of the citizenry and the economy? It is accepted that crime is a conflation of a number of economic, social and cultural factors; hence as a reviewable point, can the SAPS ensure the development of unassailable and perpetual policy solutions, underpinned with the highest quality that provides a guarantee of the citizen’s basic constitutional right to freedom and life. This article reviews literature on TQM and extrapolates lessons learnt to the practical functioning of the SAPS with a view to provide a myriad of TQM principles that may be considered by SAPS Management; this could serve as a catalyst for an improved policing service in South Africa.


2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 420-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melissa Steyn

Green, Sonn, and Matsebula's (2007) article is useful in helping to establish and develop whiteness studies in South African academia, and thus to shift the academic gaze from the margins to the centre. The article is published in the wake of three waves of international whiteness studies, which successively described whiteness as a space of taken-for-granted privilege; a series of historically different but related spaces; and, finally, as part of the global, postcolonial world order. Green, Sonn, and Matsebula's (2007) contribution could be extended by more fully capturing the dissimilarity in the texture of the experience of whiteness in Australia and South Africa. In South Africa whiteness has never had the quality of invisibility that is implied in the ‘standard’ whiteness literature, and in post-apartheid South Africa white South Africans cannot assume the same privileges, with such ease, when state power is overtly committed to breaking down racial privilege.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lindani Myeza ◽  
Naledi Nkhi ◽  
Warren Maroun

PurposeThe study aims to deepen the understanding of why risk management principles are circumvented, thereby contributing to transgressions in public procurement for South African state-owned enterprises (SOEs). A deeper understanding of why risk management principles are circumvented is especially important in South Africa, given the high social, economic and environmental risks to which national and major SOEs are exposed in the procurement process.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses a qualitative design, based on detailed semi-structured interviews with 19 participants comprising management advisors, forensic investigators and auditors to explore why risk management principles are circumvented by South Africa SOEs.FindingsThe results of the study indicate that the tone that is set at political and executive level plays an important role in determining compliance with risk management principles by lower-level staff. Intense levels of political influence at SOEs are the main reason behind risk management systems being undermined.Originality/valueThe current study is one of the first explorations of why transgressions in public procurement continue to be evident despite risk management reforms being adopted by South Africa public sector. The research responds to the call for more studies on why reforms in South Africa public sector are not reducing transgression in public procurement. The study provides primary evidence on the importance of political and executive leadership in influencing the effectiveness of risk management reforms in the public sector.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Salim Parker ◽  
Anwar A. Hoosen ◽  
Charles Feldman ◽  
Amgad Gamil ◽  
Jerusha Naidoo ◽  
...  

The Hajj is the largest annual mass gathering on Earth. Respiratory infections are one of the leading causes of disease and hospitalisation during the pilgrimage, with pneumonia and influenza most common among these infections despite the availability of prophylactic vaccines. In fact, immunisation against influenza and pneumococcal disease is currently not a requirement for South African pilgrims entering Saudi Arabia. This review examines the burden of respiratory infections during the Hajj, particularly pneumonia and influenza, with a focus on pilgrims from South Africa. Although the number of South African pilgrims attending the Hajj has been capped at 2 000 since 2013, 30 000 South Africans perform the minor Umrah pilgrimage annually. Understanding the aetiology of disease in this group could have implications for medical resourcing during the Hajj.


Viruses ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (10) ◽  
pp. 2050
Author(s):  
Tanya Nadia Glatt ◽  
Caroline Hilton ◽  
Cynthia Nyoni ◽  
Avril Swarts ◽  
Ronel Swanevelder ◽  
...  

Background: COVID-19 convalescent plasma (CCP) has been considered internationally as a treatment option for COVID-19. CCP refers to plasma collected from donors who have recovered from and made antibodies to SARS-CoV-2. To date, convalescent plasma has not been collected in South Africa. As other investigational therapies and vaccination were not widely accessible, there was an urgent need to implement a CCP manufacture programme to service South Africans. Methods: The South African National Blood Service and the Western Cape Blood Service implemented a CCP programme that included CCP collection, processing, testing and storage. CCP units were tested for SARS-CoV-2 Spike ELISA and neutralising antibodies and routine blood transfusion parameters. CCP units from previously pregnant females were tested for anti-HLA and anti-HNA antibodies. Results: A total of 987 CCP units were collected from 243 donors, with a median of three donations per donor. Half of the CCP units had neutralising antibody titres of >1:160. One CCP unit was positive on the TPHA serology. All CCP units tested for anti-HLA antibodies were positive. Conclusion: Within three months of the first COVID-19 diagnosis in South Africa, a fully operational CCP programme was set up across South Africa. The infrastructure and skills implemented will likely benefit South Africans in this and future pandemics.


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