scholarly journals Even under majority influence, great apes fail to copy novel actions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damien Neadle ◽  
Jackie Chappell ◽  
Zanna Clay ◽  
Claudio Tennie

It remains unclear when and why the ability to copy actions evolved and also its uniqueness to humans. Thus far, a lack of valid evidence for spontaneous action copying by other apes supports the view that only humans spontaneously copy actions. However, wild apes have access to multiple demonstrators and have been demonstrated to be affected by majority influences, thus raising the possibility that ape action copying might require a majority ratio of demonstrators to observers. We tested for spontaneous ape action copying across all four non-human great ape species using a demonstrator majority. Nineteen captive mother-reared apes (across 4 species) were tested (Raage=9-52; Mage=18.63; ♀=14; ♂=5). All failed to copy the demonstrated actions, despite observing it in a majority influence condition. We conclude that culture in non-human great apes is more likely supported by variants of social learning which regulate frequencies, rather than forms, of observed behaviours.

2016 ◽  
Vol 283 (1825) ◽  
pp. 20152402 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Reindl ◽  
S. R. Beck ◽  
I. A. Apperly ◽  
C. Tennie

The variety and complexity of human-made tools are unique in the animal kingdom. Research investigating why human tool use is special has focused on the role of social learning: while non-human great apes acquire tool-use behaviours mostly by individual (re-)inventions, modern humans use imitation and teaching to accumulate innovations over time. However, little is known about tool-use behaviours that humans can invent individually, i.e. without cultural knowledge. We presented 2- to 3.5-year-old children with 12 problem-solving tasks based on tool-use behaviours shown by great apes. Spontaneous tool use was observed in 11 tasks. Additionally, tasks which occurred more frequently in wild great apes were also solved more frequently by human children. Our results demonstrate great similarity in the spontaneous tool-use abilities of human children and great apes, indicating that the physical cognition underlying tool use shows large overlaps across the great ape species. This suggests that humans are neither born with special physical cognition skills, nor that these skills have degraded due to our species’ long reliance of social learning in the tool-use domain.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hélène Marie De Nys ◽  
Therese Löhrich ◽  
Doris Wu ◽  
Sébastien Calvignac-Spencer ◽  
Fabian Hubertus Leendertz

Abstract. Humans and African great apes (AGAs) are naturally infected with several species of closely related malaria parasites. The need to understand the origins of human malaria as well as the risk of zoonotic transmissions and emergence of new malaria strains in human populations has markedly encouraged research on great ape Plasmodium parasites. Progress in the use of non-invasive methods has rendered investigations into wild ape populations possible. Present knowledge is mainly focused on parasite diversity and phylogeny, with still large gaps to fill on malaria parasite ecology. Understanding what malaria infection means in terms of great ape health is also an important, but challenging avenue of research and has been subject to relatively few research efforts so far. This paper reviews current knowledge on African great ape malaria and identifies gaps and future research perspectives.


Author(s):  
Patrick Roberts

The evolutionary proximity of the non-human great apes to us is often stressed in studies of animals, such as Kanzi, a bonobo (Pan paniscus) bred in captivity, that demonstrate their capacity to undertake tool-use and even utilize and comprehend language (Toth et al., 1993; Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin, 1996; Schick et al., 1999). Likewise, studies of chimpanzees (Pan spp.) have highlighted the similarity of their emotional and empathetic capacities to those of humans (Parr et al., 2005; Campbell and de Waal, 2014). However, as noted by Savage- Rumbaugh and Lewin (1996), in palaeoanthropology and archaeology more broadly, the emergence of the hominin clade and, later, our species, is referenced in terms of the ‘chasm’ between ourselves and other extant great apes. Indeed, despite our genetic and behavioural proximity, extant non-human great ape taxa are often popularly characterized as living fossils of how we used to be. They are used as analogues for the subsistence and behaviour of the Last Common Ancestor (LCA) of humans and non-human great apes (Clutton-Brock and Harvey, 1977; Goodall, 1986; Foley and Lewin, 2004) and it is almost as if the fact that they still occupy the tropical environments in which these hominoids likely evolved (though see Elton, 2008) allows them to be treated as static comparisons (Figure 3.1). Since Darwin wrote the Descent of Man in 1871, the forests of the tropics, and their modern non-human great ape inhabitants, have tended to be perceived as being left behind as the hominin clade gained increasingly ‘human’ traits of tool-use, medium to large game hunting, and upright locomotion on open ‘savanna’ landscapes (Dart, 1925; Potts, 1998; Klein, 1999). From this perspective it is perhaps unsurprising that tropical forests are seen as alien to the genus Homo and its closest hominin ancestors.


2019 ◽  
pp. 143-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Sterelny

Our great ape cousins, and very likely the last common ancestor of the human and pan lineage, depend very largely on their own intrinsic capacities not just for material resources but also for their informational resources. Chimps and bonobos are capable of social learning, and very likely, in their foraging and their communicative practices, they do learn from their parents and peers. But everything they learn socially they could probably learn by themselves, by individual exploration learning. Their lives do not depend on social learning. And while they may learn about their physical and social environment from others, they do not learn how to learn. Humans are very different: for us, social learning is essential rather than optional. As a consequence, our cognitive capacities are amplified by our social environment, by our material technology, and by our capacities to learn cognitive skills, not just physical skills, from our social peers. This chapter charts the deep history of these changes and their archaeological signature.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio Tennie ◽  
Elisa Bandini ◽  
Carel P. van Schaik ◽  
Lydia M. Hopper

Abstract The zone of latent solutions (ZLS) hypothesis provides an alternative approach to explaining cultural patterns in primates and many other animals. According to the ZLS hypothesis, non-human great ape (henceforth: ape) cultures consist largely or solely of latent solutions. The current competing (and predominant) hypothesis for ape culture argues instead that at least some of their behavioural or artefact forms are copied through specific social learning mechanisms (“copying social learning hypothesis”) and that their forms may depend on copying (copying-dependent forms). In contrast, the ape ZLS hypothesis does not require these forms to be copied. Instead, it suggests that several (non-form-copying) social learning mechanisms help determine the frequency (but typically not the form) of these behaviours and artefacts within connected individuals. The ZLS hypothesis thus suggests that increases and stabilisations of a particular behaviour’s or artefact’s frequency can derive from socially-mediated (cued) form reinnovations. Therefore, and while genes and ecology play important roles as well, according to the ape ZLS hypothesis, apes typically acquire the forms of their behaviours and artefacts individually, but are usually socially induced to do so (provided sufficient opportunity, necessity, motivation and timing). The ZLS approach is often criticized—perhaps also because it challenges the current null hypothesis, which instead assumes a requirement of form-copying social learning mechanisms to explain many ape behavioural (and/or artefact) forms. However, as the ZLS hypothesis is a new approach, with less accumulated literature compared to the current null hypothesis, some confusion is to be expected. Here, we clarify the ZLS approach—also in relation to other competing hypotheses—and address misconceptions and objections. We believe that these clarifications will provide researchers with a coherent theoretical approach and an experimental methodology to examine the necessity of form-copying variants of social learning in apes, humans and other species.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 200-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne E. Russon

Abstract This paper assesses great apes’ abilities for pantomime and action imitation, two communicative abilities proposed as key contributors to language evolution. Modern great apes, the only surviving nonhuman hominids, are important living models of the communicative platform upon which language evolved. This assessment is based on 62 great ape pantomimes identified via data mining plus published reports of great ape action imitation. Most pantomimes were simple, imperative, and scaffolded by partners’ relationship and scripts; some resemble declaratives, some were sequences of several inter-related elements. Imitation research consistently shows great apes perform action imitation at low fidelity, but also that action imitation may not represent a distinct process or function. Discussion focuses on how findings may advance reconstruction of the evolution of language, including what great apes may contribute to understanding ‘primitive’ forms of pantomime and imitation and how to improve their study.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (11) ◽  
pp. 1779 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inestin Amona ◽  
Hacène Medkour ◽  
Jean Akiana ◽  
Bernard Davoust ◽  
Mamadou Lamine Tall ◽  
...  

Enteroviruses (EVs) are viruses of the family Picornaviridae that cause mild to severe infections in humans and in several animal species, including non-human primates (NHPs). We conducted a survey and characterization of enteroviruses circulating between humans and great apes in the Congo. Fecal samples (N = 24) of gorillas and chimpanzees living close to or distant from humans in three Congolese parks were collected, as well as from healthy humans (N = 38) living around and within these parks. Enteroviruses were detected in 29.4% of gorilla and 13.15% of human feces, including wild and human-habituated gorillas, local humans and eco-guards. Two identical strains were isolated from two humans coming from two remote regions. Their genomes were similar and all genes showed their close similarity to coxsackieviruses, except for the 3C, 3D and 5′-UTR regions, where they were most similar to poliovirus 1 and 2, suggesting recombination. Recombination events were found between these strains, poliovirus 1 and 2 and EV-C99. It is possible that the same EV-C species circulated in both humans and apes in different regions in the Congo, which must be confirmed in other investigations. In addition, other studies are needed to further investigate the circulation and genetic diversity of enteroviruses in the great ape population, to draw a definitive conclusion on the different species and types of enteroviruses circulating in the Republic of Congo.


2019 ◽  
Vol 286 (1907) ◽  
pp. 20190488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wouter Wolf ◽  
Michael Tomasello

Humans create social closeness with one another through a variety of shared social activities in which they align their emotions or mental states towards an external stimulus such as dancing to music together, playing board games together or even engaging in minimal shared experiences such as watching a movie together. Although these specific behaviours would seem to be uniquely human, it is unclear whether the underlying psychology is unique to the species, or if other species might possess some form of this psychological mechanism as well. Here we show that great apes who have visually attended to a video together with a human (study 1) and a conspecific (study 2) subsequently approach that individual faster (study 1) or spend more time in their proximity (study 2) than when they had attended to something different. Our results suggest that one of the most basic mechanisms of human social bonding—feeling closer to those with whom we act or attend together—is present in both humans and great apes, and thus has deeper evolutionary roots than previously suspected.


2014 ◽  
Vol 35 (5) ◽  
pp. 1037-1071 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Gustafsson ◽  
Michel Saint Jalme ◽  
Marie-Claude Bomsel ◽  
Sabrina Krief

Author(s):  
Keaghan J Yaxley ◽  
Robert A Foley

Abstract Owing to their close affinity, the African great apes are of interest in the study of human evolution. Although numerous researchers have described the ancestors we share with these species with reference to extant great apes, few have done so with phylogenetic comparative methods. One obstacle to the application of these techniques is the within-species phenotypic variation found in this group. Here, we leverage this variation, modelling common ancestors using ancestral state reconstructions (ASRs) with reference to subspecies-level trait data. A subspecies-level phylogeny of the African great apes and humans was estimated from full-genome mitochondrial DNA sequences and used to implement ASRs for 14 continuous traits known to vary between great ape subspecies. Although the inclusion of within-species phenotypic variation increased the phylogenetic signal for our traits and improved the performance of our ASRs, whether this was done through the inclusion of subspecies phylogeny or through the use of existing methods made little difference. Our ASRs corroborate previous findings that the last common ancestor of humans, chimpanzees and bonobos was a chimp-like animal, but also suggest that the last common ancestor of humans, chimpanzees, bonobos and gorillas was an animal unlike any extant African great ape.


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