Weaponizing Election Petitions
Across Africa's multiparty regimes, losing parliamentary candidates have increasingly relied on electoral courts as an institutional venue to settle post-electoral disputes. However, it remains to be seen whether judicial intervention into the electoral process is indicative of the institutionalization of democratic procedures in Africa. One reason for this is that scholars have not systematically explored the strategic motivations of candidates who mount legal challenges. In this paper, we argue that not all petitioners are the same. While some are genuinely motivated to remedy perceived electoral fraud and procedural irregularities, others use the courts strategically to shift blame for defeat, bolster their future electoral prospects, and even negotiate government jobs. We pilot a classification scheme to distinguish between the motivations of losing candidates in sub-national elections who file electoral petitions and examine its validity using an original database of every sub-national post-election challenge brought before Kenyan courts in the aftermath of the 2013 general elections. Across the 71 sub-national Kenyan post-election challenges where petitioners were losing candidates, we find that only 10 of the cases were coded as \textit{sincere} attempts to overturn the election outcome. To put it simply, we find that a majority of Kenyan petitioners seemingly ``weaponize'' the courts and this strategic use has implications for research on the role of the judiciary in promoting democratic legitimacy.