When robots (pretend to) think

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Ghiglino ◽  
Agnieszka Wykowska

Mental activities are a fascinating mystery that humans have tried to unveil since the very beginning of philosophy. We all try to understand how other people “tick” and formulate hypotheses, predictions, expectations and, morebroadly, representations of the others’ goals, desires and intentions, and behaviors following from those. We “think” spontaneously about others’ and our own mental states. The advent of new technologies – seemingly smart artificialagents – is giving researchers new environments to test mindreading models, pushing the cognitive flexibility of the human social brain from the natural domain to towards the artificial.

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Judith Mildner ◽  
Diana Tamir

One can never know the internal workings of another person – one can only infer others’ mental states based on external cues. In contrast, each person has direct access to the contents of their own mind. Here we test the hypothesis that this privileged access shapes the way people represent internal mental experiences, such that they represent their own mental states more distinctly than the states of others. Across four studies, participants considered their own and others’ mental states; analyses measured the distinctiveness of mental state representations. Two neuroimaging studies used representational similarity analyses to demonstrate that the social brain manifests more distinct activity patterns when thinking about one’s own states versus others’. Two behavioral studies support these findings. Further, they demonstrate that people differentiate between states less as social distance increases. Together these results suggest that we represent our own mind with greater granularity than the minds of others.


2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stacey N. Doan ◽  
Helen Y. Lee ◽  
Qi Wang

We investigated the role of mothers’ references to mental states and behaviors and children’s emotion situation knowledge (ESK) in a prospective, cross-cultural context. European American mothers ( n = 71) and Chinese immigrant mothers ( n = 60) and their children participated in the study. Maternal references to mental states and behaviors were assessed at Time 1 when children were three years of age. ESK was assessed when children were 3, 3.5, and 4.5 years of age. Multi-group latent growth curve analyses were used to model children’s growth in ESK over time, as well as relations between mental state language and references to behaviors on children’s trajectories. Results indicated that maternal references to mental states were associated with concurrent levels of ESK for European American children, and change over time for the Chinese immigrant children. Maternal references to behaviors were negatively associated with concurrent ESK for both groups.


Author(s):  
Steven Vallas

Research on the restructuring of work has tended to neglect the autonomous effects that symbolic or cultural influences can have on the utilization of new technologies. This article draws on fieldwork conducted in three pulp and paper mills to explore the symbolic boundaries that occupational groups bring to bear on the process of workplace automation. As sophisticated technologies and management methods were introduced, process engineers engaged in subtle yet important efforts to portray manual workers’ knowledge in derisive terms. Such boundary work led managers to institute credential barriers that restricted manual workers’ opportunities, eventually enabling engineers to gain exclusive control over analytic functions as their own “natural” domain. The study suggests that symbolic representations can have powerful consequences for the restructuring of work, reproducing social inequalities even when new technologies render them unnecessary.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla J. Ammons ◽  
Constance F. Doss ◽  
David Bala ◽  
Rajesh K. Kana

Background:Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others, is frequently impaired in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and may result from altered activation of social brain regions. Conversely, Typically Developing (TD) individuals overextend ToM and show a strong tendency to anthropomorphize and interpret biological motion in the environment. Less is known about how the degree of anthropomorphism influences intentional attribution and engagement of the social brain in ASD.Objective:This fMRI study examines the extent of anthropomorphism, its role in social attribution, and the underlying neural responses in ASD and TD using a series of human stick figures and geometrical shapes.Methods:14 ASD and 14 TD adults watched videos of stick figures and triangles interacting in random or socially meaningful ways while in an fMRI scanner. In addition, they completed out-of-scanner measures of ToM skill and real-world social deficits. Whole brain statistical analysis was performed for regression and within and between group comparisons of all conditions using SPM12’s implementation of the general linear model.Results:ToM network regions were activated in response to social movement and human-like characters in ASD and TD. In addition, greater ToM ability was associated with increased TPJ and MPFC activity while watching stick figures; whereas more severe social symptoms were associated with reduced right TPJ activation in response to social movement.Conclusion:These results suggest that degree of anthropomorphism does not differentially affect social attribution in ASD and highlights the importance of TPJ in ToM and social attribution.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 965
Author(s):  
Dorit Kliemann ◽  
Ralph Adolphs ◽  
Lynn K. Paul ◽  
J. Michael Tyszka ◽  
Daniel Tranel

Social cognition and emotion are ubiquitous human processes that recruit a reliable set of brain networks in healthy individuals. These brain networks typically comprise midline (e.g., medial prefrontal cortex) as well as lateral regions of the brain including homotopic regions in both hemispheres (e.g., left and right temporo-parietal junction). Yet the necessary roles of these networks, and the broader roles of the left and right cerebral hemispheres in socioemotional functioning, remains debated. Here, we investigated these questions in four rare adults whose right (three cases) or left (one case) cerebral hemisphere had been surgically removed (to a large extent) to treat epilepsy. We studied four closely matched healthy comparison participants, and also compared the patient findings to data from a previously published larger healthy comparison sample (n = 33). Participants completed standardized socioemotional and cognitive assessments to investigate social cognition. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data were obtained during passive viewing of a short, animated movie that distinctively recruits two social brain networks: one engaged when thinking about other agents’ internal mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, emotions; so-called Theory of Mind or ToM network), and the second engaged when thinking about bodily states (e.g., pain, hunger; so-called PAIN network). Behavioral assessments demonstrated remarkably intact general cognitive functioning in all individuals with hemispherectomy. Social-emotional functioning was somewhat variable in the hemispherectomy participants, but strikingly, none of these individuals had consistently impaired social-emotional processing and none of the assessment scores were consistent with a psychiatric disorder. Using inter-region correlation analyses, we also found surprisingly typical ToM and PAIN networks, as well as typical differentiation of the two networks (in the intact hemisphere of patients with either right or left hemispherectomy), based on idiosyncratic reorganization of cortical activation. The findings argue that compensatory brain networks can process social and emotional information following hemispherectomy across different age levels (from 3 months to 20 years old), and suggest that social brain networks typically distributed across midline and lateral brain regions in this domain can be reorganized, to a substantial degree.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. 81-81
Author(s):  
Lisa D'Ambrosio ◽  
Lisa D'Ambrosio

Abstract The spread of COVID-19 in the United States in early 2020 abruptly transformed American life, with widespread closures of public spaces and businesses, limitations on social activities, and the need for individuals to physically distance from each other. Some changes wrought by the virus may persist post-pandemic - such as Americans' adoption of new technologies or disease prevention behaviors. Since the onset of COVID-related safer-at-home orders, the MIT AgeLab has sought to understand how the pandemic affects people’s attitudes and behaviors. This symposium will present findings drawn from three waves of national, online surveys conducted in 2020: March (N=1202), May-June (N=1,387), and November-December 2020 (N=1444). The surveys explored participants’ COVID-19-related attitudes and behaviors across a range of domains. Each presentation in this symposium will highlight a different focus of cross-generational research conducted over time, with a particular focus on experiences of adults ages 55 and over. The first will focus on participants’ overall health, wellbeing, and perceptions of the COVID-19 vaccine. The second will present experiences of family caregivers of older adults and children. The third will center on the impact of the pandemic on the generations’ retirement and longevity planning experiences. The fourth and final presentation will focus on participants’ attitudes and experiences using and adopting technology. This symposium will deepen attendees’ understandings of multigenerational attitudes and experiences during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a particular focus on the experiences of adults ages 55 and over.


2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (10) ◽  
pp. 1640-1659
Author(s):  
Irine Symeonidou ◽  
Iroise Dumontheil ◽  
Heather J Ferguson ◽  
Richard Breheny

Most developmental research on Theory of Mind (ToM)—our ability to infer the beliefs, intentions, and desires of others—has focused on the preschool years. This is unsurprising as it was previously thought that ToM skills are developed between the ages of 2 and 7 years. Over the last couple of decades however, studies have provided evidence for significant structural and functional changes in the brain areas involved in ToM (the “social brain”) not only during childhood but also during adolescence. Importantly, some of these findings suggest that the use of ToM shows a prolonged development through middle childhood and adolescence. Although evidence from previous studies suggests a protracted development of ToM, the factors that constrain performance during middle childhood and adolescence are only just beginning to be explored. In this article, we report two visual-world eye-tracking studies that focus on the timecourse of predictive inferences. We establish that when the complexity of ToM inferences are at a level which is comparable with standard change-of-location false-belief tasks, then adolescents and adults generate predictions for other agents’ behaviour in the same timecourse. However, when inferences are socially more complex, requiring inferences about higher order mental states, adolescents generate predictive gaze bias at a marked delay relative to adults. Importantly, our results demonstrate that these developmental differences go beyond differences in executive functions (inhibitory control or working memory) and point to distinct expectations between groups and greater uncertainty when predicting actions based on conflicting desires.


2007 ◽  
Vol 362 (1480) ◽  
pp. 671-678 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris D Frith

The notion that there is a ‘social brain’ in humans specialized for social interactions has received considerable support from brain imaging and, to a lesser extent, from lesion studies. Specific roles for the various components of the social brain are beginning to emerge. For example, the amygdala attaches emotional value to faces, enabling us to recognize expressions such as fear and trustworthiness, while the posterior superior temporal sulcus predicts the end point of the complex trajectories created when agents act upon the world. It has proved more difficult to assign a role to medial prefrontal cortex, which is consistently activated when people think about mental states. I suggest that this region may have a special role in the second-order representations needed for communicative acts when we have to represent someone else's representation of our own mental state. These cognitive processes are not specifically social, since they can be applied in other domains. However, these cognitive processes have been driven to ever higher levels of sophistication by the complexities of social interaction.


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