scholarly journals Testing the similarity-projection hypothesis using the reaction time paradigm: Anchoring and adjustment in social judgments

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatsunori Ishii ◽  
Masanori Takezawa

It has long been argued that people use their own mental states to infer those of others who they perceive as similar to themselves. Tamir and Mitchell (2013) examined this hypothesis through the reaction time paradigm and demonstrated a positive relationship between the reaction time of other’s mental state judgments and the distance of judgments from the participants’ mental states as an evidence of using projection. However, their methodology was limited, and the robustness of the paradigm was not well examined. We conducted a series of studies employing different types of tasks and target persons based on Tamir and Mitchell’s (2013) study. The results of Studies 1 and 2 were consistent with the hypothesis, that is, a long reaction time in judging the preferences of a target predicted inconsistency between the judgments for the target and participants’ own selves only when the former was perceived to be similar to the latter. Although, when this relationship was observed in Study 3, the target person was perceived not only as similar but also as dissimilar. In this paper, we discuss that projection may more likely be used when information about targets is scarce, irrespective of the perceived similarity to the target person.

2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 263-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse Bering

AbstractLittle is known about how the minds of dead agents are represented. In the current experiment, individuals with different types of explicit afterlife beliefs were asked in an implicit interview task whether various mental state types, as well as pure biological imperatives, continue after death. The results suggest that, regardless of one's explicit reports about personal consciousness after death, those who believe in some form of life after death (and, to a certain extent, even those who do not) implicitly represent dead agents' minds in the same way: psychobiological and perceptual states cease while emotional, desire, and epistemic states continue. The findings are interpreted according to simulation constraints — because it is epistemologically impossible to know what it is like to be dead, individuals will be most likely to attribute to dead agents those types of mental states that they cannot imagine being without. Such a model argues that it is natural to believe in life after death and social transmission serves principally to conceptually enrich (or degrade) intuitive conceptions of the afterlife.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 68
Author(s):  
Ekaterina M. Alekseeva ◽  
Galiya M. Gatiyatullina

<p>The article is devoted to the problem of mental state associative speech representation. The study involved 31 Russian-speaking subjects (27 females and 4 males) at the age of 18 - 22 years old. The experimental procedure using DMDX program allowed to measure the time of speech response to stimuli - the concepts of 25 mental states. The average reaction time to the concepts of mental states, shown on the computer monitor, made 2114.68 milliseconds. The most rapid associative speech response was the response to the following stimuli: "ecstasy" (1452.54 msec), "meditation" (1569.26 msec), "tranquility" (1685.21 msec), the slowest response is the response to "interest" (2517.5 msec) and "indecision" (2454.63 msec). In total, 448 associations were given to the concepts of 25 mental states by tested subjects - speech reactions, i.e. 17.9 associations per mental state on the average. The greatest number of speech associations (24) was given to the concept of love. The smallest number was given to the concept of ecstasy (11 associations). Associative fields of mental states (meditation, ecstasy, melancholy, tiredness, loneliness) have the most pronounced core. The prospects of the study consist in the performance of a similar associative experiment among the representatives of another culture, as well as in the studying of an estimated and situational associative representation of mental states.</p>


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Diana Tamir

Each individual experiences mental states in their own idiosyncratic way, yet perceivers are able to accurately understand a huge variety of states across unique individuals. How do they accomplish this feat? Do people think about their own anger in the same ways as another person’s? Is reading about someone’s anxiety the same as seeing it? Here, we test the hypothesis that a common conceptual core unites mental state representations across contexts. Across three studies, participants judged the mental states of multiple targets, including a generic other, the self, a socially close other, and a socially distant other. Participants viewed mental state stimuli in multiple modalities, including written scenarios and images. Using representational similarity analysis, we found that brain regions associated with social cognition expressed stable neural representations of mental states across both targets and modalities. This suggests that people use stable models of mental states across different people and contexts.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Milena Rmus ◽  
Diana Tamir

People’s thoughts and feelings ebb and flow in predictable ways: surprise arises quickly, anticipation ramps up slowly, regret follows anger, love begets happiness, and so forth. Predicting these transitions between mental states can help people successfully navigate the social world. We hypothesize that the goal of predicting state dynamics shapes people’ mental state concepts. Across seven studies, when people observed more frequent transitions between a pair of novel mental states, they judged those states to be more conceptually similar to each other. In an eighth study, an artificial neural network trained to predict real human mental state dynamics spontaneously learned the same conceptual dimensions that people use to understand these states: the 3d Mind Model. Together these results suggest that mental state dynamics explain the origins of mental state concepts.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Judith Mildner ◽  
Diana Tamir

One can never know the internal workings of another person – one can only infer others’ mental states based on external cues. In contrast, each person has direct access to the contents of their own mind. Here we test the hypothesis that this privileged access shapes the way people represent internal mental experiences, such that they represent their own mental states more distinctly than the states of others. Across four studies, participants considered their own and others’ mental states; analyses measured the distinctiveness of mental state representations. Two neuroimaging studies used representational similarity analyses to demonstrate that the social brain manifests more distinct activity patterns when thinking about one’s own states versus others’. Two behavioral studies support these findings. Further, they demonstrate that people differentiate between states less as social distance increases. Together these results suggest that we represent our own mind with greater granularity than the minds of others.


Author(s):  
T.J. Kasperbauer

This chapter applies the psychological account from chapter 3 on how we rank human beings above other animals, to the particular case of using mental states to assign animals moral status. Experiments on the psychology of mental state attribution are discussed, focusing on their implications for human moral psychology. The chapter argues that attributions of phenomenal states, like emotions, drive our assignments of moral status. It also describes how this is significantly impacted by the process of dehumanization. Psychological research on anthropocentrism and using animals as food and as companions is discussed in order to illuminate the relationship between dehumanization and mental state attribution.


Author(s):  
Gaojian Huang ◽  
Christine Petersen ◽  
Brandon J. Pitts

Semi-autonomous vehicles still require drivers to occasionally resume manual control. However, drivers of these vehicles may have different mental states. For example, drivers may be engaged in non-driving related tasks or may exhibit mind wandering behavior. Also, monitoring monotonous driving environments can result in passive fatigue. Given the potential for different types of mental states to negatively affect takeover performance, it will be critical to highlight how mental states affect semi-autonomous takeover. A systematic review was conducted to synthesize the literature on mental states (such as distraction, fatigue, emotion) and takeover performance. This review focuses specifically on five fatigue studies. Overall, studies were too few to observe consistent findings, but some suggest that response times to takeover alerts and post-takeover performance may be affected by fatigue. Ultimately, this review may help researchers improve and develop real-time mental states monitoring systems for a wide range of application domains.


Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulia Felappi

AbstractAs the label suggests, according to propositionalism, each intentional mental state, attitude or event is or involves a relation to a proposition. In this paper, I will discuss a case that seems prima facie not to be accountable for by propositionalism. After having presented the case, I will show why it is different from others that have been discussed in the literature as able to show that propositionalism cannot be correct. I will then consider what the propositionalist can say to fix the problem and I will show that no strategy that is genuinely propositionalist seems promising. I will not conclude that propositionalism is doomed. But I will show that if propositionalism can account for our case at all, it can only do so by losing its main appeal, i.e. its elegance and simplicity. But then propositionalism seems to have lost its advantage with respect to its obvious alternative, i.e. a pluralist account according to which mental states, attitudes and events are not all homogeneously relations to propositions, but rather our mental life should be accounted for in terms of a plurality of kinds of relata.


Healthcare ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 158
Author(s):  
Naira Delgado ◽  
Helena Bonache ◽  
Moisés Betancort ◽  
Yurena Morera ◽  
Lasana T. Harris

It is generally accepted that empathy should be the basis of patient care. However, this ideal may be unrealistic if healthcare professionals suffer adverse effects when engaging in empathy. The aim of this study is to explore the effect of inferring mental states and different components of empathy (perspective-taking; empathic concern; personal distress) in burnout dimensions (emotional exhaustion; depersonalization; personal accomplishment). A total of 184 healthcare professionals participated in the study (23% male, Mage = 44.60; SD = 10.46). We measured participants’ empathy, the inference of mental states of patients, and burnout. Correlation analyses showed that inferring mental states was positively associated with perspective-taking and with empathic concern, but uncorrelated with personal distress. Furthermore, emotional exhaustion was related to greater levels of personal distress and greater levels of inferences of mental states. Depersonalization was associated with greater levels of personal distress and lower levels of empathic concern. Personal accomplishment was associated with the inference of mental states in patients, lower levels of personal distress, and perspective-taking. These results provide a better understanding of how different components of empathy and mental state inferences may preserve or promote healthcare professionals’ burnout.


Vivarium ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominik Perler

AbstractMedieval philosophers clearly recognized that emotions are not simply "raw feelings" but complex mental states that include cognitive components. They analyzed these components both on the sensory and on the intellectual level, paying particular attention to the different types of cognition that are involved. This paper focuses on William Ockham and Adam Wodeham, two fourteenth-century authors who presented a detailed account of "sensory passions" and "volitional passions". It intends to show that these two philosophers provided both a structural and a functional analysis of emotions, i.e., they explained the various elements constituting emotions and delineated the causal relations between these elements. Ockham as well as Wodeham emphasized that "sensory passions" are not only based upon cognitions but include a cognitive component and are therefore intentional. In addition, they pointed out that "volitional passions" are based upon a conceptualization and an evaluation of given objects. This cognitivist approach to emotions enabled them to explain the complex phenomenon of emotional conflict, a phenomenon that has its origin in the co-presence of various emotions that involve conflicting evaluations.


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