The Signature of All Things: Children Infer Knowledge States from Static Images

From minimal observable action, humans make fast, intuitive judgments about what other people think, want, and feel (Heider & Simmel, 1944). Even when no agent is visible, children can infer the presence of intentional agents based on the environmental traces that only agents could leave behind (Saxe et al., 2005; Newman et al., 2010). Here we show that, beyond inferring the presence of agents, four- to six-year-olds can also determine the mental states that best explain an environmental trace. Participants (N = 35, M: 5.6 years, range:4.0 − 6.8 years) saw pairs of dresser drawers with different numbers and orientations of open drawers, and they were asked to de- termine which static scenes was generated by an agent with a given knowledge state (whether the agent wasn’t searching at all but was just playing, knew exactly where an object was hidden, knew the approximate location, had no idea where it was hidden, or at first didn’t know and then remembered). We compare children’s performance to a computational model that extends models of mental-state attribution to consider cases where the behavior is not observed but must be inferred from the structure of the environment. We find that children’s graded pattern of responded shows quantitative similarity to the predictions made by our model

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Dehumanization and Mentalizing Animals

10.1093/oso/9780190695811.003.0004 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

T.J. Kasperbauer

Keyword(s):

Moral Psychology ◽

Mental State ◽

Moral Status ◽

Mental States ◽

Psychological Research ◽

Human Beings ◽

Mental State Attribution ◽

The Relationship ◽

Phenomenal States

This chapter applies the psychological account from chapter 3 on how we rank human beings above other animals, to the particular case of using mental states to assign animals moral status. Experiments on the psychology of mental state attribution are discussed, focusing on their implications for human moral psychology. The chapter argues that attributions of phenomenal states, like emotions, drive our assignments of moral status. It also describes how this is significantly impacted by the process of dehumanization. Psychological research on anthropocentrism and using animals as food and as companions is discussed in order to illuminate the relationship between dehumanization and mental state attribution.

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Attributing Minds to Triangles: Kinematics and Observer-Animator Kinematic Similarity predict Mental State Attribution in the Animations Task

10.21203/rs.3.rs-208776/v2 ◽

2021 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Bianca A. Schuster ◽

Dagmar S. Fraser ◽

Jasper J. F. van den Bosch ◽

Sophie Sowden ◽

Andrew S. Gordon ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Mental State ◽

Mental States ◽

Autism Spectrum ◽

Correct Identification ◽

Mental State Attribution ◽

Key Factor ◽

Spectrum Disorders ◽

Clinical Conditions ◽

Clinical Populations

Abstract The ability to ascribe mental states, such as beliefs or desires to oneself and other individuals forms an integral part of everyday social interaction. One task that has been extensively used to test mental state attribution in a variety of clinical populations is the animations task, where participants are asked to infer mental states from short videos of interacting triangles. In this task, individuals with clinical conditions such as autism spectrum disorders typically offer fewer and less appropriate mental state descriptions than controls, however little is currently known about why they show these difficulties. Previous studies have hinted at the similarity between an observer’s and the triangles’ movements as a key factor for the successful interpretation of these animations. In this study we present a novel adaptation of the animations task, suitable to track and compare animation generator and -observer kinematics. Using this task and a population-derived stimulus database, we demonstrate that an animation’s kinematics and kinematic similarity between observer and generator are integral for the correct identification of that animation. Our results shed light on why some clinical populations show difficulties in this task and highlight the role of participants’ own movement and specific perceptual properties of the stimuli.

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The Effects Of Adult Ageing And Culture On Theory Of Mind

10.31219/osf.io/g9fxr ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

louise phillips ◽

Louisa Lawrie ◽

Alexandre Schaefer ◽

Min Hooi Yong

Keyword(s):

Socioeconomic Status ◽

Theory Of Mind ◽

Cultural Differences ◽

Mental State ◽

Mental States ◽

False Belief ◽

Social Rules ◽

Mental State Attribution ◽

Generational Changes ◽

False Belief Reasoning

Older adults tend to have poorer mental state understanding (Theory of Mind, ToM) than their younger counterparts, including in both Western and Asian cultures. The current study aimed to directly investigate whether there are any cultural differences in the pattern of age effects on ToM tasks. Given evidence of cultural differences in the development of ToM across childhood, we predicted that older Asian adults would find the mental state tasks particularly resource-demanding. We used two ToM tests which made differing demands on updating multiple mental states (the false belief task) and applying social rules to mental state processing (the faux pas task). We also looked at the role of education, socioeconomic status, individualism versus collectivism and working memory (WM). A total of 298 participants from UK and Malaysia completed faux pas, false belief, and WM tasks. Results showed that interacting effects of age and culture were evident in faux pas detection, some aspects of false belief reasoning, and WM tasks, with older Malaysian participants performing poorly compared to the other groups. We also found that WM fully mediated age differences in ToM in the Malaysian sample. High levels of individualism were associated with poorer faux pas detection, but education and socioeconomic status did not explain additional variance in the ToM tasks. This pattern of results may reflect generational changes in the familiarity and cognitive load of explicit mental state attribution, along with cultural differences in the pace and nature of cognitive ageing.

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Kinematics and observer-animator kinematic similarity predict mental state attribution from Heider–Simmel style animations

Scientific Reports ◽

10.1038/s41598-021-97660-2 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 11 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Bianca A. Schuster ◽

Dagmar S. Fraser ◽

Jasper J. F. van den Bosch ◽

Sophie Sowden ◽

Andrew S. Gordon ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Social Interaction ◽

Random Forest ◽

Mental State ◽

Mental States ◽

Correct Identification ◽

Random Forest Analysis ◽

Mental State Attribution ◽

Clinical Conditions ◽

Clinical Populations

AbstractThe ability to ascribe mental states, such as beliefs or desires to oneself and other individuals forms an integral part of everyday social interaction. Animations tasks, in which observers watch videos of interacting triangles, have been extensively used to test mental state attribution in a variety of clinical populations. Compared to control participants, individuals with clinical conditions such as autism typically offer less appropriate mental state descriptions of such videos. Recent research suggests that stimulus kinematics and movement similarity (between the video and the observer) may contribute to mental state attribution difficulties. Here we present a novel adaptation of the animations task, suitable to track and compare animation generator and -observer kinematics. Using this task and a population-derived stimulus database, we confirmed the hypotheses that an animation’s jerk and jerk similarity between observer and animator significantly contribute to the correct identification of an animation. By employing random forest analysis to explore other stimulus characteristics, we reveal that other indices of movement similarity, including acceleration- and rotation-based similarity, also predict performance. Our results highlight the importance of movement similarity between observer and animator and raise new questions about reasons why some clinical populations exhibit difficulties with this task.

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Attributing Minds to Triangles: Kinematics and Observer-Animator Kinematic Similarity predict Mental State Attribution in the Animations Task

10.21203/rs.3.rs-208776/v1 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Bianca A. Schuster ◽

Dagmar S. Fraser ◽

Jasper J. F. van den Bosch ◽

Sophie Sowden ◽

Andrew S. Gordon ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Mental State ◽

Mental States ◽

Autism Spectrum ◽

Correct Identification ◽

Mental State Attribution ◽

Key Factor ◽

Spectrum Disorders ◽

Clinical Conditions ◽

Clinical Populations

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Mental state attribution in schizophrenia: What distinguishes patients with “poor” from patients with “fair” mentalising skills?

European Psychiatry ◽

10.1016/j.eurpsy.2010.10.002 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 27 (5) ◽

pp. 358-364 ◽

Cited By ~ 16

Author(s):

M. Brüne ◽

D. Schaub

Keyword(s):

Executive Functioning ◽

Mental State ◽

Cognitive Skills ◽

Social Cognitive ◽

Skills Training ◽

Mental States ◽

Control Group ◽

Mental State Attribution ◽

Normal Ranges ◽

Median Split

AbstractPurposeAlthough many patients with schizophrenia are impaired in mental states attribution abilities, a significant number perform within normal or near-normal ranges in mental state attribution tasks. No studies have analysed cognitive or behavioural differences between patients with – to some extent – preserved mental state attribution skills and those with poor mentalising abilities.Material and methodsTo examine characteristics of “poor” and “fair” mentalisers, 58 patients with schizophrenia performed a mental state attribution task, a test of general intelligence, and two executive functioning tests. “Poor” and “fair” mentalising skills were defined according to a median-split procedure; the median score in the patient group was also within two standard deviations of the control group. In addition, patients’ social behavioural skills and psychopathological profiles were rated.ResultsPatients performing within normal or near normal ranges on the mental state attribution task had fewer social behavioural abnormalities than patients with poor mentalising abilities (even when controlled for intelligence), but did not differ in executive functioning. Fair mental state performers showed less disorganisation and excitement symptoms than poor performers. The degree of disorganisation mediated the influence of mental state attribution on social behavioural skills.ConclusionsSchizophrenia patients with (partially) preserved mentalising skills have fewer behavioural problems in the social domain than patients with poor mentalising abilities. Conceptual disorganisation mediates the prediction of social behavioural skills through mentalising skills, suggesting that disorganised patients may require special attention regarding social-cognitive skills training.

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Social Attention Effects Do Not Depend On Mental-state Attribution

PsycEXTRA Dataset ◽

10.1037/e520602012-140 ◽

2011 ◽

Author(s):

Geoff G. Cole ◽

Daniel T. Smith ◽

Rebeccah-Claire Billing

Keyword(s):

Mental State ◽

Social Attention ◽

Mental State Attribution

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Stable neural representations of mental states across target people and stimulus modalities

10.31234/osf.io/7axzj ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽

Mark Allen Thornton ◽

Diana Tamir

Keyword(s):

Mental State ◽

Mental States ◽

Brain Regions ◽

The Self ◽

Similarity Analysis ◽

Multiple Modalities ◽

Neural Representations ◽

Conceptual Core ◽

Stimulus Modalities ◽

Huge Variety

Each individual experiences mental states in their own idiosyncratic way, yet perceivers are able to accurately understand a huge variety of states across unique individuals. How do they accomplish this feat? Do people think about their own anger in the same ways as another person’s? Is reading about someone’s anxiety the same as seeing it? Here, we test the hypothesis that a common conceptual core unites mental state representations across contexts. Across three studies, participants judged the mental states of multiple targets, including a generic other, the self, a socially close other, and a socially distant other. Participants viewed mental state stimuli in multiple modalities, including written scenarios and images. Using representational similarity analysis, we found that brain regions associated with social cognition expressed stable neural representations of mental states across both targets and modalities. This suggests that people use stable models of mental states across different people and contexts.

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Mental state dynamics explain the origin of mental state concepts

10.31234/osf.io/kbcsj ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Mark Allen Thornton ◽

Milena Rmus ◽

Diana Tamir

Keyword(s):

Neural Network ◽

Artificial Neural Network ◽

Mental State ◽

Mental States ◽

Social World ◽

The Social ◽

Artificial Neural ◽

Ebb And Flow

People’s thoughts and feelings ebb and flow in predictable ways: surprise arises quickly, anticipation ramps up slowly, regret follows anger, love begets happiness, and so forth. Predicting these transitions between mental states can help people successfully navigate the social world. We hypothesize that the goal of predicting state dynamics shapes people’ mental state concepts. Across seven studies, when people observed more frequent transitions between a pair of novel mental states, they judged those states to be more conceptually similar to each other. In an eighth study, an artificial neural network trained to predict real human mental state dynamics spontaneously learned the same conceptual dimensions that people use to understand these states: the 3d Mind Model. Together these results suggest that mental state dynamics explain the origins of mental state concepts.

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People represent their own mental states more distinctly than others’

10.31234/osf.io/qyu69 ◽

2018 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Mark Allen Thornton ◽

Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽

Judith Mildner ◽

Diana Tamir

Keyword(s):

Mental State ◽

Social Distance ◽

Activity Patterns ◽

Mental States ◽

Direct Access ◽

Social Brain ◽

Privileged Access ◽

Behavioral Studies ◽

The Social ◽

External Cues

One can never know the internal workings of another person – one can only infer others’ mental states based on external cues. In contrast, each person has direct access to the contents of their own mind. Here we test the hypothesis that this privileged access shapes the way people represent internal mental experiences, such that they represent their own mental states more distinctly than the states of others. Across four studies, participants considered their own and others’ mental states; analyses measured the distinctiveness of mental state representations. Two neuroimaging studies used representational similarity analyses to demonstrate that the social brain manifests more distinct activity patterns when thinking about one’s own states versus others’. Two behavioral studies support these findings. Further, they demonstrate that people differentiate between states less as social distance increases. Together these results suggest that we represent our own mind with greater granularity than the minds of others.

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