scholarly journals Context Reinstatement

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy R. Manning
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Cognitive Functions ◽  
Scale Invariance ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Event Segmentation ◽  
Fundamental Properties

Context reinstatement is the process by which we incorporate thoughts from our past into our current mental state. This chapter is concerned with characterizing the cognitive and neuropsychological underpinnings of context reinstatement. Modern theories of context reinstatement are inextricably tied to theories of how we process and perceive the present. The primary goal of this chapter is to present a conceptual framework for characterizing how experiences unfold in time, and how our mental states at each moment relate to our experiences. This framework allows us to compare, contrast, and test different theories of context reinstatement. A second component of this chapter is concerned with two fundamental properties of how our experiences unfold, and how we perceive and remember them: scale invariance and event segmentation. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the proposed role of context reinstatement in facilitating a range of important memory-related cognitive functions.

scholarly journals Attributing Minds to Triangles: Kinematics and Observer-Animator Kinematic Similarity predict Mental State Attribution in the Animations Task

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bianca A. Schuster ◽  
Dagmar S. Fraser ◽  
Jasper J. F. van den Bosch ◽  
Sophie Sowden ◽  
Andrew S. Gordon ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
Correct Identification ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Spectrum Disorders ◽  
Clinical Conditions ◽  
Clinical Populations

Abstract The ability to ascribe mental states, such as beliefs or desires to oneself and other individuals forms an integral part of everyday social interaction. One task that has been extensively used to test mental state attribution in a variety of clinical populations is the animations task, where participants are asked to infer mental states from short videos of interacting triangles. In this task, individuals with clinical conditions such as autism spectrum disorders typically offer fewer and less appropriate mental state descriptions than controls, however little is currently known about why they show these difficulties. Previous studies have hinted at the similarity between an observer’s and the triangles’ movements as a key factor for the successful interpretation of these animations. In this study we present a novel adaptation of the animations task, suitable to track and compare animation generator and -observer kinematics. Using this task and a population-derived stimulus database, we demonstrate that an animation’s kinematics and kinematic similarity between observer and generator are integral for the correct identification of that animation. Our results shed light on why some clinical populations show difficulties in this task and highlight the role of participants’ own movement and specific perceptual properties of the stimuli.

6.  Mental State Decoding in Dysphoric Individuals: The Role of Motivation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brooke Sinclair
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Social Activity ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Underlying Mechanism ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Depression Symptoms ◽  
Clinical Conditions ◽  
Decoding Ability

Depression is associated with pervasive impairments in social and interpersonal functioning. Research demonstrates that individuals with depression have difficulty interacting with peers and show lower levels of social activity than do nondepressed individuals (Levendosky, Okun, & Parker, 1995). In addition, depressed individuals report that their social interactions are less supportive and less rewarding than those of non‐depressed individuals (Nezlek, Hamptom, & Shean, 2000). This reduced social competence may cause depressed individuals to disengage from social interaction, which may in turn exacerbate their state of depression (Rippere, 1980). It is thus important to understand and identify the mechanisms beneath these deficits.  Researchers commonly use the theory of mind framework to understand impaired social functioning in clinical conditions. Theory of mind refers to the ability to make judgments about others’ mental states to understand and predict their social behaviour. Research has found a relationship between theory of mind and dysphoria (i.e., elevated scores on a measure of depression symptoms, but not necessarily a diagnosis of clinical depression). Specifically, dysphoric individuals demonstrate enhanced mental state judgments (Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, & Chen, 2005).  My research investigates social motivation as an underlying mechanism for dysphoric individuals’ enhanced decoding ability. A sample of undergraduates will participate in a theory of mind decoding task following social, monetary or no motivation. I hypothesize that dysphoric individuals will make significantly more accurate judgments than non‐dysphoric individuals. Further, I predict that social motivation will enhance non‐dysphoric individuals’ sensitivity to others’ mental states.

scholarly journals Attributing Minds to Triangles: Kinematics and Observer-Animator Kinematic Similarity predict Mental State Attribution in the Animations Task

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bianca A. Schuster ◽  
Dagmar S. Fraser ◽  
Jasper J. F. van den Bosch ◽  
Sophie Sowden ◽  
Andrew S. Gordon ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
Correct Identification ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Spectrum Disorders ◽  
Clinical Conditions ◽  
Clinical Populations

Abstract The ability to ascribe mental states, such as beliefs or desires to oneself and other individuals forms an integral part of everyday social interaction. One task that has been extensively used to test mental state attribution in a variety of clinical populations is the animations task, where participants are asked to infer mental states from short videos of interacting triangles. In this task, individuals with clinical conditions such as autism spectrum disorders typically offer fewer and less appropriate mental state descriptions than controls, however little is currently known about why they show these difficulties. Previous studies have hinted at the similarity between an observer’s and the triangles’ movements as a key factor for the successful interpretation of these animations. In this study we present a novel adaptation of the animations task, suitable to track and compare animation generator and -observer kinematics. Using this task and a population-derived stimulus database, we demonstrate that an animation’s kinematics and kinematic similarity between observer and generator are integral for the correct identification of that animation. Our results shed light on why some clinical populations show difficulties in this task and highlight the role of participants’ own movement and specific perceptual properties of the stimuli.

scholarly journals Comorbidity between depression and anxiety: assessing the role of bridge mental states in dynamic psychological networks

BMC Medicine ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin N. Groen ◽  
Oisín Ryan ◽  
Johanna T. W. Wigman ◽  
Harriëtte Riese ◽  
Brenda W. J. H. Penninx ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Symptom Clusters ◽  
Depression And Anxiety ◽  
Comorbid Depression ◽  
Vector Autoregressive ◽  
Credible Intervals ◽  
The Difference ◽  
First Time

Abstract Background Comorbidity between depressive and anxiety disorders is common. A hypothesis of the network perspective on psychopathology is that comorbidity arises due to the interplay of symptoms shared by both disorders, with overlapping symptoms acting as so-called bridges, funneling symptom activation between symptom clusters of each disorder. This study investigated this hypothesis by testing whether (i) two overlapping mental states “worrying” and “feeling irritated” functioned as bridges in dynamic mental state networks of individuals with both depression and anxiety as compared to individuals with either disorder alone, and (ii) overlapping or non-overlapping mental states functioned as stronger bridges. Methods Data come from the Netherlands Study of Depression and Anxiety (NESDA). A total of 143 participants met criteria for comorbid depression and anxiety (65%), 40 participants for depression-only (18.2%), and 37 for anxiety-only (16.8%) during any NESDA wave. Participants completed momentary assessments of symptoms (i.e., mental states) of depression and anxiety, five times a day, for 2 weeks (14,185 assessments). First, dynamics between mental states were modeled with a multilevel vector autoregressive model, using Bayesian estimation. Summed average lagged indirect effects through the hypothesized bridge mental states were compared between groups. Second, we evaluated the role of all mental states as potential bridge mental states. Results While the summed indirect effect for the bridge mental state “worrying” was larger in the comorbid group compared to the single disorder groups, differences between groups were not statistically significant. The difference between groups became more pronounced when only examining individuals with recent diagnoses (< 6 months). However, the credible intervals of the difference scores remained wide. In the second analysis, a non-overlapping item (“feeling down”) acted as the strongest bridge mental state in both the comorbid and anxiety-only groups. Conclusions This study empirically examined a prominent network-approach hypothesis for the first time using longitudinal data. No support was found for overlapping mental states “worrying” and “feeling irritable” functioning as bridge mental states in individuals vulnerable for comorbid depression and anxiety. Potentially, bridge mental state activity can only be observed during acute symptomatology. If so, these may present as interesting targets in treatment, but not prevention. This requires further investigation.

scholarly journals Explaining Imagination

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Langland-Hassan
Keyword(s):  
Mental Imagery ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Special Role ◽  
Counterfactual Reasoning ◽  
Psychological States

Imagination will remain a mystery—we will not be able to explain imagination—until we can break it into simpler parts that are more easily understood. Explaining Imagination is a guidebook for doing just that, where the simpler parts are other familiar mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments, decisions, and intentions. In different combinations and contexts, these states constitute cases of imagining. This reductive approach to imagination is at direct odds with the current orthodoxy, which sees imagination as an irreducible, sui generis mental state or process—one that influences our judgments, beliefs, desires, and so on, without being constituted by them. Explaining Imagination looks closely at the main contexts where imagination is thought to be at work and argues that, in each case, the capacity is best explained by appeal to a person’s beliefs, judgments, desires, intentions, or decisions. The proper conclusion is not that there are no imaginings after all, but that these other states simply constitute the relevant cases of imagining. Contexts explored in depth include: hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning, engaging in pretense, appreciating fictions, and generating creative works. The special role of mental imagery within states like beliefs, desires, and judgments is explained in a way that is compatible with reducing imagination to more basic folk psychological states. A significant upshot is that, in order to create an artificial mind with an imagination, we need only give it these more ordinary mental states.

Mental State Approaches to Well-Being

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Haybron
Keyword(s):  
Life Satisfaction ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Psychological Dimensions

This chapter discusses the role of mental states in well-being, focusing on three types of state: pleasure, emotional well-being, and life satisfaction. Some philosophical theories, notably hedonism, take mental states to constitute the entirety of well-being, an approach that has significant attractions but also faces weighty objections. But even those who reject mental state theories of well-being should recognize that the psychological dimensions of well-being are centrally important in human life—though not always in the ways one might expect, particularly in the case of life satisfaction. A second aim of the chapter is to examine the implications of the philosophical discussion for measures of well-being, as well as the contrast between so-called hedonic and eudaimonic approaches. A brief consideration of the upshot of these reflections for policy concludes the chapter.

scholarly journals When do comprehenders mentalize for pragmatic inference?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Trott ◽  
Ben Bergen
Keyword(s):  
Task Performance ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
State Information ◽  
Turn On ◽  
Pragmatic Inference ◽  
Construct Meaning

People often speak indirectly. For example, “It’s cold in here” might be intended not only as a comment on the temperature, but also as a request to turn on the heater. How are comprehenders’ inferences about a speaker’s intentions informed by their ability to reason about the speaker’s mental states, i.e., mentalizing? We introduce a mechanistic framework by which mentalizing might be recruited for pragmatic inference, then ask: is mentalizing recruited primarily for sampling mental state information, or also for the deployment of that information for pragmatic inference? We find that the role of mentalizing is modulated by how explicitly a task involves knowledge. Mentalizing correlates with task performance when comprehenders are asked to sample and report mental state information (Experiment 1b), or when given mental state information explicitly and asked to make an inference (Experiment 2-Explicit); in contrast, mentalizing does not correlate with task performance, or correlates only weakly, when participants are given mental state information implicitly and asked to make a pragmatic inference (Experiment 1a, Experiment 2-Implicit). These results suggest that mentalizing is recruited flexibly, allowing comprehenders to construct meaning from under-specified input.

Occupational Therapy for Children with Handwriting Difficulties: A Framework for Evaluation and Treatment

1997 ◽  
Vol 60 (12) ◽  
pp. 514-520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sidney Chu
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Cognitive Functions ◽  
Developmental Disorder ◽  
Functional Performance ◽  
Occupational Therapist ◽  
Complex Nature ◽  
Unique Role ◽  
Complex Skills ◽  
Experience Difficulty

Handwriting is one of the most complex skills that is learnt and taught. It requires motor, sensory, perceptual, praxis and cognitive functions, and the integration of these functions. When the complex nature of this skill is considered, it comes as little surprise that many children experience difficulty in mastering this area. When an occupational therapist observes that a child referred to the service is having difficulty with handwriting, it becomes necessary for the therapist to administer procedures to identify the strengths and weaknesses that will then become the basis for a remedial programme. This article presents a conceptual framework for evaluating and treating handwriting difficulties presented by children in mainstream education with specific developmental disorder, such as dyspraxia or dyslexia. The performance components and functional performance of handwriting are briefly reviewed. Both evaluation and intervention procedures are discussed in order to guide the therapist in developing remedial and instructional programmes. The article highlights the unique role of the occupational therapist in evaluating and treating a child's functional performance of handwriting skills.

Expectations

2020 ◽  
pp. 995-1018
Author(s):  
Jenny Judge ◽  
Bence Nanay
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Musical Experience ◽  
Detailed Characterization ◽  
Musical Listening

Almost every facet of the experience of musical listening—from pitch, to rhythm, to the experience of emotion—is thought to be shaped by the meeting and thwarting of expectations. On the assumption that these components of the phenomenal character of musical experience are indeed shaped by expectations rather than some other kind of mental state (an assumption we do not challenge in this chapter), it is unclear what kind of mental states these expectations are. In particular, it is unclear what their format is, and whether they are conscious or unconscious. The chapter distinguishes between different modes of musical listening, arguing that expectations play different roles in each, and pointing to the need for increased collaboration between music psychologists and philosophers in order to arrive at a more detailed characterization of conscious musical experience and the role of expectations therein than has previously been offered.

The Role of Criteria in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy

1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 601-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
John L. Koethe
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Proper Interpretation ◽  
Behavior Characteristic

Although the literature on Wittgenstein's notion of criteria is extensive, it seems unsatisfactory. Most interpretations of criteria not only misrepresent Wittgenstein; more importantly, they misconstrue the relation between a mental state and the behavior characteristic of that state. If by “criteria” Wittgenstein meant what he has been taken to mean, it is unlikely that any mental states have criteria. In this paper I shall argue that a proper interpretation of Wittgenstein's notion provides an account of the relation between some mental states and the behavior characteristic of them which is at least approximately correct.According to current interpretations of criteria the relation between a form of behavior C and the mental state of which it is a criterion, S, is such that the proposition “A person displaying C is (or: very likely is) in S” is either a necessary truth, known a priori to be true, or “true in virtue of a definition, convention, or rule of language.”

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