scholarly journals The material difference in human cognition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karenleigh A. Overmann

Humans leverage material forms for unique cognitive purposes: We recruit and incorporate them into our cognitive system, exploit them to accumulate and distribute cognitive effort, and use them to recreate phenotypic change in new individuals and generations. These purposes are exemplified by writing, a relatively recent tool that has become highly adept at eliciting specific psychological and behavioral responses in its users, capability it achieved by changing in ways that facilitated, accumulated, and distributed incremental behavioral and psychological change between individuals and generations. Writing is described here as a self-organizing system whose design features reflect points of maximal usefulness that emerged under sustained collective use of the tool. Such self-organization may hold insights applicable to human cognitive evolution and tool use more generally. Accordingly, this article examines the emergence of the ability to leverage material forms for cognitive purposes, using the tool-using behaviors and lithic technologies of ancestral species and contemporary non-human primates as proxies for matters like collective use, generational sustainment, and the nonteleological emergence of design features.

2020 ◽  
pp. 105971232093073
Author(s):  
Karenleigh A Overmann

Humans leverage material forms for unique cognitive purposes: We recruit and incorporate them into our cognitive system, exploit them to accumulate and distribute cognitive effort, and use them to recreate phenotypic change in new individuals and generations. These purposes are exemplified by writing, a relatively recent tool that has become highly adept at eliciting specific psychological and behavioral responses in its users, capability it achieved by changing in ways that facilitated, accumulated, and distributed incremental behavioral and psychological change between individuals and generations. Writing is described here as a self-organizing system whose design features reflect points of maximal usefulness that emerged under sustained collective use of the tool. Such self-organization may hold insights applicable to human cognitive evolution and tool use more generally. Accordingly, this article examines the emergence of the ability to leverage material forms for cognitive purposes, using the tool-using behaviors and lithic technologies of ancestral species and contemporary non-human primates as proxies for matters like collective use, generational sustainment, and the non-teleological emergence of design features.


Author(s):  
Tarja Susi ◽  
Tom Ziemke

This paper addresses the relation between an agent and its environment, and more specifically, how subjects perceive object/artefacts/tools and their (possible) use. Four different conceptions of the relation between subject and object are compared here: functional tone (von Uexküll), equipment (Heidegger), affordance (Gibson), and entry point (Kirsh). even as these concepts have developed within different disciplines (theoretical biology, philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science) and in very different historical contexts, they are used more or less interchangeably in much of the literature, and typically conflated under the label of ‘affordance’. However, at closer inspection, they turn out to have not only similarities, but also substantial differences, which are identified and discussed here. Given that the relation between subjects and their objects is crucial to understanding human cognition and interaction with tools and technology, as well as robots’ interaction with their environment, we argue that these differences deserve some more attention than they have received so far.


Author(s):  
Iain Davidson

Tom Wynn’s original work that looked at the evolution of stone tool technology using Piaget’s developmental sequence was the beginning of productive research into the evolution of hominin and human cognition. In this chapter, I evaluate those beginnings and discusses recent attempts to provide a more satisfactory understanding of changes in stone tool technologies, including work by Philip Barnard and William McGrew, subsequent work by Tom Wynn, and my own work with various collaborators. It suggests that some of the previous understandings of cognitive evolution were shaped by the fact that approaches to stone tools were largely determined in the nineteenth century. I propose some new ways of looking at stone tools and the sort of story that allows for more productive models of the evolution of human cognition.


Author(s):  
Neelam Naikar ◽  
Ashleigh Brady

This chapter presents a perspective of human expertise in sociotechnical systems based on the phenomenon of self-organization. Consistent with the ideals of the field of cognitive systems engineering, this perspective is based on empirical observations of how work is achieved in complex settings and incorporates an emphasis on design. The proposed perspective is motivated by the observation that workers in sociotechnical systems adapt not just their individual behaviors, but also their collective structures, in ways that are closely fitted to the evolving circumstances, such that these systems are necessarily self-organizing, a phenomenon that is essential for dealing with complexity in the task environment. Accordingly, the chapter explores in depth the theoretical and design implications of the phenomenon of self-organization for understanding and supporting human expertise in sociotechnical systems, and draws attention to the broader implications of this phenomenon for advancing a social basis for human cognition.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Brooks ◽  
Shinya Yamamoto

Tool use is a central topic in research on cognitive evolution and behavioral ecology in non-human animals. Originally thought to be a uniquely human phenomenon, many other species have been observed making and using tools for a variety of purposes, starting with Goodall’s (1964) groundbreaking work with chimpanzees in Gombe. Despite the frequent attention and great research interest in animal tool use, and ubiquity of the behavior, we argue here that chewing sticks by dogs (and other animals) should be included as a case of tool use. We discuss alternate possible explanations and then propose several testable predictions regarding this hypothesis. We suggest that tool use may be more common than is often assumed and that many cases of animal tool use may be overlooked.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
François Osiurak ◽  
Caroline Crétel ◽  
Natalie Uomini ◽  
Chloé Bryche ◽  
Mathieu Lesourd ◽  
...  

Understanding the link between brain evolution and the evolution of distinctive features of modern human cognition is a fundamental challenge. A still unresolved question concerns the co-evolution of tool behavior (i.e., tool use or tool making) and language. The shared neurocognitive processes hypothesis suggests that the emergence of the combinatorial component of language skills within the frontal lobe/Broca’s area made possible the complexification of tool-making skills. The importance of frontal lobe/Broca’s area in tool behavior is somewhat surprising with regard to the literature on neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience, which has instead stressed the critical role of the left inferior parietal lobe. Therefore, to be complete, any version of the shared neurocognitive processes hypothesis needs to integrate the potential interactions between the frontal lobe/Broca’s area and the left inferior parietal lobe as well as their co-evolution at a phylogenetic level. Here we sought to provide first elements of answer through the use of the massive deployment framework, which posits that evolutionarily older brain areas are deployed in more cognitive functions (i.e., they are less specific). We focused on the left parietal cortex, and particularly the left areas PF, PGI, and AIP, which are known to be involved in tool use, language, and motor control, respectively. The deployment of each brain area in different cognitive functions was measured by conducting a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies. Our results confirmed the pattern of specificity for each brain area and also showed that the left area PGI was far less specific than the left areas PF and AIP. From these findings, we discuss the different evolutionary scenarios depicting the potential co-evolution of the combinatorial and generative components of language and tool behavior in our lineage.


2011 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. P. Møller

Abstract Behavioral responses to environmental change are the mechanisms that allow for rapid phenotypic change preventing temporary or permanent damage and hence preventing reductions in fitness. Extreme climatic events are by definition rare, although they are predicted to increase in amplitude and frequency in the coming years. However, our current knowledge about behavioral responses to such extreme events is scarce. Here I analyze two examples of the effects of extreme weather events on behavior and life history: (1) A comparison of behavior and life history during extremely warm and extremely cold years relative to normal years; and (2) a comparison of behavior before and after the extremely early snowfall in fall 1974 when numerous birds died in the Alps during September-October. Behavioral and life history responses of barn swallows Hirundo rustica to extremely cold and extremely warm years were positively correlated, with particularly large effect sizes in cold years. Extreme mortality in barn swallows during fall migration 1974 in the Alps eliminated more than 40% of the breeding population across large areas in Central and Northern Europe, and this affected first arrival date, changes in timing and extent of reproduction and changes in degree of breeding sociality supposedly as a consequence of correlated responses to selection. Finally, I provide directions for research that will allow us to better understand behavior and life history changes in response to extreme climate change.


2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (23) ◽  
pp. 6348-6354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan L. MacLean

A satisfactory account of human cognitive evolution will explain not only the psychological mechanisms that make our species unique, but also how, when, and why these traits evolved. To date, researchers have made substantial progress toward defining uniquely human aspects of cognition, but considerably less effort has been devoted to questions about the evolutionary processes through which these traits have arisen. In this article, I aim to link these complementary aims by synthesizing recent advances in our understanding of what makes human cognition unique, with theory and data regarding the processes of cognitive evolution. I review evidence that uniquely human cognition depends on synergism between both representational and motivational factors and is unlikely to be accounted for by changes to any singular cognitive system. I argue that, whereas no nonhuman animal possesses the full constellation of traits that define the human mind, homologies and analogies of critical aspects of human psychology can be found in diverse nonhuman taxa. I suggest that phylogenetic approaches to the study of animal cognition—which can address questions about the selective pressures and proximate mechanisms driving cognitive change—have the potential to yield important insights regarding the processes through which the human cognitive phenotype evolved.


2012 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 226-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph L. Holloway

AbstractDesign features for language and stone toolmaking (not tool use) involve similar if not homologous cognitive processes. Both are arbitrary transformations of internal “intrinsic” symbolization, whereas non-human tool using is mostly an iconic transformation. The major discontinuity between humans and non-humans (chimpanzees) is language. The presence of stone tools made to standardized patterns suggests communicative and social control skills that involved language.


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