scholarly journals Gloss to the Resolution of the Supreme Court of 26 February 2021, III CZP 24/20 [on the Interpretation of the Will]

2021 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 235-244
Author(s):  
Paweł Marcin Zdanikowski
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Functional Interpretation ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Positive Assessment ◽  
Degree Of Certainty ◽  
The Will

The resolution with gloss concerns the rules for interpreting a will. The Supreme Court stated in it that an interpretation of a will should be performed taking into account all circumstances, including those external to the will and using all means of evidence. The Supreme Court decided that it is the court adjudicating in the case for inheritance acquisition, assessing the evidence gathered in a specific case, that should assess whether it is actually possible to establish the will of the testator. The author of the gloss accepts the thesis of the resolution, but argues with the position of the Supreme Court contained in its justification that only the rules for evidence assessment constitute an instrument allowing one to establish the testator’s will. In the opinion of the author of the gloss the functional interpretation of Art. 948 of the Polish Civil Code (k.c.) indicates limits to the interpretation of the will. After all this is a process that renders it possible to determine the testator’s will in a manner that does not raise any doubts. Therefore, if the interpretation of the will of such fails to secure such a degree of certainty, even despite a positive assessment of the evidence gathered in the case, the court should state that the inheritance has been acquired under the Act.

Scientific Commentary on the Review of Judicial Practice on Some Issues of the Application of Legislation on Business Entities

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 27-32
Author(s):  
V. K. Andreev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Public Relations ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Russian Federation ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Judicial Practice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Business Entities ◽  
Law Making

The article discusses the forms of clarification on matters of judicial practice by the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the Presidium of the Supreme Court, as well as in the Review of judicial practice on some issues of the application of legislation on business companies dated December 25, 2019. Clarifications of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on issues of judicial practice are characterized as the positions of the courts identified in the course of studying and summarizing the judicial practice of the corresponding category of cases, which are acts of individual regulation of public relations. Focusing on Art. 6 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation and Section 6, Art. 12 of the APC RF shows the validity of dividing wrong into two types of wrong: the «moderate» type of «judicial law-making and the position of the court» and the «radical» type of «judicial law-making», when the court develops the rule of law, which contradicts the constitutional principle of separation of powers. When resolving corporate disputes, it is necessary to investigate whether the charter of a non-public company does not contain the rights and obligations of its participants, which they themselves created by making a unanimous decision and including them in the charter of the company (paragraph 3 of Art. 66.3 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, paragraph 3 of Art. 14 of the Law about LLC).

scholarly journals Czy przebaczenie niweczy skutki uprzedniego wydziedziczenia?

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 143-153
Author(s):  
Anna Moskal
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Inheritance Law ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Made In

Does forgiveness nullify the effects of previous disinheritance? The legal nature of forgiveness is the subject of passionate debates among the representatives of civil law doctrine. According to the dominant position in the literature, forgiveness is an act of affection or its manifested expression of forgiveness of the perpetrator of experienced injustice and related to this grudge. This institution has been applied three times in the Civil Code — once with the donation agreement, twice in regulations of inheritance law. Article 1010 § 1 provides that a testator cannot disinherit eligible for legal portion if he forgave him. The wording of the above article indicates that accomplishment of disinheritance in case if testator eligible for legal portion has previously forgiven. The legislator did not, however, determine the effects of forgiveness in relation to previous disinheritance. In the act of 1971, the Supreme Court accepted that such forgiveness would automatically nullify the effects of disinheritance, and could be made in any form. In recent years, lower courts have begun to question the Supreme Court's position, and judges increasingly refer to the critical statements of numerous doctrines. As it was rightly stated, admitting the possibility of invoking the forgiveness made after disinheritance poses a serious threat to the realization of the testator’s will, who, by forgiving, does not necessarily want to revoke the effects of his previous disinheritance. The postulate of de lege ferenda is, according to the author of the article, giving of freedom of judging the effects of forgiveness to the courts and each examination of the forgiving testator’s will on the possible abatement of the consequences of previous disinheritance.]]>

scholarly journals TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM REAFFIRMED IN THE SUPREME COURT

2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 499-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Sloan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Royal Society ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Moral Claim ◽  
Her Family ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Will ◽  
Cruelty To Animals ◽  
First Time ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The case now known as Ilott v The Blue Cross [2017] UKSC 17 was the first time that the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 was considered at the highest judicial level. The Court of Appeal ([2015] EWCA Civ 797, noted in [2016] C.L.J. 31) had significantly enhanced the award given to an estranged and “disinherited” but needy daughter (Heather Ilott) at the expense of the charities (the Blue Cross, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds and Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) who were the principal beneficiaries under the will of her mother, Melita Jackson, leaving her with £143,000 out of the £486,000 estate primarily to purchase the council house in which she and her family were living. The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the charities’ appeal, restoring Judge Million's original £50,000 order. Giving the lead judgment, Lord Hughes reasserted the centrality of testamentary freedom in English law, emphasised the importance of the Act's limitation to “reasonable financial provision” for maintenance for non-spouse/civil partner applicants (s. 1(2)(b)), and held that a need for maintenance was a necessary but not sufficient condition for a successful claim. He approved previous case law in holding that maintenance could not “extend to any or everything which it would be desirable for the claimant to have” (at [14]), but was not limited to “subsistence” either (at [15]). He also confirmed that the focus of the correct test under the 1975 Act is not on the behaviour of the testatrix, but opined the reasonableness of her decision may still be a significant consideration, as may the extent of any “moral claim” even if that is not a “sine qua non” (at [20]).

Law, Custom, and Social Norms: Civil Adjudications in Qing and Republican China

2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-104
Author(s):  
Xiaoqun Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Chinese History ◽  
Republican China ◽  
Civil Justice ◽  
Republican Period ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Moral Universe ◽  
The Republic

This study examines how law, custom, and social norm interacted in civil justice in Qing and Republican China by looking into 152 civil cases tried in 1912, right after the founding of the Republic of China, and a body of legal interpretations from the Supreme Court during 1912-1929, and certain provisions in the Civil Code of 1929-30--the very first one in Chinese history. It shows that both law and custom were invoked by judges within their moral universe or social norm. It traces how the Supreme Court allowed local customs to be a legal ground for rulings in certain civil disputes, and which customs in civil matters in the Qing and the early Republic were, and which were not, “hardened” into the Civil Code. The interplay between law and custom, mediated by judges with their normative sense of right and wrong, constituted both continuity and change in civil justice between the Qing era and the Republican period. Ultimately, the issues addressed here speak to a larger question of how Chinese jurists, within their judicial discretions, tried to strike a difficult but necessary balance between “law-on-books” and “law-in-action,” while law on the books was undergoing important revisions.

scholarly journals MENAKAR PROGRESIFITAS LEMBAGA PERADILAN DALAM MEWUJUDKAN DEMOKRASI BERINTEGRITAS

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 2102-2117
Author(s):  
Alda Rifada Rizqi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
The People ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Law ◽  
Corrupt Behavior

Democracy with integrity will be realized if carried out in accordance with the will of the people as holders of sovereignty, the KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) as the election organizer has the authority to make regulations that support a better democracy. KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) Regulation No. 20 of 2018 as evidence that the KPU is committed to participating in preventing corrupt behavior. It was considered to have been considered as an effort to protect the interests of the people, but the regulation was submitted to a judicial review at the Supreme Court. Then, based on legal-formal considerations and based on the legal positivism of the Supreme Court, the request for the test is granted. The decision distanced itself from progressive legal values that justified the denial of what was regulated in legislation in order to put forward the values of public justice, because basically the law was made to fulfill human interests, accommodating the will of the people for the sake of order.

scholarly journals Odpowiedzialność kościelnych osób prawnych za czyny pedofilskie duchownego – wyrok na miarę precedensu. Uwagi w sprawie wyroku Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 31 marca 2020 r., sygn. II CSK 124/19

2020 ◽  
pp. 33-52
Author(s):  
Paweł Borecki
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Catholic Church ◽  
World View ◽  
Civil Liability ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
District Court ◽  
Supreme Court Ruling ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of First Instance ◽  
Legal Entities

The judgment of March 31, 2020, file ref. II CSK 124/19, has great social and legal significance. It is the first Supreme Court ruling concerning the civil liability of church legal entities for pedophilic acts committed by a clergyman. The Supreme Court shared the view of the Court of Appeal accepting the liability of church legal persons in the light of all the facts of the case of Art. 430 of the Civil Code (culpability in supervision). However, it convincingly distanced itself from the position of the District Court (court of first instance) that liability under Art. 429 of the Civil Code (culpability in choice) should be taken into consideration. In the justification of the judgment, the Supreme Court conducted a thorough analysis of the premises for the civil liability of church legal persons for the activities of a religious person subordinate to them. In particular, it stated that if the perpetrator acts for personal gain and the performance of the official activity enables him to cause damage, the superior cannot effectively raise the objection that the subordinate caused said damage only in the performance of the entrusted tasks. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the interpretation of Art. 430 of the Civil Code, assuming the liability of legal persons for damage caused by a subordinate. It distinctly applied this liability to church legal entities. When appointing the adjudication panel of the Supreme Court, impartiality was preserved. On the other hand, doubts are raised regarding the Court’s neutrality in terms of world-view in some parts of its judgment justification. The judgment of March 31, 2020 must be assessed as brave and just. It has the chance to set the course of judicial decisions in matters of the liability of religious legal persons for pedophilic acts committed by clergy acting under their supervision. The justification of the judgment is understandably critical towards the perpetrator and church legal persons superior to him, and also sometimes towards the provisions of the Code of Canon Law. It should be emphasized, however, that the judgment is not an “indictment” against the Catholic Church as such, and even less so against religion.

scholarly journals Odpowiedzialność zakładu ubezpieczeń za szkody wyrządzone przez agenta ubezpieczeniowego

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 13-30
Author(s):  
Amanda Adamska ◽  
Anna Maria Barańska
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Insurance Company ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Insurance Agent ◽  
Insurance Intermediation ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Injured Party ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Definition Of

The responsibility of an insurance company for damages caused by an insurance agent The subject of this article is the responsibility of an insurance company for damages caused by an insurance agent in connection with the performance of agency activities. The Act on Insurance Intermediation of 22 May 2003 lays down a liability regime based on the principle of risk. It also contains the definition of an insurance agent and performed agency activities. In the next part of the article there is analysed the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court concerning the interpretation of article 11 1 of the abovementioned Act. It discusses an attempt at defining the difference between activities performed “in connection with” and “at the occasion of” other activities. Finally there is analysed an issue of the contribution of the injured party to the occurrence of the damage in this type of cases article 362 of the Civil Code.

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