The notion of “progress” from the philosophy of language perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-24
Author(s):  
Ekaterina Vostrikova

This paper discusses the notion of progress and the idea proposed by Alexander Nikiforov that the term “progress” belongs to the same class of words as predicates of personal taste. This claim is based on the observation that our assessment of progress depends on our subjective point of view. The paper argues that there is a substantive difference between terms of personal taste and the term “progress”. Specifically, it is shown that “progress” does not necessarily make reference to a personal point of view. The subjectivity of our assessment of “progress” in certain areas seems to be rooted in the choice of the scale and our ideas of the ideal state of an object that is the endpoint of that scale. The paper also discusses A. Nikiforov’s idea that the evolution of the Universe can provide us with the objective scale for evaluation of progress in all areas. I argue against this idea by showing that it does not help us overcome the subjectivity of progress assessment in many cases.

Think ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (60) ◽  
pp. 33-49
Author(s):  
William Lyons

The author sets out to respond to the student complaint that ‘Philosophy did not answer “the big questions”’, in particular the question ‘What is the meaning of life?’ The response first outlines and evaluates the most common religious answer, that human life is given a meaning by God who created us and informs us that this life is just the pilgrim way to the next eternal life in heaven. He then discusses the response that, from the point of view of post-Darwinian science and the evolution of the universe and all that is in it, human life on Earth must be afforded no more meaning than the meaning we would give to a microscopic planaria or to some creature on another planet in a distant universe. All things including human creatures on Planet Earth just exist for a time and that is that. There is no plan or purpose. In the last sections the author outlines the view that it is we humans ourselves who give meaning to our lives by our choices of values or things that are worth pursuing and through our resulting sense of achievement or the opposite. Nevertheless the question ‘What is the meaning of life?’ can mean quite different things in different contexts, and so merit different if related answers. From one point of view one answer may lie in terms of the love of one human for another.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-39
Author(s):  
Imam Ghozali ◽  
Zulfikar Hasan ◽  
Chanifudin ◽  
Rahman

Afifuddin Muhajir's background concerning the Ideal State cannot be separated from the strengthening of the demands of some Indonesian Muslims who are members of the 212 movements to uphold NKRI Bersyariah. Starting from their success in tackling the political career of Basuki Cahaya Purnama (Ahok) in the 2017 DKI Pilkada. This movement strengthened in the 2019 Presidential election. They supported the Prabowo subianto-Sandiaga Uno pair who were considered more Islamic and capable of realizing their political ideals. Afifuddin Muhajir considered the Political Identity movement in the name of religion to be a very dilemma in Indonesian society which is multi-ethnic, ethnic, cultural, and religious. Politics as a product of Jurisprudence and Muamalah has space for ijtihad and has becomes a common consensus to build the life of the nation and state. This research is a Research Library, that examines Afifuddin Muhajir in his speech conferring the Honorary Doctorate at the Walisongo Islamic State University, Semarang, Central Java. This study focuses on the concept of the Ideal State according to Afifuddin Muhajir with sub-discussions, namely: Political Islam, Pancasila, NKRI, and the State Constitution. This discussion sub-section will answer the concept of an ideal state according to Afifuddin Muhajir from the point of view of Jurisprudence and Ushul Fiqh who are experts in their expertise. This research is certainly interested in answering extremist Islamic groups who want a state form at the level of sharia or Islamic law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-38
Author(s):  
Marián Zouhar

Abstract The aim of the paper is to defend the idea that, from the semantic point of view, predicates of personal taste behave in communication like ordinary indexical expressions (pronouns, demonstratives, etc.). It means that they express different semantic contents relative to relevantly different contexts of utterances. This is a consequence of the claim that “tasty” (which is our paradigm example of a predicate of personal taste) and “tasty for (someone)” (where “someone” is a placeholder for an agent) express the same, or very similar, semantic contents relative to the same context of utterance. Now this idea can be challenged by pointing to certain communicative phenomena, such as disagreements about matters of personal taste. It is argued, however, that there is an explanation of taste disagreements that is compatible with the indexical nature of predicates of personal taste. Moreover, it is shown that an explanation along these lines is rather natural because it seems to be necessitated by communication-based evidence.


Author(s):  
HIROSHI TSUNEMI

There are five X-ray astronomy satellites launched from Japan. The latest satellite, Suzaku, was launched in 2005. MAXI is an all sky survey mission in X-ray that was attached to the ISS in 2009. These two are functioning at present. ASTRO-H is the only approved mission in X-ray that will be launched in 2014. There are four X-ray detectors on board ASTRO-H, SXS, SXI, HXI and SGD as well as X-ray telescopes made of thin foil mirrors. Most of the future missions heavily depend on them both in technology and in science. From this point of view, we have to concentrate on ASTRO-H so that we can expand our activities in future. In Japan, the small scientific satellite project is now on-going. Two missions are already allocated while no X-ray mission is approved. DIOS, PolariS, CAST and FFAST are proposed. Here we explain FFAST in detail that will study the evolution of the universe.


Author(s):  
Dominic Scott

This chapter presents a reading of Plato’s Republic. The Republic is among Plato’s most complex works. From its title, the first-time reader will expect a dialogue about political theory, yet the work starts from the perspective of the individual, coming to focus on the question of how, if at all, justice contributes to an agent’s happiness. Only after this question has been fully set out does the work evolve into an investigation of politics—of the ideal state and of the institutions that sustain it, especially those having to do with education. But the interest in individual justice and happiness is never left behind. Rather, the work weaves in and out of the two perspectives, individual and political, right through to its conclusion. All this may leave one wondering about the unity of the work. The chapter shows that, despite the enormous range of topics discussed, the Republic fits together as a coherent whole.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Nils Franzén

Abstract This article discusses why it is the case that we refuse to accept strange evaluative claims as being true in fictions, even though we are happy to go along with other types of absurdities in such contexts. For instance, we would refuse to accept the following statement as true, even in the context of a fiction: (i) In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl. This article offers a sensibilist diagnosis of this puzzle, inspired by an observation first made by David Hume. According to sensibilism, the way we feel about things settles their evaluative properties. Thus, when confronted with a fictional scenario where the configuration of non-evaluative facts and properties is relevantly similar to the actual world, we refuse to go along with evaluative properties being instantiated according to a different pattern. It is the attitudes we hold in the actual world that fix the extension of evaluative terms, even in nonactual worlds. When engaging with a fiction, we (to some extent) leave our beliefs about what the world is like behind, while taking our emotional attitudes with us into the fiction. To substantiate this diagnosis, this paper outlines a sensibilist semantics for evaluative terms based on recent discussion regarding predicates of personal taste, and explains how, together with standard assumptions about the nature of fictional discourse, it makes the relevant predictions with respect to engagement with fictions.


1967 ◽  
Vol 113 (501) ◽  
pp. 813-822 ◽  
Author(s):  
Örnulv Ödegård

My choice of Kraepelin as a point of departure for this lecture has definite reasons. If one wants to stay within the field of clinical psychiatry (as opposed to psychiatric history), that is as far back as one can reasonably go. By this no slight is intended upon the pre-Kraepelinian psychiatrists. For our topic Henry Maudsley would indeed have been a most appropriate starting point, and by no means for reasons of courtesy. His general point of view is admirably sound as a basis for the scientific study of prognosis in psychiatry. I quote: “There is no accident in madness. Causality, not casualty, governs its appearance in the universe, and it is very far from being a good and sufficient practice simply to mark its phenomena and straightway to pass on as if they belonged not to an order but to a disorder of events that called for no explanation.” On the special problem of prognosis he shows his clinical acumen by stating that the outlook is poor when the course of illness is insidious, but this only means that these cases develop their psychoses on the basis of mental deviations which go very far back in the patient's life, so that in fact they are generally in a chronic stage at the time of their first admission to hospital. Here he actually corrects a mistake which is still quite often made. He shows his dynamic attitude when he says that prognosis is to a large extent modified by external conditions, in particular by the attitude of friends and relatives. Maudsley's dynamic reasoning was limited by the narrow framework of the degeneration hypothesis of those days. He had a sceptical attitude towards classification, which he regarded as artificial and dangerously pseudo-exact. His own classification was deliberately provisional, with very wide groups. He held that a description of various sub-forms of chronic insanity was useless, as it would mean nothing but a tiresome enumeration of unconnected details.


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