scholarly journals LONG TERM COMPLICATIONS OF COVID-19

Author(s):  
Laxminarayana Kurady Bairy ◽  
Raghavendra Bhat

SARS-CoV-2 pandemic started in December 2019. Some countries have seen second and even third wave of infection. Unlike in the beginning of the pandemic, the management of the infection has improved over the period resulting in less morbidity and mortality. This is because of improved knowledge of the disease due to several studies that are conducted during last one year. However, of late what is worrying is the long-term complications of the disease. The most common being the post covid fatigue, which lasts more than six months in some patients resulting in not able to carry out routine work as well as earning livelihood. Other common complications are pulmonary, cardiac, renal and neurological. The exact mechanism of these complications are not known. The real problem is that there is no definite treatment for these complications. Resting, relaxing and reassurance are the treatment practiced now apart from organ/system specific management. Since the pandemic is recent one we may have wait for some more time to get more information of long-term sequelae of COVID19.  

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Di Domenico ◽  
Chiara E. Sabbatini ◽  
Pierre-Yves Boëlle ◽  
Chiara Poletto ◽  
Pascal Crépey ◽  
...  

Abstract Background After one year of stop-and-go COVID-19 mitigation, in the spring of 2021 European countries still experienced sustained viral circulation due to the Alpha variant. As the prospect of entering a new pandemic phase through vaccination was drawing closer, a key challenge remained on how to balance the efficacy of long-lasting interventions and their impact on the quality of life. Methods Focusing on the third wave in France during spring 2021, we simulate intervention scenarios of varying intensity and duration, with potential waning of adherence over time, based on past mobility data and modeling estimates. We identify optimal strategies by balancing efficacy of interventions with a data-driven “distress” index, integrating intensity and duration of social distancing. Results We show that moderate interventions would require a much longer time to achieve the same result as high intensity lockdowns, with the additional risk of deteriorating control as adherence wanes. Shorter strict lockdowns are largely more effective than longer moderate lockdowns, for similar intermediate distress and infringement on individual freedom. Conclusions Our study shows that favoring milder interventions over more stringent short approaches on the basis of perceived acceptability could be detrimental in the long term, especially with waning adherence.


2018 ◽  
pp. 49-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. E. Mamonov

Our analysis documents that the existence of hidden “holes” in the capital of not yet failed banks - while creating intertemporal pressure on the actual level of capital - leads to changing of maturity of loans supplied rather than to contracting of their volume. Long-term loans decrease, whereas short-term loans rise - and, what is most remarkably, by approximately the same amounts. Standardly, the higher the maturity of loans the higher the credit risk and, thus, the more loan loss reserves (LLP) banks are forced to create, increasing the pressure on capital. Banks that already hide “holes” in the capital, but have not yet faced with license withdrawal, must possess strong incentives to shorten the maturity of supplied loans. On the one hand, it raises the turnovers of LLP and facilitates the flexibility of capital management; on the other hand, it allows increasing the speed of shifting of attracted deposits to loans to related parties in domestic or foreign jurisdictions. This enlarges the potential size of ex post revealed “hole” in the capital and, therefore, allows us to assume that not every loan might be viewed as a good for the economy: excessive short-term and insufficient long-term loans can produce the source for future losses.


Author(s):  
Matthew Rendall

It is sometimes argued in support of discounting future costs and benefits that if we gave the same weight to the future as to the present, we would invest nearly all our income, but never spend it. Rather than enjoying the fruits of our investments, we would always do better to reinvest them. Undiscounted utilitarianism (UU), so the argument goes, is collectively self-defeating. This attempted reductio ad absurdum fails. Regardless of whether each generation successfully followed UU, or merely attempted to follow it, we could never get trapped in endless saving. The real problem is different: without the ability to foresee the end of the world, UU cannot tell us how much to save. Discounting is a defensible response, but only when coupled with a rule against risking catastrophe.


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