scholarly journals Not So Innocent

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-86
Author(s):  
Oda Storbråten Davanger
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Human Error ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Faith And Reason ◽  
Human Goodness

Leibniz seeks to establish the tenability of faith and reason in his moral philosophy through a tripod of thought, consisting of 1) fundamental human goodness; 2) human error in judgment; and 3) that God is just. A difficulty arises concerning how God can justly punish human beings if they always will what is Good. By considering akrasia, which occurs when error is committed despite its clear nonconformity with the Good, and examining the Leibnizian concept of “judgment,” Leibniz’s tripod can be upheld.

Can't We All Just Respect One Another a Little Less?

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 463-484
Author(s):  
Michael Neumann
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Thomas Nagel ◽  
Moral Claims

Contemporary moral philosophy and much contemporary moralizing almost radiate respect for persons. Thomas Nagel is one of many who take its primacy for granted. In a review of Scanion he says:Scanlon's theory addresses a number of its central questions: first, the question of the objectivity or truth of moral Claims, their relation to reason, and whether or not they should be regarded as in some sense relative or subjective; second, the question of the kind of concern or respect for persons that is at the foundation of morality…Many others take the centrality and foundational role of such respect as a given. This is a big change from the days when moralists held that all human beings deserved a certain basic and equal disrespect.

Karl Barth's Moral Thought

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald McKenny
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Theological Ethics ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Form Of Life ◽  
God's Grace ◽  
The Right

Does theological ethics articulate moral norms with the assistance of moral philosophy? Or does it leave that task to moral philosophy alone while it describes a distinctively Christian way of acting or form of life? These questions lie at the heart of theological ethics as a discipline. Karl Barth’s theological ethics makes a strong case for the first alternative. This book follows Barth’s efforts to present God’s grace as a moral norm in his treatments of divine commands, moral reasoning, responsibility, and agency. It shows how Barth’s conviction that grace is the norm of human action generates problems for his ethics at nearly every turn, as it involves a moral good that confronts human beings from outside rather than perfecting them as the kind of creature they are. Yet it defends Barth’s insistence on the right of theology to articulate moral norms, and it shows how Barth may lead theological ethics to exercise that right in a more compelling way than he did.

Philippa Foot's Virtue Ethics Has an Achilles' Heel

Dialogue ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Woodcock
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
General Problem ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Natural Goodness ◽  
Human Goodness ◽  
Philippa Foot ◽  
Normative Implications

ABSTRACTMy aim in this article is to argue that Philippa Foot fails to provide a convincing basis for moral evaluation in her book Natural Goodness. Foot's proposal fails because her conception of natural goodness and defect in human beings either sanctions prescriptive claims that are clearly objectionable or else it inadvertently begs the question of what constitutes a good human life by tacitly appealing to an independent ethical standpoint to sanitize the theory's normative implications. Foot's appeal to natural facts about human goodness is in this way singled out as an Achilles' heel that undermines her attempt to establish an independent framework for virtue ethics. This problem might seem to be one that is uniquely applicable to the bold naturalism of Foot's methodology; however, I claim that the problem is indicative of a more general problem for all contemporary articulations of virtue ethics.

Moral Philosophy and its Anti-pluralist Bias

1996 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 117-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bhikhu Parekh
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Normative Question ◽  
Ways Of Life

It is an obvious fact of history that human beings have always entertained and continue to entertain different conceptions of the good and lead very different lives both individually and collectively. This raises two questions. First, why do ways of life differ? And second, how should we respond to their differences? The first is an explanatory, and the second a normative question, and the two are closely related. The first question has been answered differently by different writers, of which I shall mention three by way of illustration.

Kant on Religious Moral Education

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 373-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis vanden Auweele
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Religious Practices ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Perfection ◽  
Human Agent

AbstractWhile scholars are slowly coming to realize that Kant’s moral philosophy has a distinctive theory of moral education, the import of religion in such education is generally neglected or even denied. This essay argues that Kant’s reflections on religion in parts II and III of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason interpret religion specifically as one aspect of moral education, namely moral ascetics. After first clearly distinguishing between a cognitive and a conative aspect of moral education, I show how certain historical religious practices serve to provide the conative aspect of moral education. Kant defines this aspect of moral education as practices that render the human agent ‘valiant and cheerful in fulfilling his duties’ (MS, 6: 484). By this it is meant that certain practices can inspire moral interests either by justifying rational hope in living up to a certain standard of moral perfection (Christology) or by endeavouring to unite human beings in a universal, invisible ethical community that inspires cooperation rather than adversity (ecclesiology).

Paradigmatic Immorality

1975 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 689-695
Author(s):  
Justin Leiber
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
List Type ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Type Number ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Paradigm Case ◽  
The Status ◽  
Important Sense ◽  
Anglo American

The notion of moral philosophy that has been dominant in Anglo-American philosophizing since G.E. Moore is peculiar. Reviewing traditional works such as Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Hume's Treatise, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and Mill's Utilitarianism, one is tempted to call this new notion of moral philosophy a different subject; and if one does this, it is less peculiar. However, let us accept that this new sort of moral philosophy does belong to the previous tradition; granted this, I shall explain why I think it peculiar through considering the status of the judgement that Hitler was a bad man.Consider the sentential function ‘x is (was) a bad man’. ‘Hitler’ seems an obviously suitable substitution for ‘x, at least in the most important sense. That is, one wants to say that if it is not proper or true to say that ‘Hitler was a bad man’ or ‘Hitler was bad’, it fs never proper or true to issue a sentence of this form, restricting x to human beings. Hitler seems indeed, in this most important sense, to be a paradigm case. One wants to say: if Hitler was not a bad man, who could be?

scholarly journals The Soul, the Virtues, and the Human Good: Comments on Aristotle's Moral Psychology

Labyrinth ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 137
Author(s):  
Kathi Beier
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Philosophy Of Psychology ◽  
Ethical Inquiry ◽  
Aristotle's Ethics ◽  
The One ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy

In modern moral philosophy, virtue ethics has developed into one of the major approaches to ethical inquiry. As it seems, however, it is faced with a kind of perplexity similar to the one that Elisabeth Anscombe has described in Modern moral philosophy with regard to ethics in general. For if we assume that Anscombe is right in claiming that virtue ethics ought to be grounded in a sound philosophy of psychology, modern virtue ethics seems to be baseless since it lacks or even avoids reflections on the human soul. To overcome this difficulty, the paper explores the conceptual connections between virtue and soul in Aristotle's ethics. It claims that the human soul is the principle of virtue since reflections on the soul help us to define the nature of virtue, to understand the different kinds of virtues, and to answer the question why human beings need the virtues at all. 

scholarly journals KANT ON HUMAN DIGNITY: A CRITICAL APPROACH -- KANT E A DIGNIDADE HUMANA: UMA INTERPRETAÇÃO CRÍTICA

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 493-512
Author(s):  
Antonio Pele
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Critical Approach ◽  
Political Field ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Guiding Principle ◽  
Basic Characteristics

In this article, I intend to reframe and qualify Kant’s moral philosophy for the understanding human dignity. Some Kant’s formulas seem to grant to the human being an inherent and absolute worthiness, when they are read (often) in a very decontextualized way. To achieve this objective, I identify the basic characteristics we commonly attribute to the contemporary model of human dignity. This model has some expressions in the axiological field (inherent and absolute worth), and, at the same time, in the legal-political field (cornerstone of human rights and guiding principle of the Rule of law). I intend to see if we can find some of these latter characteristics in the mentioned usages that Kant gives to the term “dignity” and of formulas supposedly connected (“end in itself”, “autonomy”, “humanity”). When contextualizing these expressions, either in the motivations or in the results of Kant’s philosophy, I arrived to the conclusion that Kant was less concerned with the intrinsic worthiness of the human beings, than with establishing the authority of morality.Keywords: Categorical imperative. Human dignity. Humanity. Kant. Rights. 

scholarly journals TEOLOGI BENCANA DALAM PERSPEKTIF M. QURAISH SHIHAB

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Mrs. Khafidhoh
Keyword(s):  
Natural Disaster ◽  
Human Error ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Volcano Eruption ◽  
The Past ◽  
Individual Aspect ◽  
The Will ◽  
Divine Punishment

Human life has always been dealt with various disasters from earthquake,  tsunami to volcano eruption. In the past, as listed in the Qur’an, a lot of stories depicted the vanished people of unbeliever. While the cases of unbeliever referred to the punishment of Alloh, the query is whether the disaster happened to the Believer served as the Divine punishment. Two questions are discussed in this research: (1) How Quraish Shihab interpreted the verses of disaster?, and (2) What is the theology of disaster in Quraish Shihab’s Tafsir al-Misbah? The research shows that natural disaster occurred, in Quraish Shihab’s view, due to the imbalance of environment. Alloh has created harmonious environment, but human being tends to conduct chaos and destruction. Disaster could be concluded into three: (1) disaster that denoted collective destruction, (2) disaster that related to the destruction of meaning, and (3), disaster that dealt with the danger. The cause of disaster could be categorized into three, namely, (1) disaster due to the will of God (2) disaster due to human error (3) disaster due to the wickedness of human. Pertaining to the ethics facing disaster, one couldrefer to istirja’, patience, learning, the obedience to Alloh. The lesson learned from the disaster are among others, (1) individual aspect : (a) increasing the degree of faith, (b) supporting one’s proximity to God, (c) realizing the love of God, (d) situating one’s faith and (e) supporting one’s humility and (2) social one, building solidarity among human beings.

Slavophilism and the Origins of Russian Religious Philosophy

2020 ◽  
pp. 132-151
Author(s):  
Randall A. Poole
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Religious Thought ◽  
Religious Philosophy ◽  
Faith And Reason ◽  
Spiritual Wholeness ◽  
Further Development ◽  
The Church ◽  
Different Sources ◽  
The Ideal

This chapter presents Slavophilism as having laid the foundations for the further development of Russian religious philosophy. The leading Slavophile thinkers in this respect were Aleksei Khomiakov and Ivan Kireevsky. Two main principles guided their religious thought: the compatibility of faith and reason, and the defence of human freedom, dignity, and personhood. Their signature religious-philosophical concepts are sobornost, faithful or believing reason, and integral personhood. The chapter explores the different sources of their religious thought, prioritizing their own faith and religious experience. Khomiakov and Kireevsky were convinced that human beings, through integrating faith and reason and achieving spiritual wholeness, could apprehend reality in its ontological or noumenal depths, in a way that abstract rationalism could not. This intuition of being came to be hailed as the distinctive ontologism of Russian religious philosophy. It provided a foundation for the development of Russian philosophical personalism. The Slavophiles, especially through the concept of sobornost, also emphasized the communal nature of personhood: persons realize themselves through free and loving interaction with each other. For Khomiakov and Kireevsky, the ideal community was the Church.

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