Comparative Jurisprudence as Scholarship and Profile of Education

2019 ◽  
pp. 49
Author(s):  
CSABA VARGA
Keyword(s):  
Explanatory Power ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
Individual Feature ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Legal Statement ◽  
The Law ◽  
Culture Tradition

Our thoughts are products of our culture, tradition, and ideal of order, so their understanding and development can only be based upon them. However, cultures, traditions and ideals vary from time to time and from people to people, as each of them has been created and developed to respond to challenges under their own conditions. Consequently, they are not only independent of each other in their genesis, but are also incommensurable in their historical set, which equals to saying that they are not even classifiable but only taxonomisable in a strict sense. Each of us lives and interprets his own world: when we compare, we attempt at putting them in a common hat, knowing that no one can go beyond the symbolic paradox of “I interpret your culture through my culture”. A way out from this trap can only result from their individual parallel characterisation after we have built up some kind of abstract philosophical universality from the ideals of order concerned. Then, in the context of the Self and of You, we are expected not only to explain the Other, but also to recognise it by its own right. In its due course, legal comparison aims at getting knowledge not only of ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ but about what is meant by law when it works in our mind. Therefore, beyond the mere act of taking cognisance, comparison comprises also the acceptance of this Other by its own right, in which none is simply reduced to anything purely factual (“what is the law?”), but the actuality of the entire normative process leading to a legal statement (“how do we think in law?”) is considered. Getting to know foreign laws begins with grouping of laws and, as expressed in legal families, by combining those which are similar while contrasting the dissimilar. Interaction and mixing amongst them is a natural sequel, but their establishment cannot be a substitute to the didactic necessity and explanatory power of analysis in term of legal families. When describing them, mere contrasting shall be consummated by presenting the specific ingenuity of each of them as a characteristic individual feature specific to them.

State of Emergency and Humanitarian Law — On Article 75 of Additional Protocol I

1984 ◽  
Vol 24 (242) ◽  
pp. 263-273
Author(s):  
Géza Herczegh
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Narrow Sense ◽  
Law Of War ◽  
Legal Provisions ◽  
The Hague ◽  
The Law ◽  
Broad Interpretation ◽  
The Individual

In a rich and abundant literature on the subject of international humanitarian law, two trends in the interpretation of the term “humanitarian law” stand out: one takes it in its broad meaning, the other in a narrow sense. According to the definition by Jean S. Pictet, humanitarian law, in the broad interpretation, is constituted by all the international legal provisions, whether written or customary, ensuring respect for the individual and the development of his life. Humanitarian law includes two branches: the law of war and human rights. The law of war, still following Professor Pictet's definition, can be subdivided into two sections, that of The Hague, or the law of war, in the strict sense, and that of Geneva, or humanitarian law, in the narrow sense. It is often difficult to distinguish clearly between these branches of law, and especially between the law of The Hague and the law of Geneva, because of the reciprocal influence each has had on the development of the other, to the extent that some well-known experts considered the traditional difference between them out-of-date and superfluous.

What is a Court of Law?

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denise Meyerson
Keyword(s):  
Explanatory Power ◽  
The Other ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Paradigm Case ◽  
Case Methodology ◽  
Central Case ◽  
Limited Degree ◽  
The Law ◽  
Do So

What is the nature of a court? In this article I argue that we need to know what a court is supposed to do in order to understand what it is. I argue against two conceptions of a court which I call ‘minimalist’ and ‘essentialist’. The former holds that a court is simply a body empowered to make binding resolutions of disputes by applying existing laws. I argue that this conception is incomplete. The latter identifies further essential features of courts, such as the use of fair processes. I argue that the essentialist conception lacks explanatory power. Drawing on the central case methodology in legal philosophy, I introduce a conception that I call the ‘paradigm case conception’. I argue that paradigm courts are not merely empowered to apply the law but equipped to do so, by virtue of possessing features that assist them to resolve legal disputes accurately and effectively (ie, with the public’s acceptance). Courts that do not possess all of these features or possess them to a limited degree are not ‘non-courts’ but defective courts. I explain why the paradigm case conception is theoretically and practically superior to the other conceptions.

The Codification of International Law

1924 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 260-280
Author(s):  
James Brown Scott
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Law Of Nations ◽  
The Law ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Correct Understanding

There are certain preliminary observations which should be made before we can take up the question of codifying international law or the method of codification, for without a correct understanding of certain matters, which may be considered fundamental, we may not know whether we are to deal with a system of law or a system of philosophy. As a matter of fact we are dealing with both, for law develops unconsciously or consciously in accordance with the principles of philosophy. If the law of nations is to be considered law in the strict sense of the word, we must deal with it as a system of law. If, on the other hand, it is a system of philosophy rather than of law, we must deal with it as philosophy, and the point of approach and the method of treatment will be different. But, above and beyond law, we are dealing with justice, and with those principles of justice, which, expressed in rules of law, we call the law of nations. Justice is the source; the principles of justice applicable to the conduct of nations constitute the law of nations, and the rules of law based upon these principles change with conditions, or to meet new conditions, and form the body and substance of international law at any given period.

Distinguishing between property damage and pure economic loss in negligence: a personality thesis

Legal Studies ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 481-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Witting
Keyword(s):  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Economic Loss ◽  
The Self ◽  
Economic Losses ◽  
Property Damage ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Pure Economic Loss ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Law

The law of negligence favours redress for damage to property interests over redress for damage to mere economic interests. The question arises whether this preference can be justified. In endeavouring to answer it, the author surveys existing reasons given by courts and commentators for maintaining a distinction between property and economic interests. Each of these reasons, which collectively focus upon the ‘problematic’ nature of economic losses, is found to be either ad hoe in nature or without substantial explanatory power. However, it is submitted that the distinction is explicable on the basis that, whereas an individual's personality is partly constituted by the property that he or she owns, so that property can be seen as essential to the ways in which individuals constitute and define themselves, no such claim can be made with respect to mere abstract holdings of wealth. Although wealth permits the acquisition of property and participation in activities and experiences which might help to constitute and define the self in the future, the very fact that wealth has not been transposed into these things precludes it from being considered as important as actual holdings of property. The protection of property interests ought, therefore, to precede the protection of mere economic interests.

scholarly journals Self-Defence against Non-state Actors: The Interaction between Self-Defence as a Primary Rule and Self-Defence as a Secondary Rule

2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 801-825 ◽  
Author(s):  
NICHOLAS TSAGOURIAS
Keyword(s):  
Legal Issues ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Security Threat ◽  
Alternative Framework ◽  
Primary Rule ◽  
State Actors ◽  
The Law ◽  
Secondary Rule ◽  
Self Defence

AbstractThis article examines the law of self-defence as applied to non-state attacks in light of the coalition air strikes against ISIL in Syria. It critiques the two current interpretations of the law of self-defence – one based on attribution and the other on the ‘unable or unwilling’ test – for failing to address adequately the security threat posed by non-state actors or for not addressing convincingly the legal issues arising from the fact that the self-defence action unfolds on the territory of another state. For this reason, it proposes an alternative framework which combines the primary rule of self-defence to justify the use of defensive force against non-state actors, with the secondary rule of self-defence to excuse the incidental breach of the territorial state's sovereignty.

Lawful War of Self-Defense

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yishai Beer
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Legal Issue ◽  
Military Doctrine ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
The Law ◽  
Imminent Threat ◽  
The Right ◽  
Military Professionalism

This chapter deals with the application of the suggested professionalism criterion in the other segment of the law, the ad bellum sphere. An unresolved legal issue in the self-defense context concerns its timing: When can a self-defendant state be proactive in its defense and strike preemptively? On the assumption that a self-defendant is not obliged to remain a sitting duck when confronted by an imminent threat against it, this chapter suggests that the criterion to be used in defining the legal-timing threshold, vindicating the right of self-defense, be taken from the toolbox of military professionalism. It should be the last reasonable point, according to the self-defendant’s military circumstances, at which it can, according to its military doctrine, successfully face the aggressor’s threat and still operationally defend itself—including, when necessary, by taking the initiative in its own self-defense.

scholarly journals Extra, Contra, Intra

2015 ◽  
pp. 11-17
Author(s):  
Andrey V. Shipilov
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Classical Antiquity ◽  
The Arts ◽  
Primitive Society ◽  
The Law ◽  
Artistic Works

Addresses the example of the Classical Antiquity and argues that the culture of a primitive society focuses on the Outward and the culture of the developed society emphasises the Inward. The author demonstrates that these trends may be traced in a variety of institutions and phenomena; he addresses manifestations of extra­intentionality and intra­intentionality in religious views and practices, the ethical complex, representations and perceptions of the Self and the Other, in the law, aesthetics, the arts and literature. Certain types of socio­cultural activities, artistic works, and monuments that typologically belong to different periods of the archaic and developed society within the Ancient culture are historically compared (contraposed).

Providing Freshmen with a Good “Starting-Block”

2019 ◽  
Vol 78 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 69-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikaël De Clercq ◽  
Charlotte Michel ◽  
Sophie Remy ◽  
Benoît Galand
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Student Adjustment ◽  
Social Psychological ◽  
Pivotal Phase ◽  
Study Program ◽  
Study Task ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Belonging ◽  
Intention To Persist

Abstract. Grounded in social-psychological literature, this experimental study assessed the effects of two so-called “wise” interventions implemented in a student study program. The interventions took place during the very first week at university, a presumed pivotal phase of transition. A group of 375 freshmen in psychology were randomly assigned to three conditions: control, social belonging, and self-affirmation. Following the intervention, students in the social-belonging condition expressed less social apprehension, a higher social integration, and a stronger intention to persist one month later than the other participants. They also relied more on peers as a source of support when confronted with a study task. Students in the self-affirmation condition felt more self-affirmed at the end of the intervention but didn’t benefit from other lasting effects. The results suggest that some well-timed and well-targeted “wise” interventions could provide lasting positive consequences for student adjustment. The respective merits of social-belonging and self-affirmation interventions are also discussed.

Stories and the Self

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Krause ◽  
Markus Appel
Keyword(s):  
Meta Analysis ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Lower Degree ◽  
Contrast Effects ◽  
Self Perception ◽  
Self Perceptions ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Implicit And Explicit

Abstract. Two experiments examined the influence of stories on recipients’ self-perceptions. Extending prior theory and research, our focus was on assimilation effects (i.e., changes in self-perception in line with a protagonist’s traits) as well as on contrast effects (i.e., changes in self-perception in contrast to a protagonist’s traits). In Experiment 1 ( N = 113), implicit and explicit conscientiousness were assessed after participants read a story about either a diligent or a negligent student. Moderation analyses showed that highly transported participants and participants with lower counterarguing scores assimilate the depicted traits of a story protagonist, as indicated by explicit, self-reported conscientiousness ratings. Participants, who were more critical toward a story (i.e., higher counterarguing) and with a lower degree of transportation, showed contrast effects. In Experiment 2 ( N = 103), we manipulated transportation and counterarguing, but we could not identify an effect on participants’ self-ascribed level of conscientiousness. A mini meta-analysis across both experiments revealed significant positive overall associations between transportation and counterarguing on the one hand and story-consistent self-reported conscientiousness on the other hand.

Don’t Put Me in This Group

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 80-93
Author(s):  
Jort de Vreeze ◽  
Christina Matschke
Keyword(s):  
Positive Emotions ◽  
Negative Emotions ◽  
Negative Information ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Group Memberships

Abstract. Not all group memberships are self-chosen. The current research examines whether assignments to non-preferred groups influence our relationship with the group and our preference for information about the ingroup. It was expected and found that, when people are assigned to non-preferred groups, they perceive the group as different to the self, experience negative emotions about the assignment and in turn disidentify with the group. On the other hand, when people are assigned to preferred groups, they perceive the group as similar to the self, experience positive emotions about the assignment and in turn identify with the group. Finally, disidentification increases a preference for negative information about the ingroup.

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