Introduction

This introductory chapter highlights Francesco Guicciardini's perspectives on international politics and foreign policy. Guicciardini frequently engages in the analysis of political situations through pairs of opposing speeches, one in favour and one against any given policy on any given issue. As a whole, they constitute a remarkable collection of debates on war, peace, alliance, and the like — in short, key issues in international affairs. Action takes place in various contexts: different Florentine institutions, the Venetian senate, the French royal council, the papal Curia, and the imperial council. The structure of the debates is always straightforward: the first speaker argues that X is the right policy and Y the wrong one; the second speaker argues the opposite. Thus, each criticises the policy advice of the other, and each supports what the other opposes.

Author(s):  
Stannard John E ◽  
Capper David

This chapter discusses express rights of termination. It is not always easy for a party to know for certain whether they are entitled to terminate or not. This is particularly so where the right in question depends on proof of fundamental breach or repudiation. For this reason, parties to a contract frequently, in the interests of certainty, make express provision for this by agreeing in advance that one or both of them may terminate if certain conditions are met. Such express rights of termination can depend on a wide variety of contingencies, but very frequently these will include a breach by the other party. Where this is the case, it is often difficult to distinguish termination under the express right from termination under the general law, particularly where the latter involves termination for breach of condition. The chapter then assesses four key issues with regard to express rights of this sort, most notably: (1) the relationship between express rights of termination and conditions at common law; (2) the requirements for the exercise of such rights; (3) the effect of termination under such a right; and (4) the problem of concurrent rights of termination.


Author(s):  
Laurence R. Jurdem

As the American public became increasingly disenchanted over the nation’s ongoing presence in Southeast Asia, the Nixon administration initiated a diplomatic strategy toward the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Nixon, who early in his political career had been a passionate anticommunist, began to consider ways in which he might bring China into the international community. The president believed that this strategy had the potential to decrease the Cold War tensions that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. The foreign policy strategy that Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, developed came to be known as détente. The initiatives that composed Nixon’s policy were based on Kissinger’s realist view of international affairs. That perspective embraced the idea of accepting the world as it was rather than trying to change it. By deemphasizing the importance of the conflict between international communism and democracy, pundits on the Right believed Nixon was not only withdrawing America from its global responsibilities, but in doing so was giving the communist world free reign to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy.


1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 927-930 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall L. Schweller

Realism is both a scientific research program and, more traditionally, a political philosophy. All realists share a pessimistic worldview that posits perpetual struggle among groups for security, prestige, and power and that denies the capacity of human reason to create a world of peace and harmony. Recent research by so-called neotraditional realists does not disconfirm Waltz's balancing proposition. Instead, these works have tended to add unit-level variables in order to transform Waltz's theory of international politics into one of foreign policy. The question is not whether states balance or bandwagon—history clearly shows that they do both—but rather under what conditions states choose one strategy or the other.


1995 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Juricic

With characteristic insight, intelligence, and good humour, the eighteenth-century Scottish poet, Robert Burns, once remarked that ‘the best-laid schemes o'mice an men gang aft agley’. Written primarily as a commonsense observation on success and unintentional failure experienced during life's travails, Burns’ witticism does ironically account for much in the world of politics as it functions both within societies and between nation-states. For in international politics, established patterns of action and reaction are often poor guides to resolving complex disputes, whereas innovative, original, and flexible policies, assisted by a good measure of paradox and luck, can sometimes settle the most intractable of problems. Not surprisingly, therefore, political pundits like to stress: ‘Be careful of asking the wrong question, because you may just get the right answer.’


1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ole R. Holsti

The political spectrum has often been viewed as a linear continuum on which the extremes of the right and left occupy the most antithetical positions. The alternative hypothesis is that there are some dimensions on which the extremes resemble each other. This essay examines the theories of international politics and foreign policy espoused by scholars of the radical right and left. Two dozen points of convergence are grouped under five headings: Understanding history and politics, the causes of war, the nature of the enemy, the conditions of peace, and ends and means in politics. Because the essay is focused on studies of international politics since the outbreak of World War II, considerable attention is devoted to the parallels between rightwing theories of the USSR and Soviet foreign policy, and left wing explanations of the United States and American foreign policy. The conclusion suggests that both theories are fundamentally flawed in two respects: (1) As employed by their proponents, the theories appear incapable of being falsified; and (2) studies employing them are marred by serious methodological flaws that violate the canons of systematic inquiry.


1960 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-114
Author(s):  
Laurence W. Martin

WoodrowWilson continues to arouse remarkably sharp and sustained controversy among those concerned with the recent revival of interest in the problem of ethics in foreign policy. Much of this debate is joined over the apparent antithesis between ethical demands for amicable cooperation among states and a compulsion to adopt antagonistic policies in order to survive in the rough and tumble of international politics. One side in this debate regards Wilson as the exemplar of sane views; the other attacks him as the chief symbol of naive misunderstanding.


1956 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 374-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth W. Thompson

IHE problem of war and national security, at one time conceived of as the province of almost anyone but the peace-minded international relationist, has come increasingly to occupy scholars and researchers. Arnold J. Toynbee, whose major concern is the philosophy of history, preserves a lively interest in international politics and particularly in the problem of war, the principles of foreign policy, and the quest for an applicable body of theory concerning international society. With the publication of the last four volumes of his famed A Study of History, it may be appropriate to call attention to the other side of his work, especially as he brings to the discussion a clarity, simplicity, and concreteness refreshing by contrast with the pompous tautologies of much of modern scholarship. This article reviews Mr. Toynbee's contribution to knowledge on the first of the problems mentioned, namely, war and national security. It seeks to present his conception of the crisis in modern war, social factors underlying the transformation of warfare, and prevailing theories on the nature and inevitability of war.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey A. Friedman

War and Chance analyzes the logic, psychology, and politics of assessing uncertainty in international affairs. It explains how the most important kinds of uncertainty in international politics are inherently subjective, and yet how scholars, practitioners, and pundits can still debate these issues in clear and structured ways. Altogether, the book shows how foreign policy analysts can assess uncertainty in a manner that is theoretically coherent, empirically meaningful, politically defensible, practically useful, and sometimes logically necessary for making sound choices. Each of these claims contradicts widespread skepticism about the value of probabilistic reasoning in international politics, and shows how placing greater emphasis on assessing uncertainty can improve nearly any kind of foreign policy analysis or decision. The book substantiates this argument by examining critical episodes in the history of U.S. national security policy, such as strategic planning in Vietnam, assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, and the search for Osama bin Laden. The book also draws on a diverse range of quantitative evidence, including a database containing nearly one million geopolitical forecasts and experimental studies involving hundreds of national security professionals.


1967 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 983-988 ◽  
Author(s):  
James N. Rosenau

When the laws of social dynamics are codified, surely the First will be that people see what they want to see. Given its universality, the First Law is no less applicable to scholars than anyone else. As political scientists, seeing what we want to see in a colleague's work, we find it “insightful,” “constructive,” and “important”; alternatively, not seeing in it what we want to see or, even worse, seeing what we don't want to see, we find it “turgid,” “misleading,” and “trivial.”So it is with Hanrieder's formulation. Since it is only a bare outline and contains no data, no one is likely to regard his article as a definitive statement, but reactions to it are likely to be quite varied and conflicting. Some readers, especially those who worry about the prevalence of a malady they call “methodologism” in political science, will see in Hanrieder's effort to develop the concepts of compatibility and consensus yet another case of the quibbling over words that is the prime symptom of this affliction. After all, such critics will point out, compatibility and consensus are, respectively, only thirteen- and nine-letter words and to claim great explanatory power for them without elaboration is to substitute the form of language for the substance of thought. In a similar manner those long committed to a particular framework for examining foreign policy phenomena will preserve their commitment and wonder why Hanrieder makes so much fuss about the need for a new formulation when the available conceptual equipment seems capable of handling the convergence of national and international politics. After all, these analysts will conclude, Hanrieder himself says that researchers should be less inclined to create new schemes and more ready to build on existing ones; why, then, does he not follow his own advice?On the other hand, analysts who are themselves perplexed by the convergence of national and international politics are likely to be more sympathetic to Hanrieder's effort, if not to its result. They may have doubts as to whether Hanrieder's unqualified claims for the concepts of compatibility and consensus are justified, but they will see his article as a serious attempt to confront a genuine and difficult problem.


1968 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 521-534 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles F. Hermann

The study of the processes by which foreign policy is formed has been in the embarrassing position of falling between two academic chairs. On the one hand, students of international affairs have displayed considerable reluctance to delve into the domestic factors that distinguish one nation's policies from another's. On the other hand, scholars of comparative politics, with their knowledge of political institutions and processes, have rarely considered the effect of various political arrangements on foreign policy.


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