The US and Brokering Republican Moderation

Author(s):  
Matthew Whiting

This chapter argues that in order for moderation through institutional inclusion to take full hold, it was necessary for the US to act as a powerful external broker throughout the negotiations of the Belfast Agreement and during the consolidation of republican moderation. This brokering was short and targeted, not of relevance in the early stages of republican moderation and only mattered during the formal peace process phase and its implementation. The US provided a series of credible guarantees to republicans that their interests would be protected and given fair representation when entering a bargain with the more powerful British state. It also provided a series of incentives (funding, investment, access to powerful allies) and disincentives (the threat of removing the incentives, political marginalisation) that encouraged republicans to increase their engagement. This was important not only in persuading republicans to sign the Belfast Agreement in 1998 but also in persuading the IRA to eventually decommission its weapons some seven years later.

Author(s):  
Ilan Pappé

This chapter examines the peace process historically as a strategy of the settler colonialist state and as a native response to it. It argues that the peace process was conceived at a particular moment, in June 1967, as part of the settler colonialist state's attempt to reconcile Israel's wish to remain demographically a Jewish state and its desire to expand geographically without losing the pretense of being a democratic state in the post-1967 context. It is also argued that the Israeli political and military elite knowingly engaged in this dilemma, contemplating the possibility of a scenario of its own or of others' making that would place it in control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. All three vantage points suggest that the two-state solution and the process that is supposed to bring it about are an Israeli plan, with modifications, by a powerful coalition of the US, EU, European Union, Russia, the United Nations, most of the Arab states, the Fatah Palestinian leadership, the Zionist Left and Center in Israel, and some well-known figures in the Palestinian solidarity movement. It is the power of the coalition and not the logic of the solution or the process that has maintained the “peace process” for so long, despite its apparent failure.


Author(s):  
Noura Erakat

This chapter focuses on the United Nations's Palestinian “statehood” bid starting in 2011. In May 2011, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)/Palestinian Authority (PA) announced that it would seek membership as a state within the UN. The UN statehood bid would alter the PLO's status as a nonmember observer entity, conferred upon it by the UN General Assembly in 1974. While the benefits of UN membership, or in the alternative, a UN upgrade, are manifold, none of them guarantee Palestinian self-determination or freedom from Israeli control. The chapter suggests that this statehood bid could have been a pivot away from complete reliance on the United States to deliver independence and a return to multilateralism that positioned the world superpower as part of the problem rather than the solution. However, the promise of multilateralism, signaled by Palestinians in 2011, has not been realized. The Palestinian leadership has responded to the ever-diminishing potential of the US-brokered peace process with incremental steps into international forums.


Author(s):  
David Bolton

In this Chapter the author describes the circumstances and impact of the Omagh bombing which occurred in Northern Ireland in August 1998, just as the peace process was beginning to see political progress and violence had significantly reduced. The impact on casualties and their families in Omagh, Buncrana in the Irish Republic, and in Madrid, Spain, is described, as are the distress and traumatic consequences for the wider community. The responses of neighbours and friends, the wider Omagh community, its medical, education, not-for-profit and civic services, are described. The contribution of commemorative and arts based events is demonstrated. The risk to the developing peace process and the Belfast Agreement is outlined and how this impacted upon the development of therapeutic services for the local community. The role of politics and politicians in ensuring services were developed, is described.


Author(s):  
Marc Mulholland

‘The government’ discusses the developing Troubles from the British government’s perspective. The British government introduced troops onto the streets of Northern Ireland to deal with the escalating tensions that exploded in August 1969. Britain was anxious to sustain the existence of the Stormont system and feared having to introduce ‘direct rule’ from London. The logical consequence of this was sustaining the political legitimacy of the Unionist government in Northern Ireland. The encounters between the British army and Catholics did much to reinforce nationalist assumptions about British oppression. The increasing violence, subsequent direct rule, the restoration of devolution, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and the 1990s peace process resulting in the 1998 Belfast Agreement are all discussed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-85
Author(s):  
Sean Byrne ◽  
Ashleigh Cummer ◽  

Two qualitative data sets from 2010 and 2016 are compared to explore the respondents’ perceptions of peacebuilding in the wake of the 1998 Belfast Agreement (BA) and the ensuing peace process. Fifty-two Civil Society Organization (CSO) leaders from Londonderry/Derry were interviewed during the summer of 2010 to delve into their perceptions of the BA, and building cross community contact through peacebuilding and reconciliation processes. The International Fund for Ireland and the European Union Peace Fund funded these respondents CSO peacebuilding projects. They held many viewpoints on peacebuilding. Seven grassroots peacebuilders from Derry/Londonderry were interviewed in 2016. These peacebuilders revealed that Northern Ireland has a long way to go to build an authentic and genuine peace. A key stumbling block to the Northern Ireland peace process is heightened societal segregation that results from the BA institutionalizing sectarianism, and the recent fallout from Brexit. Politicians continue to refuse addressing the past that has long-term implications for peace.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 773-789 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina E. Henke

Tony Blair tried throughout the preparatory phase of the US-led Iraq intervention in 2003 to influence US policy on the Middle East Peace Process. This article tries to understand how Blair fared in this endeavour. Using newly declassified documents, it examines the circumstances under which the US administration listened and engaged with British ideas and when and why it ignored British requests. The study shows that Blair was able to extract the greatest US concessions on the Middle East Peace Process in moments when Great Britain’s participation in the Iraq campaign was the most uncertain. The findings promote fresh thinking on how, when and why the United Kingdom can influence US decision-making.


2020 ◽  
Vol 04 (01) ◽  
pp. 01-22
Author(s):  
Dr. Muhammad Nadeem Mirza ◽  
Hussain Abbas ◽  
Ummul Baneen

Afghan war has long been considered as a strategic failure, as the US could neither bring an end to the violence, nor ensure complete territorial control. Deteriorating security situation has also endangered stability of adjoining states. With the failure of military means to resolve Afghan crisis, the need for a political solution gained momentum resulting in the US-Taliban agreement in early 2020. This study traces out why, despite various rounds of talks and initiatives of reconciliation and peace process, the successful stability could not be achieved in Afghanistan. The study concluded that all the stake-holders continued to pursue unrealistic objectives, resulting in failure of the previous efforts of peace talks.


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