Eternal Life and the Body According to Spinoza

2020 ◽  
pp. 68-80
Author(s):  
Alexandre Matheron

In this chapter, Matheron presents some brief thoughts on Proposition 39 of Part V of the Ethics, which states that a body capable of many things has a mind whose greater part is eternal. The key to unlocking this seemingly unusual claim is to understand what happens in the body when the mind understands. This leads Matheron to reconstruct the demonstrations that accompany the preceding propositions in Part V as well as to a discussion of adequate and inadequate ideas in Spinoza. Though we might not be immediately aware of it, to have an adequate idea of something external us is to have the adequate idea of a certain order that is established between affections in our body whose structure matches the one that inheres in the thing in question. This leads Matheron to a discussion of the ‘third kind of knowledge’ and its relation to the Spinozist concept of eternity, all of which clarify the initial starting point: the acquisition of new and more adequate knowledge always entails a clearer understanding of our body’s capacities that are already included in the eternal idea that we are.

2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 206-219
Author(s):  
Meindert E. Peters

Friedrich Nietzsche's influence on Isadora Duncan's work, in particular his idea of the Dionysian, has been widely discussed, especially in regard to her later work. What has been left underdeveloped in critical examinations of her work, however, is his influence on her earlier choreographic work, which she defended in a famous speech held in 1903 called The Dance of the Future. While commentators often describe this speech as ‘Nietzschean’, Duncan's autobiography suggests that she only studied Nietzsche's work after this speech. I take this incongruity as a starting point to explore the connections between her speech and Nietzsche's work, in particular his Thus Spoke Zarathustra. I argue that in subject and language Duncan's speech resembles Nietzsche's in important ways. This article will draw attention to the ways in which Duncan takes her cues from Nietzsche in bringing together seemingly conflicting ideas of religion and an overturning of morality; Nietzsche's notion of eternal recurrence and the teleology present in his idea of the Übermensch; and a renegotiation of the body's relation to the mind. In doing so, this article contributes not only to scholarship on Duncan's early work but also to discussions of Nietzsche's reception in the early twentieth century. Moreover, the importance Duncan ascribes to the body in dance and expression also asks for a new understanding of Nietzsche's own way of expressing his philosophy.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-171
Author(s):  
Nāṣir Al-Dīn Abū Khaḍīr

The ʿUthmānic way of writing (al-rasm al-ʿUthmānī) is a science that specialises in the writing of Qur'anic words in accordance with a specific ‘pattern’. It follows the writing style of the Companions at the time of the third caliph, ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān, and was attributed to ʿUthmān on the basis that he was the one who ordered the collection and copying of the Qur'an into the actual muṣḥaf. This article aims to expound on the two fundamental functions of al-rasm al-ʿUthmānī: that of paying regard to the ‘correct’ pronunciation of the words in the muṣḥaf, and the pursuit of the preclusion of ambiguity which may arise in the mind of the reader and his auditor. There is a further practical aim for this study: to show the connection between modern orthography and the ʿUthmānic rasm in order that we, nowadays, are thereby able to overcome the problems faced by calligraphers and writers of the past in their different ages and cultures.


Author(s):  
Nora Goldschmidt ◽  
Barbara Graziosi

The Introduction sheds light on the reception of classical poetry by focusing on the materiality of the poets’ bodies and their tombs. It outlines four sets of issues, or commonplaces, that govern the organization of the entire volume. The first concerns the opposition between literature and material culture, the life of the mind vs the apprehensions of the body—which fails to acknowledge that poetry emerges from and is attended to by the mortal body. The second concerns the religious significance of the tomb and its location in a mythical landscape which is shaped, in part, by poetry. The third investigates the literary graveyard as a place where poets’ bodies and poetic corpora are collected. Finally, the alleged ‘tomb of Virgil’ provides a specific site where the major claims made in this volume can be most easily be tested.


Author(s):  
Martin J. Bayly

With the British annexation of the Punjab in 1849 following the disasters of the First Anglo-Afghan War, Mountstuart Elphinstone's "An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul", and those of his intellectual successors, became "useful knowledge", and found a fertile administrative environment in the management of India's northwest frontier. According to this logic of government, frontier spaces could be tamed through adequate knowledge and understanding of their indigenous populations, part of a wider assemblage of power that has been referred to in Foucauldian terms as "frontier governmentality". Taking this concept as its starting point, this chapter turns its attention to the procurement, evolution, and use of colonial knowledge as part of this wider project of frontier governance. If "frontier governmentality" differed from "colonial governmentality", then what made it distinct? By studying the trajectories of the body of colonial knowledge initiated by Mountstuart Elphinstone and his intellectual successors, new understandings of colonial power in frontier spaces start to emerge through the lens of "governmentality", offering key insights into the modalities of colonial government in so-called "peripheral" areas, and the role played by "colonial knowledge" as part of this assemblage of power.


1917 ◽  
Vol 63 (263) ◽  
pp. 565-568
Author(s):  
Alan McDougall

In the beginning every creature was a patriarch: it was, philosophically, not only its individual self, but also all its potential progeny. Such a creature's whole conduct was directed towards the one goal of eternal life on earth. It so happened that in very many cases the creature's best chance of success involved association with other creatures of its kind, or even of other kinds. From this arose the complication of the acquirement of tribal instincts. Tribal instincts were acquired only for patriarchal purposes, though in very many cases they proved to be the immediate cause of the creature's death. A further complication arose when certain of the creatures acquired intellect and took to thinking. Philosophically, a living thing exists only that it may produce a generation capable of producing yet another generation. A generation is important only as the cause of its next generation. Intellect often gave the creature an immediate advantage over rivals, but it glorified the individual self at the expense of the patriarchal self. This is recognised in the third chapter of Genesis, where intellect is called the serpent, and thinking is called (in Chapter II) the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The statement that “in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die” declares that the race is kept going only by those who do not understand how to limit their families.


2013 ◽  
Vol 72 ◽  
pp. 221-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fredrik Svenaeus

AbstractIn this paper I present and compare the ideas behind naturalistic theories of health on the one hand and phenomenological theories of health on the other. The basic difference between the two sets of theories is no doubt that whereas naturalistic theories claim to rest on value neutral concepts, such as normal biological function, the phenomenological suggestions for theories of health take their starting point in what is often named intentionality: meaningful stances taken by the embodied person in experiencing and understanding her situation and taking action in the world.Although naturalism and phenomenology are fundamentally different in their approach to health, they are not necessarily opposed when it comes to understanding the predicament of ill persons. The starting point of medical investigations is what the patient feels and says about her illness and the phenomenological investigation should include the way diagnoses of different diseases are interpreted by the person experiencing the diseases as an embodied being. Furthermore, the two theories display similarities in their emphasis of embodiment as the central element of health theory and in their stress on the alien nature of the body displayed in illness. Theories of biology and phenomenology are, indeed, compatible and in many cases also mutually supportive in the realm of health and illness.


2011 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Symes

Soon after he was consecrated bishop in 963, Æthelwold of Winchester (909–84) began to promulgate a series of new rules for worship and religious life in the monasteries of England. In one passage that is well known to theatre historians, Æthelwold insisted on the following performance of the Easter morning liturgy.While the third lesson is being read aloud, four of the brothersshould dress themselves.One of them, wearing an alb,should come in as though intent on other businessand gostealthilyto the place of the sepulchre, and therehe should sit quietly….The three remaining brothers …should make their way slowly and haltingly, coming before the place of the sepulchreas if they are seeking something. For these things are done in imitation of the angel seated on the tomb and of the women coming with perfumes to anoint the body of Jesus.When, therefore, the one sitting there sees the three drawing near, who are still wandering aboutas though seeking something, he should begin to singsweetly, in amoderatevoice: “Whom do you seek?”


2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 132-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. I. Kriman

The article discusses the modern philosophical concepts of transhumanism and posthumanism. The central issue of these concepts is “What is the posthuman?” The 21st century is marked by a contradictory understanding of the role and status of the human. On the one hand, there comes the realization of human hegemony over the whole world around: in the 20th century mankind not only began to conquer outer space, invented nuclear weapons, made many amazing discoveries but also shifted its attention to itself or rather to the modification of itself. Transhumanist projects aim to strengthen human influence by transforming human beings into other, more powerful and viable forms of being. Such projects continues the project of human “deification.” On the other hand, acknowledging the onset of the new geological epoch of the Anthropocene, there comes the rejection of classical interpretations of the human. The categories of historicity, sociality and subjectivity are no longer so anthropocentric. In the opinion of the posthumanists, the project of the Vitruvian man has proven to be untenable in the present-day environment and is increasingly criticized. The reflection on the phenomenon of the human and his future refers to the concepts that explore not only human but also non-human. Very often we can find a synonymous understanding of transhumanism and posthumanism. Although these movements work with the same modern constructs and concepts but interpret them in a fundamentally different way. The discourse of transhumanism refers to the Cartesian opposition of the body and the mind. Despite the sacralization of technology and the desire to purify the posthuman from such seemingly permanent attributes of the living as aging and death, transhumanism in many ways continues the ideas of the Enlightenment. For posthumanists, the subject is nomadic and a kind of assembly of human, animal, digital, chimerical. Thus, in posthumanism the main maxim of humanism about the human as the highest value is rejected – the human ceases to be “the measure of all things.”


1912 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanley Hirst

Mr. A. D. Michael has already recorded* the presence of mites of the genus Tarsonemus upon diseased sugar-cane from Barbados. He states that two species belonging to this genus were present in the material sent to him, and that the larger of the two species was certainly identical with one which Mr. Bancroft found doing serious damage to sugar-cane in Queensland. Mr. Michael proposed the name Tarsonemus bancrofti for this larger species. So far as I am aware, no description of this nominal species has been published and I am obliged to rely on Mr. Bancroft's published sketches† for information concerning it. Unfortunately his drawings are not executed in sufficient detail and I am not certain that his mite is the same species as the one which is dealt with in the present note; but as the figures of the Queensland mite differ appreciably from the Barbados specimens, it seems advisable to describe the latter under another name (T. spinipes). The species of the genus Tarsonemus often resemble one another very closely in structure, and they cannot be recognised with certainty unless a fully detailed account of their principal characters, accompanied by careful drawings, is given. Dr. Bancroft gives drawings of both sexes of his mite. He does not figure any spines on the third leg of the male, but he shows a lobeshaped expansion, similar to that of T. spinipes, on the inner side of the short fourth leg. The hairs of the body are not depicted. According to his drawings, the body of the female resembles that of T. spinipes in being very long and narrow, but is apparently much narrower at the anterior end. He represents the two terminal setae of the fourth leg of the female as being both very long and slender, the outer one being seemingly almost as long as the inner. The size of T. bancrofti is not stated, nor is the scale of enlargement of the figures given.


1991 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 127-142
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Madell

The central fact about the problem of personal identity is that it is a problem posed by an apparent dichotomy: the dichotomy between the objective, third-person viewpoint on the one hand and the subjective perspective provided by the first-person viewpoint on the other. Everyone understands that the mind/body problem is precisely the problem of what to do about another apparent dichotomy, the duality comprising states of consciousness on the one hand and physical states of the body on the other. By contrast, contemporary discussions of the problem of personal identity generally display little or no recognition of the divide which to my mind is at the heart of the problem. As a consequence, there has been a relentlessly third-personal approach to the issue, and the consequent proposal of solutions which stand no chance at all of working. I think the idea that the problem is to be clarified by an appeal to the idea of a human being is the latest manifestation of this mistaken approach. I am thinking in particular of the claim that what ought to govern our thinking on this issue is the fact that human beings constitute a natural kind, and that standard members of this kind can be said to have some sort of essence. Related to this is the idea that ‘person’, while not itself a natural kind term, is not a notion which can be framed in entire independence of this natural kind.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document