scholarly journals Analysis on Management of Job Burnout of Counselors in Chinese Colleges Based on Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (17) ◽  
pp. 207
Author(s):  
Xiaolei Wang ◽  
Ruoxuan Zhang ◽  
Zengxin Li ◽  
Junlong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Job Burnout ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Incentive System ◽  
College Counselors ◽  
Rational Choices ◽  
Multiple Scenarios ◽  
First Mover

In Chinese colleges, counselors need to simultaneously engage in teaching and management. The dual responsibilities make them probe to job burnout. To solve the problem, this paper puts forward assumptions about the behavior, income, and cost of counselors, and sets up a game model of burnout governance for college counselors. On this basis, the game between the college and counselors was analyzed under multiple scenarios: the two parties make completely independent decisions; the college is the first mover in the decision-making—— namely the equilibrium of the mixed strategy. Suppose a few colleges decide to improve the counselor management system. Based on the evolutionary game model, the authors discussed the influence of the improvement on all the colleges. The results show that the rational choices of the two parties should be “the college reforms the counselor management system”, while “the counselors work actively and avoid job burnout”; if a few colleges decide to improve the counselor management system, all the other colleges will follow suit, which leads to an improvement of efficient incentive system for college counselors. The research results provide a good reference for the burnout governance of college counselors.

scholarly journals Optimization of Financial Penalties for Environmental Pollution by Chinese Traditional Energy Enterprises

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Le Chang ◽  
Yadong Song ◽  
Tao Yu
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Environmental Damage ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionary Processes ◽  
Environmental Laws ◽  
Strategy Game

The formulation of proper financial penalties plays an important role in regulating Chinese traditional energy enterprises’ illegal pollution. Through the construction of a mixed-strategy game model and an evolutionary game model for regulatory agencies and traditional energy enterprises, the article studies how financial penalties impact players’ strategies and evolutionary processes to optimize financial penalties. It found that excessive financial penalties could reduce enforcement, but insufficient financial penalties would cause more pollution discharge violations. The article concludes that Chinese environmental laws should focus more on setting reasonable penalties based on the profit from activities that generate illegal pollution rather than on the environmental damage to improve regulatory effectiveness.

scholarly journals Research on Green Construction Supervision Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 98
Author(s):  
Wei Wei ◽  
Zhongfu Qin
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Construction Enterprise ◽  
Construction Enterprises ◽  
Green Construction ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Game Player ◽  
Construction Supervision ◽  
Supervision Mechanism

<p><em>On the basis of the analysis of the game relationship between the construction enterprise and the supervision department, the evolutionary game model of the green construction supervision is established. By analyzing the unilateral stability of the game player, it is found that when the regulatory probability of regulatory authorities is maintained at the corresponding regulatory probability of the mixed strategy equilibrium point, the green construction probability of construction enterprises will evolve to 100%, and has good stability. According to this, the supervision mechanism of setting the threshold of supervision probability is put forward so as to realize full coverage of green construction.</em></p>

scholarly journals RENT-SEEKING DECISIONS OF THE MAIN PARTICIPANTS IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS BASED ON EVOLUTIONARY-GAME AND SYSTEM DYNAMICS

2022 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 106-119
Author(s):  
Weiwei Zuo ◽  
Qiankun Wang ◽  
Peng Li
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Construction Projects ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Interaction Mechanism ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Behavioral Characteristics ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Dynamics Method

The performance of a construction project can be severely harmed by its participants’ rent-seeking. In order to prevent such attempt, this research integrates the evolutionary game theory with system dynamics method to simulate the impact of the change of some factors that may cause/reduce rent-seeking. Based on the analysis of the behavioral characteristics and interactive relationships of the main participants (the owner, supervisor, and contractor), an evolutionary game model is constructed and simulated with the method of system dynamics based on the replication dynamic equation of the mixed strategy solution of the three-party static game model. By assigning the parameters of project scale, supervision likelihood, supervision success rate, supervision cost, and penalty intensity, the interaction mechanism of the participants on each factor is revealed through a case-based simulation. The results show that the impacts of these factors on participants’ rent-seeking decisions are significantly different. Furthermore, some management suggestions are provided to prevent rent-seeking for project owner according to the research conclusions. This research can help the project owners take proper measures to prevent rent-seeking of the supervisors and the contractors to improve the performances of the projects.

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

scholarly journals Entangled and correlated photon mixed strategy for social decision making

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shion Maeda ◽  
Nicolas Chauvet ◽  
Hayato Saigo ◽  
Hirokazu Hori ◽  
Guillaume Bachelier ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Slot Machines ◽  
Decision Strategy ◽  
Social Infrastructure ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Social Decision Making ◽  
The Given

AbstractCollective decision making is important for maximizing total benefits while preserving equality among individuals in the competitive multi-armed bandit (CMAB) problem, wherein multiple players try to gain higher rewards from multiple slot machines. The CMAB problem represents an essential aspect of applications such as resource management in social infrastructure. In a previous study, we theoretically and experimentally demonstrated that entangled photons can physically resolve the difficulty of the CMAB problem. This decision-making strategy completely avoids decision conflicts while ensuring equality. However, decision conflicts can sometimes be beneficial if they yield greater rewards than non-conflicting decisions, indicating that greedy actions may provide positive effects depending on the given environment. In this study, we demonstrate a mixed strategy of entangled- and correlated-photon-based decision-making so that total rewards can be enhanced when compared to the entangled-photon-only decision strategy. We show that an optimal mixture of entangled- and correlated-photon-based strategies exists depending on the dynamics of the reward environment as well as the difficulty of the given problem. This study paves the way for utilizing both quantum and classical aspects of photons in a mixed manner for decision making and provides yet another example of the supremacy of mixed strategies known in game theory, especially in evolutionary game theory.

scholarly journals Research on Cooperative Innovation Behavior of Industrial Cluster Based on Subject Adaptability

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Jia ◽  
Minghui Jiang ◽  
Lei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Industrial Cluster ◽  
Industrial Clusters ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Cooperative Innovation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

From the perspective of the interactive cooperation among subjects, this paper portrays the process of cooperative innovation in industrial cluster, in order to capture the correlated equilibrium relationship among them. Through the utilization of two key tools, evolutionary stable strategy and replicator dynamics equations, this paper considers the cost and gains of cooperative innovation and the amount of government support as well as other factors to build and analyze a classic evolutionary game model. On this basis, the subject’s own adaptability is introduced, which is regarded as the system noise in the stochastic evolutionary game model so as to analyze the impact of adaptability on the game strategy selection. The results show that, in the first place, without considering subjects’ adaptability, their cooperation in industrial clusters depends on the cost and gains of innovative cooperation, the amount of government support, and some conditions that can promote cooperation, namely, game steady state. In the second place after the introduction of subjects’ adaptability, it will affect both game theory selection process and time, which means that the process becomes more complex, presents the nonlinear characteristics, and helps them to make faster decisions in their favor, but the final steady state remains unchanged.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

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