scholarly journals Study on Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game of Emergency Management of Public Health Emergencies Based on Dynamic Rewards and Punishments

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (16) ◽  
pp. 8278
Author(s):  
Ruguo Fan ◽  
Yibo Wang ◽  
Jinchai Lin
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Emergency Management ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
And Control ◽  
Reward And Punishment

In the context of public health emergency management, it is worth studying ways to mobilize the enthusiasm of government, community, and residents. This paper adopts the method of combining evolutionary game and system dynamics to conduct a theoretical modeling and simulation analysis on the interactions of the behavioral strategies of the three participants. In response to opportunistic behavior and inadequate supervision in the static reward and punishment mechanism, we introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism that considers changes in the social environment and the situation of epidemic prevention and control. This paper proves that the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuation problem in the evolutionary game process under static scenarios and achieve better supervision results through scenario analysis and simulation experiments.

scholarly journals Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Kui Zhou ◽  
Qi Wang ◽  
Junnan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Coal Mining ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Safe Production ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Reward And Punishment

In recent years, although coal mine accidents in China have decreased, they still occur frequently. Most previous studies on the evolutionary game of safety mining are limited to a focus on system dynamics and two-party game problems and lack a spatial graphic analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of coal mining enterprises, local governments, and central governments. As our method, a payment matrix of participants and replicated dynamic equations is established, and we also implement parameter simulation in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in safe coal mining. Specifically, (1) intensifying rewards and penalties for coal mining enterprises and local governments will help encourage coal mining enterprises to implement safe production measures and local governments to implement central government safety supervision policies. However, increased rewards will reduce central government’s willingness to adopt incentive strategies. (2) The central government’s reward for coal mining enterprises’ safe production must be greater than the increased cost of safe production to encourage enterprises to implement such production. Economic incentives for local governments must be greater than the benefits of rent-seeking; only then will local governments choose to strictly implement supervision policies. (3) Increasing sales revenue and rent-seeking costs of coal mining enterprises can also encourage them to implement safe production. Therefore, a well-designed reward and punishment mechanism will change the behaviour of coal enterprises and improve the probability of safe production. The research presented in this paper further works on improving safe coal mining production and designing reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms.

scholarly journals The Evolution Model of Public Risk Perception Based on Pandemic Spreading Theory under Perspective of COVID-19

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Yi-Cheng Zhang ◽  
Zhi Li ◽  
Guo-Bing Zhou ◽  
Nai-Ru Xu ◽  
Jia-Bao Liu
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Risk Perception ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Prevention And Control ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
Public Risk ◽  
And Control

After the occurrence of public health emergencies, due to the uncertainty of the evolution of events and the asymmetry of pandemic information, the public’s risk perception will fluctuate dramatically. Excessive risk perception often causes the public to overreact to emergencies, resulting in irrational behaviors, which have a negative impact on economic development and social order. However, low-risk perception will reduce individual awareness of prevention and control, which is not conducive to the implementation of government pandemic prevention and control measures. Therefore, it is of great significance to accurately evaluate public risk perception for improving government risk management. This paper took the evolution of public risk perception based on the COVID-19 region as the research object. First, we analyze the characteristics of infectious diseases in the evolution of public risk perception of public health emergencies. Second, we analyze the characteristics of risk perception transmission in social networks. Third, we establish the dynamic model of public risk perception evolution based on SEIR, and the evolution mechanism of the public risk perception network is revealed through simulation experiments. Finally, we provide policy suggestions for government departments to deal with public health emergencies based on the conclusions of this study.

scholarly journals Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health Emergencies

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Zhiqi Xu ◽  
Yukun Cheng ◽  
Shuangliang Yao
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Health Emergency ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Negative Behaviors ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
Theoretical Support ◽  
Safety And Health

Public health emergencies are more related to the safety and health of the public. For the management of the public health emergencies, all parties’ cooperation is the key to preventing and controlling the emergencies. Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, we formulate a tripartite evolutionary game model, involving the local government, the enterprises, and the public, for the public health emergency, e.g., COVID-19. The evolutionary stable strategies under different conditions of the tripartite evolutionary game are explored, and the effect from different factors on the decision-makings of participants for public health emergencies is also analyzed. Numerical analysis results show that formulating reasonable subsidy measures, encouraging the participation of the public, and enforcing the punishment to enterprises for their negative behaviors can prompt three parties to cooperate in fighting against the epidemic. Our work enriches an understanding of the governance for the public health emergency and provides theoretical support for the local government and related participants to make proper decisions in public health emergencies.

Evidence-Based Approach for Disaster Preparedness Authorities to Inform the Contents of Repositories for Prescription Medications for Chronic Disease Management and Control

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 447-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
David W. Brown ◽  
Stacy L. Young ◽  
Michael M. Engelgau ◽  
George A. Mensah
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Chronic Disease ◽  
Chronic Conditions ◽  
Causes Of Death ◽  
Prescription Medication ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Narcotic Analgesics ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
Drug Classes ◽  
And Control

AbstractIntroduction:Chronic diseases are major causes of death and disability and often require multiple prescribed medications for treatment and control. Public health emergencies (e.g., disasters due to natural hazards) that disrupt the availability or supply of these medications may exacerbate chronic disease or even cause death.Problem:A repository of chronic disease pharmaceuticals and medical supplies organized for rapid response in the event of a public health emergency is desirable. However, there is no science base for determining the contents of such a repository. This study provides the first step in an evidence-based approach to inform the planning, periodic review, and revision of repositories of chronic disease medications.Methods:Data from the 2004 National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NHAMCS) were used to examine the prescription medication needs of persons presenting to US hospital emergency departments for chronic disease exacerbations. It was assumed that the typical distribution of cases for an emergency department will reflect the patient population treated in the days after a public health emergency. The estimated numbers of prescribed drugs for chronic conditions that represent the five leading causes of death, the five leading primary diagnoses for physician office visits, and the five leading causes of disease burden assessed by disability-adjusted life years are presented.Results:The 2004 NHAMCS collected data on 36,589 patient visits that were provided by 376 emergency departments. Overall, the five drug classes mentioned most frequently for emergency department visits during 2004 were narcotic analgesics (30.7 million), non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (25.2 million), non-narcotic analgesics (15.2 million), sedatives and hypnotics (10.4 million), and cephalosporins (8.2 million). The drug classes mentioned most frequently for chronic conditions were: (1) for heart disease, antianginal agents/vasodilators (715,000); (2) for cancer, narcotic analgesics (53,000); (3) for stroke, non-narcotic analgesics (138,000); (4) for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, anti-asthmatics/bronchodilators (3.2 million); and (5) for diabetes, hypoglycemic agents (261,000). Ten medication categories were common across four or more chronic conditions.Conclusions:Persons with chronic diseases have an urgent need for ongoing care and medical support after public health emergencies. These findings provide one evidence-based approach for informing public health preparedness in terms of planning for and review of the prescription medication needs of clinically vulnerable populations with prevalent chronic disease.

scholarly journals Research on the Modernization of National Governance in Response to Public Health Emergencies

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 123-128
Author(s):  
Kejun Liu
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Collaborative Governance ◽  
Risk Governance ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Governance Capacity ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
The People ◽  
Important Challenge ◽  
The Government ◽  
And Control

The prevention and control of public health emergencies is an important challenge to national governance level and governance capacity. The increasing practical challenges of public health governance, the imperfect mechanism of public health emergency response and the insufficient investment in public health cause have affected the effectiveness of national governance of public health emergencies and hindered the in-depth promotion of the modernization of national governance. Therefore, the government, society and the people must move from crisis and prevention mechanism to forward-looking and dynamic adaptive risk governance mechanism, from multi-level structural governance to network collaborative governance, and from defense to attack, so as to improve the national system from the aspect of governance efficiency in response to public health emergencies, and then promote the modernization of national governance. 

scholarly journals Government Epidemic Prevention and Economic Growth Path Under Public Health Emergency: Theoretical Model and Simulation Analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhichao Yin ◽  
Xiaoxu Chen ◽  
Zongshu Wang ◽  
Lijin Xiang
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Economic Growth ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Close Contact ◽  
Public Health Emergency ◽  
Contact Tracing ◽  
Growth Path ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
Economic Output

This paper constructs a partial equilibrium model under public health emergency shocks based on economic growth theory, and investigates the relationship between government intervention and virus transmission and economic growth path. We found that both close contacts tracing measures and isolation measures are beneficial to human capital stock and economic output per capita, and the effect of close contact tracing measures is better than that of isolation measures. For infectious diseases of different intensities, economic growth pathways differed across interventions. For low contagious public health emergencies, the focus should be on the coordination of isolation and tracing measures. For highly contagious public health emergencies, strict isolation, and tracing measures have limited effect in repairing the negative economic impact of the outbreak. The theoretical model provides a basic paradigm for the future researches to study economic growth under health emergencies, with good scalability and robustness.

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