scholarly journals Information Investment and Sharing in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Government Subsidy and Consumer Preference for Energy-Saving Products

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jinxi Li ◽  
Yuyin Yi ◽  
Haishen Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Energy Saving ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
High Demand ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
The Government ◽  
Share Information

This study establishes a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer who invests in energy-saving products (ESPs) and one retailer who sells the products and may possess demand-forecast advantage. Considering government subsidy and consumer preference for ESPs and a random demand, we develop a four-stage Stackelberg game model to research the optimal strategies of the information investment and sharing of the retailer and the energy-saving R&D of the manufacturer. The results show the following: (1) When incurring a low information investment cost, the retailer is willing to invest in information acquisition techniques, while the retailer agreeing to share market information is related to the government subsidies and the probability of a high demand. The optimal strategy for the retailer is to share information when the probability of a high demand is less than 50% and the government subsidies for ESPs are high. Otherwise, the optimal strategy is not to share information. (2) The manufacturer not always expects the retailer to share information, which depends on the probability of a high demand and manufacturing cost. Especially, when the probability of a high demand is less than 50%, only a manufacturer incurring high cost will expect. (3) If the retailer refuses to share the information, the manufacturer can motivate the retailer to change his/her decision by sharing the information investment cost.

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing and Green Product Design Strategies in a Sustainable Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidy and Different Channel Power Structures

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (22) ◽  
pp. 12446
Author(s):  
Kelei Xue ◽  
Guohua Sun ◽  
Yuyan Wang ◽  
Shuiye Niu
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Product Design ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Design Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Green Product Design

Green product design is a vital measure to support sustainable development in a circular economy era. This paper studies the multi-product pricing and green product design strategies under different supply chain structures and government subsidy strategies. Considering different channel leadership, we establish the centralized (C), manufacturer-led (MS), and retailer-led (RS) supply chain models, respectively. By applying a game-theoretical approach, corresponding equilibrium pricing, green product design, and government subsidy decisions under different supply chain structures are obtained. Through comparison and numerical analysis, we find that: (1) the different subsidy strategies of the government have an important impact on green product development. When the government provides a uniform subsidy strategy, a RS supply chain can bring greener product, more market demands, more profit, and more social welfare; (2) when the government provides a differentiated subsidy strategy, MS and RS supply chain structures can bring greener product and more market demand than the centralized supply chain. They can also bring the same social welfare and the same product to the green design level. However, the MS supply chain structure can bring more profit for the firm; (3) the consumers’ green awareness positively impacts the design and development of green product. Therefore, it is beneficial for the firm to adopt reasonable measures to boost the environmental awareness of consumers in order to realize the sustainable development of our society.

scholarly journals Game-Theoretic Analysis to Examine How Government Subsidy Policies Affect a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Izabela Ewa Nielsen ◽  
Sani Majumder ◽  
Subrata Saha
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Government Organizations ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government

The pros and cons of government subsidy policies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) setting on optimal pricing, investment decisions in improving product quality, and used product collection under social welfare (SW) optimization goal have not been examined comprehensively. This study compares the outcomes of three government policies under manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) and retailer-Stackelberg (RS), namely (i) direct subsidy to the consumer, (ii) subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, and (iii) subsidy to the manufacturer to improve product quality. Results demonstrate that the greening level, used product collection, and SW are always higher under the RS game, but the rate of a subsidy granted by the government is always higher under the MS game. Profits for the CLSC members and SW are always higher if the government provides a subsidy directly to the consumer, but productivity of investment in the perspective of the manufacturer or government are less. In a second policy, the government organizations grant a subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, but it does not necessarily yield the desired outcome compared to others. In a third policy, the manufacturer receives a subsidy on a research and development (R&D) investment, but it yields a sub-optimal greening level. This study reveals that the outcomes of subsidy policies can bring benefit to consumers and add a degree of complication for CLSC members; government organizations need to inspect carefully among attributes, mainly product type, power of CLSC members, and investment efficiency for the manufacturer, before implementing any subsidy policies so that it can lead to an environmentally and economically viable outcome.

scholarly journals A Green Supply-Chain Decision Model for Energy-Saving Products That Accounts for Government Subsidies

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 2209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Xue ◽  
Ruifeng Gong ◽  
Laijun Zhao ◽  
Xiaoqing Ji ◽  
Yan Xu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Energy Conservation ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Energy Saving ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Government Subsidies

Government subsidies are a common policy adopted to promote energy conservation and emission reduction. The decision-making that occurs within the green supply chain for energy-saving products under government subsidies is an area of great academic interest and game theory is becoming a popular tool in such research. In this paper, we examined centralized and decentralized decision-making models for the green supply chain and a coordinated decision-making model for revenue-sharing contracts based on game theory. We studied the effects of government subsidies on retail prices, energy conservation levels, market demand, supply chain profits, and social welfare for energy-saving products. We then compared the effectiveness of the three models using a numerical example. Our results revealed the range of contract parameters for which manufacturer and retailer profits increase. Our results show that government subsidies can significantly improve social welfare and promote the improvement of energy-saving products. Centralized decision-making generates higher profits than decentralized decisions and government subsidies were positively correlated with the level of energy conservation, product prices, and market demand. Revenue sharing contract coordination decisions can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the same effect as centralized decisions.

Myanmar’s electrification plans need foreign funds

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Energy Saving ◽  
Energy Efficient ◽  
Poverty Reduction ◽  
Electricity Demand ◽  
Electricity Sector ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Economic Productivity ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Building Designs

Subject Electricity sector development in Myanmar. Significance The Ministry of Electricity and Energy (MOEE) may raise electricity tariffs to mitigate spiralling government subsidies exacerbated by growing electricity demand of 5-7% annually, reports citing the department’s permanent secretary said on April 7. The government is pushing electrification as Myanmar’s burgeoning economy diversifies. Impacts Electrification could aid Myanmar’s poverty reduction aims and its economic productivity. Energy-saving measures such as energy-efficient lighting and building designs are required. Off-grid electrification will utilise renewables. Higher business electricity tariffs would have inflationary effects and could see business closures.

scholarly journals Government Subsidies and Revenue Sharing Decisions for Port and Shipping Service Supply Chain in Emission Control Areas

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Bing Han ◽  
Xia Pan ◽  
Yu Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Emission Control ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
System Optimization ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Service Supply Chain ◽  
The Government

As the core of the port and shipping service supply chain system, the port and shipping companies must urgently solve the problem of how to balance emissions, costs, and benefits with the gradual extension of China’s emission control area (ECA) and the stringent emission requirements. From the perspective of system optimization, this research constructs a revenue sharing model of the port and shipping service supply chain and deals with the revenue sharing decision-making problem of the secondary service supply chain after port enterprises and shipping enterprises joining the government subsidy mechanism driven by ECA’s policy. Research shows that the government subsidy mechanism directly affects the profit of the port and shipping service supply chain, which is the key factor in implementing the ECA’s policy and promoting the emission reduction of the port and shipping enterprises. The revenue sharing of the port and shipping enterprises plays a decisive role in the revenue of the shipping enterprises. Cooperative emission reduction mechanism should be led by port enterprises to promote the balance between revenue and emission reduction in the supply chain system. Results provide a reference for the Chinese government to formulate corresponding incentives and subsidy policy under the new ECA’s regulations as well as solving the problems of how to balance emissions reduction and cost improvement for port and shipping enterprises.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Decisions Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Different Government Subsidies

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang Su ◽  
Xiaojing Liu ◽  
Wenyi Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Emission Level ◽  
The Government

This study examined how to arrange the generation and pricing of supply chain members in the case of consumer green preference with different government subsidies. The green supply chain comprises a manufacturer and a retailer; the government subsidizes manufacturers who produce green products and consumers who buy green products. The study built a green supply chain pricing decision model with different forms of subsidy under various power structures. By backward induction and sensitivity analysis, this study analyzed optimal strategies of green supply chain under various modes, and we discuss how the government subsidy coefficient affects the optimal decision of a green supply chain. The results show that, firstly, whether the government subsidizes the manufacturers or the consumers, the wholesale price offered by the manufacturer is directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures. Secondly, when the government subsidizes the manufacturer, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are inversely proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the manufacturer leader; the carbon-emission level and the retail price are all directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the retailer leader. Finally, when the government subsidizes the consumers, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures.

scholarly journals How Different Government Subsidy Objects Impact on Green Supply Chain Decision considering Consumer Group Complexity

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Qingfeng Meng ◽  
Mengwan Li ◽  
Zhen Li ◽  
Jing Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Consumer Group ◽  
Environmental Preferences ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

This paper fully considers the complexity characteristics of the consumer group, such as the heterogeneity of consumer environmental preferences and consumption levels and constructs a two-stage price decision model of green supply chain composed of the manufacturer and retailers. Under the four different scenarios, no government subsidies, government subsidies are given to the manufacturer, government subsidies are given to the green product retailer, and government subsidies are given to green product consumers, the impact of government subsidies on green supply chain member price decisions is analyzed, and the validity of the model is verified by an example. The results show that compared with the no government subsidies, government subsidies to the manufacturer will reduce the wholesale and sales prices of green products, and subsidies to the green product retailer will lead to higher wholesale prices and lower sales prices of green products, and subsidies to green product consumers will increase the wholesale and sales prices of green products. No matter which object is subsidized by the government, the wholesale price of general products will not change and the sales price will decrease. Government subsidies will facilitate the sales of green products, thereby expanding the market share of green products.

scholarly journals Effects of Government Subsidies on Production and Emissions Reduction Decisions under Carbon Tax Regulation and Consumer Low-Carbon Awareness

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (20) ◽  
pp. 10959
Author(s):  
Weiling Wang ◽  
Yongjian Wang ◽  
Xiaoqing Zhang ◽  
Dalin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Environmental Damage ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
The Government ◽  
Tax Regulation

To promote low-carbon production, the government simultaneously provides some subsidies under carbon tax regulations. Two government subsidies are widely adopted: one is based on emissions reduction quantity and the other is based on emissions reduction investment cost. Additionally, consumer low-carbon awareness has also been enhanced. Considering the aforementioned circumstances, this paper investigates the effects of different government subsidies on production and emissions reduction decisions under a carbon tax regulation by formulating three decision-making optimization models. The results show that (1) although the carbon tax regulation cannot guarantee further improvement of emissions reduction levels, government subsidies could make the corresponding conditions of improving emissions reduction investments wider; (2) a heavy carbon tax or stronger consumer low-carbon awareness would make the positive effect of government subsidies more apparent; and (3) subsidy policies may also be selected by the government from different perspectives, such as manufacturer development, consumer surplus, environmental damage and social welfare. Especially, from the perspective of maximizing social welfare, investment cost (IC) subsidy is not always advantageous, while emissions reduction (ER) subsidy can always bring higher social welfare compared with the case under no government subsidy.

scholarly journals Game-Theoretic Models of Green Products in a Two-Echelon Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Government Subsidies

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhenkai Lou ◽  
Xuming Lou ◽  
Xiaozhen Dai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Layer Model ◽  
Numerical Illustration ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper deals with issues concerning green subsidies of government and optimal decisions of a manufacture and dual-channel retailers in a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain. Both a decentralized supply chain and a centralized supply chain are considered. Sufficient and necessary conditions for guaranteeing that the two supply chains run normally under government subsidies are proposed. For the decentralized supply chain, a three-layer model is constructed according to different priorities of the four participants. Both Bertrand game and Stackelberg game are involved. For the centralized supply chain, a two-layer model is given. Decision models of the government under a financial budget are developed for maximizing the green degree of each case. It is shown that the green degree of the product of the centralized supply chain is always higher than that of the decentralized supply chain. Meanwhile, the total profit of the centralized supply is also higher. Finally, a numerical illustration is presented to visualize the discussed models and make some supplements.

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