scholarly journals Applicability of Transaction Cost Economics to Understanding Organizational Structures in Solidarity-Based Food Systems in Germany

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1095 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura A. Carlson ◽  
Vera Bitsch

In response to consumer concerns about sustainability of food production and distribution systems, and the difficulties many agricultural producers face to self-sustain while providing the quality of products consumers desire, alternatives to market-based exchange are developing. Solidarity-based food systems (SFS) based on relationships of mutual trust, dependency and support between consumers and producers are an example. SFS are designed to insulate producers from market pressures and alleviate consumers’ mistrust in market-based mechanisms. A network of SFS has formed in Germany under the name Solidarische Landwirtschaft (Solawi). Theories based on economic principles that help explain the way alternatives to market-based transactions in agriculture are organized are still lacking. The article suggests Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) as helpful to gain a better understanding of how these organizations form and function. The governance structures Solawis create are considered hybrid organizations according to TCE. Qualitative research methods are used to generate detailed accounts of the governance structures of four Solawis and the reasons behind the decisions of individual actors to participate. Effectiveness of TCE in evaluating these structures is analyzed. Based on the results, the concept of transaction benefits is suggested as a potential augmentation of TCE to improve its applicability to SFS.

Author(s):  
Anneli Lofstedt ◽  
Baukje de Roos ◽  
Paul G. Fernandes

Abstract Purpose To review the seafood dietary recommendations of European countries and compare them to national seafood supplies. Methods Current seafood dietary recommendations were collated from national health authorities across Europe. Food balance sheets were downloaded from the FAO, and appropriate conversion factors were applied to each seafood commodity. Average net per capita seafood supplies from 2007 to 2017 were derived from data on imports and production for food from both capture fisheries and aquaculture, accounting for exports. Results Both national dietary recommendations and seafood supplies varied considerably throughout Europe. At a national level, on a per capita basis, only 13 out of the 31 of European dietary recommendations for fish consumption were satisfied by national seafood supplies. Most of the countries with coastal access, as well as those with traditional fish-eating cultures, such as France and countries in Northern Europe, had adequate seafood supplies to meet their recommendations. The landlocked countries of Central and Eastern Europe did not have enough seafood supplies to satisfy their recommendations. Conclusions Our findings emphasise the need to not only consider consumer health outcomes when developing and advocating dietary recommendations, but also the sustainability of food production systems. As many foods are not necessarily locally sourced but traded as part of global production and distribution systems, it is important to consider greater consistency between national dietary recommendations to facilitate more sustainable marine food systems.


2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magali Delmas ◽  
Alfred Marcus

This paper compares the economic efficiency of firm-agency governance structures for pollution reduction using transaction costs economics. Two governance structures are analyzed with the transaction costs approach: command and control regulation (CCR) and negotiated agreements (NAs). We propose that the choice of governance structure depends on the strategies firms pursue given the attributes of their transactions and their market opportunities. The application of transaction cost economics analysis leads to different choices of regulatory instruments. Firms in more mature, stable industries are likely to choose command and control, while firms in new, dynamic sectors are more likely to opt for negotiated agreements. Frequency of transactions is a key factor in firm choice.


2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (5) ◽  
pp. 393-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Libby O. Christensen ◽  
Ryan E. Galt ◽  
Alissa Kendall

AbstractMany consumers are trying to reduce their food's environmental impact by purchasing more locally sourced food. One choice for local food is Community Supported Agriculture (CSA), in which farmers provide a share of produce on a regular basis to pre-paying farm members. The number of CSAs in the USA has grown from two in the mid-1980s to perhaps as many as 12,617 according to the latest US census of agriculture (2014). We use a case study approach to investigate the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions associated with five CSA operations in the Sacramento Valley of California. By understanding the GHG emissions of CSAs and the practices that might be improved, we hope to support innovative strategies to reduce GHG emissions in these agricultural production systems. Input, production and distribution data were collected from each farm and reported in CO2e emissions for 1 kg CSA produce at the pickup location. Results show large variation in total emissions, ranging from 1.72 to 6.69 kg CO2e kg−1 of produce with an average of 3.94 kg CO2e kg−1 produce. The largest source of emissions was electricity, contributing over 70% of total CO2e emissions on average. Based on our findings, despite the seemingly similarities between these operations in terms of production site, acreage, customers and production practices, there is still a large amount of variability with regard to total GHG. Thus we argue coming up with a standardized production function for diversified production and deriving GHGs or calculating average total emissions overlooks the heterogeneity of the system. Food systems can never be reduced to a simple binary of local is better and conventional is worse, or its inverse local is worse and conventional is better, because of the complexities of the production and distribution systems and their relationship to GHG emissions. Yet, we can say that localized production systems that are low in electricity use (or use renewable energy sources) and use efficiently-produced compost use have lower GHG emissions than those that do not.


Author(s):  
Barak Richman

This chapter assesses New Institutional Economics (NIE). It begins by describing the author’s own understanding of the New Private Law (NPL). The chapter then provides a brief introduction to NIE and its intersection with the study of legal doctrines and institutions. NIE’s roots extend—at least—to Ronald Coase’s famous 1937 article, “The Nature of the Firm,” and more likely to the writings of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century political economists. These intellectual traditions have shaped what is now known as NIE into two distinct branches. The first branch examines institutions as “humanly designed constraints that structure political, social, and economic interactions.” The second branch of NIE focuses on more micro-level behavior. Called “the governance branch” and operationalized by transaction cost economics, the foundational idea is to describe firms not in neoclassical terms as production functions, but in organizational terms as governance structures. The chapter explains how both NPL and NIE exhibit the hallmarks of interdisciplinary, scholarly pluralism, and an inquisitive focus on real-world, tractable problems. It concludes with some thoughts about the future of NPL and, in particular, the lessons it can take from NIE’s successes.


2022 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaiane Aparecida Pereira ◽  
Amanda Ferreira Guimarães ◽  
Rejane Heloise dos Santos ◽  
Sandra Mara de Alencar Schiavi ◽  
José Paulo de Souza

Abstract: This study sought to discuss the governance structures adopted between livestock producers and their cooperative slaughterhouses in the chain of differentiated beef in the state of Paraná. The theoretical basis used was the Transaction Cost Economics and Measurement Costs Economics, complemented by the specificities of cooperatives. We conducted interviews with three key agents and eleven representatives of six cooperative slaughterhouses operating in this system. As result, we observed that the cooperatives have similar objectives and requirements, although there are differences in the levels of formality or flexibility. Although transactions are recurrent and have been successful, they involve a high asset specificity, depend on subjective measurements, and are still exposed to market uncertainties, which leaves room for the generation of conflicts and disincentives to quality. Despite this, the relational and reputational aspects associated with trust and partnership between the parties are elements that enable reduced transaction and measurement costs in these structures. At first, the measurements conducted by the cooperatives had an important role in the construction of trust between the parties and for value distribution. In a second moment, the trust built enabled the reduction of measurement costs.


2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Fuhr ◽  
Thorsten Beckers

With airport privatization and infrastructure expansion projects taking place in the liberalized European air transport market, airport and airline companies are critically reevaluating their vertical governance structures. This paper analyzes the comparative efficiency of vertical governance structures in the airport-airline supply relationship. Using transaction cost economics as the lens of analysis, we develop propositions and present supporting qualitative case studies. Our propositions state that hub airlines and hub airports seek specialized governance structures, while value-based carriers and base airports enter into long-term contracts supported by complementary safeguards. These privately crafted governance modes complement or even replace external regulation.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cleiciele Albuquerque Augusto ◽  
José Paulo De Souza

The transaction cost economics (TCE), in the field of New Institutional Economics, have been shown as one of the most elaborate theoretical and explanatory constructs of arrangements existing in organizational reality. However, recent studies have sought on the Resource Based View (RBV) approach the theoretical foundations about setting these arrangements, in addition to highlighting a required complementarity between TCE and the RVB in understanding how they are formed. In this sense, the objective in this article was to understand how the complementarity theory TCE and RBV explain the configuration of the governance structures in the context of New Institutional Economics. The discussion presented in the form of essay, demonstrated that resources and differentiated capabilities could provide the basis for the proper choice of governance structures. These structures, in turn, are chosen in order to protect and achieve sustainable competitive advantages from these resources. Thus, that the complementary view of TCE with RBV is able to encompass more fully the aspects related to the choice of firm boundaries, minimizing the individual limitations of these approaches in terms of strategic analysis.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 511-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franco M. Martins ◽  
Jacques Trienekens ◽  
Onno Omta

This paper depicts the main coordination mechanisms (CMs) included in governance structures used to support the supply of piglets in the Brazilian Pork Chain (BPC). Furthermore, it analyses how and why actors use plural forms of coordination to support similar transactions. Based on the literature and an exploratory study carried out in the BPC, we propose a framework to analyse how price, volume, quality and resource allocation are coordinated in a transaction. This paper builds on transaction cost economics in two ways. First, it shows that to arrange a transaction, a buyer may set CMs in distinct positions within the market-hierarchy continuum. Second, it shows that actors use plural CMs with different counterparties in similar transactions. We found four explanations for plural governance: market fluctuations, bargaining power of suppliers, stricter coordination and quality, and the exchange context.


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