scholarly journals Research on Air Pollution Control in China: From the Perspective of Quadrilateral Evolutionary Games

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 1756 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weixin Yang ◽  
Yunpeng Yang
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Air Pollution Control ◽  
Stable Points ◽  
The Ideal

By constructing a quadrilateral evolutionary game model involving the central government, local governments, polluting enterprises, and the public, this paper attempts to comprehensively analyze the development and implementation of China’s air pollution control policies. Through the quadrilateral evolutionary game model, this paper systematically studies the evolutionary stable strategies of the four parties involved and obtains 27 equilibrium points, strategy sets, and their corresponding policy performance with the help of the four-dimensional dynamic system. The research results show that there are five equilibrium points that represent the least ideal scenarios, 14 equilibrium points that represent the less than ideal scenarios, four equilibrium points that represent the ideal scenarios, three equilibrium points that represent the more than ideal scenarios, and one equilibrium point that represents the most ideal scenarios. By analyzing the eight equilibrium points that represent the ideal, more than ideal and most ideal scenarios, especially the four stable points, this paper has obtained the conditions as well as policy implications of the four stable points in China’s air pollution control campaign.

CROSS-BOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL UNDER “ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS”: PERSPECTIVES FROM HONG KONG–GUANGDONG COLLABORATION

2017 ◽  
Vol 65 (03) ◽  
pp. 601-625
Author(s):  
TING YIN TIFFANY WONG ◽  
YUAN XU ◽  
YOUNGHO CHANG
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Hong Kong ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Air Pollution Control ◽  
Two Systems ◽  
One Country Two Systems ◽  
Effective Collaboration

This study aims to examine how “One Country, Two Systems” has shaped and influenced the collaboration on cross-boundary air pollution control between the governments of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Guangdong province. The presence of the Chinese central government significantly fostered the start of this collaboration, but the implementation and collaborative relationship were relatively weak and unsustainable due to the two local governments’ largely different interests, goals and political demands. We found that the emphasis on “One Country” especially after 2003 led to the signature of more joint agreements in comparison with what the emphasis on “Two Systems” did between 1997 and 2003. Joint agreements appear to be necessary conditions for effective collaboration, but too many of them without satisfying implementation could have resulted in less concrete benefits. A balanced stress on “One Country” and “Two Systems” might bring an appropriate number of joint agreements with good implementation for more effective collaboration.

The policy implementation strategies of county cadres: Political instrument and flexible local governance

2020 ◽  
pp. 0920203X2096823
Author(s):  
Gang Tian ◽  
Wen-Hsuan Tsai
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Local Governance ◽  
Implementation Strategies ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
The Political ◽  
Air Pollution Control ◽  
Grass Roots ◽  
Political Risks

Using the concept of ‘hedging’, we explore how local cadres in China deviate from central policies in order to serve local interests and, while doing so, avoid being called to account by their superiors. Political signals enable cadres to decide when to invest more resources into the implementation of certain policies. In this way, they optimize their performance and avoid the political risks involved in failing to carry out their designated tasks. This article uses county Y as an example in a discussion of county-level implementation of policies related to economic growth and air pollution control. We find that local cadres weaken the functions of the superior ‘special inspection team’ (专项督察组, hereafter inspection team), treating them as political instruments used by the central and local authorities to ensure a greater level of responsiveness at the grass roots. Information concerning the imminent arrival of an inspection team in their locality acts as a signal for cadres to allocate more resources to the enforcement of air pollution control measures, thus maximizing their performance in this area. Through this research, we have endeavoured to provide a deeper understanding of the operating logic of Chinese local governments and the behaviour of county cadres.

scholarly journals Substantive Innovation or Strategic Innovation? Research on Multiplayer Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model and Simulation

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Junqiang Li ◽  
Hao Ren ◽  
Changcheng Zhang ◽  
Qingxia Li ◽  
Kaifeng Duan
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Innovation Development ◽  
Innovation Research ◽  
Strategic Innovation ◽  
Model And Simulation ◽  
Enterprise Innovation ◽  
The Subject

Innovation subsidy is of great significance to promoting enterprise innovation development. However, in recent years, the frequent occurrence of R&D subsidy deception in China has greatly reduced effectiveness of innovation. From the perspective of the strategic choice motivation of the innovation subject (including the enterprises, research institutions, and local governments), this paper constructs a multiplayer stochastic evolutionary game model. The influence of each variable on the subject strategy adoption is analyzed by simulation. There are two important findings in this paper. First, the paper confirms that there is an optimal boundary for the high subsidies received by enterprises and academic institutions, and the “subsidy boundary” is solved through the model. Second, this paper analyzes the effectiveness of the regulation of each variable through simulation and provides management and policy implications.

Evolutionary Environmental Policy: An Analysis of the U.S. Air pollution Control Policy

1997 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong-Jin Cha
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Control Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Air Pollution Control ◽  
Theoretical Frameworks ◽  
And Control ◽  
The U.S

The purposes of this study are to examine the nature of air pollution control and available policy instruments in the United States. Focusing on command-and-control (CAC), emission tax, bubble policy and emission offset policy, this study analyzes their theoretical frameworks and limitations. The analysis of this study suggests that the U.S. air pollution control policies have been evolved to deal with economic inefficiencies from the CAC approach. Reforming the pollution policy to market incentive systems could achieve the efficiency of pollution control. Possible policy implications are also discussed.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. 2472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lingyan Xu ◽  
Zhuoyun Zhou ◽  
Jianguo Du
Keyword(s):  
Point Source ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Intensive Management ◽  
Point Source Pollution ◽  
Synergy Effects ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Non Point Source Pollution

This paper focuses on the sustainable development dilemma of agricultural production in China under the pattern of intensive management, which is seriously challenged by agricultural non-point source pollution. The key to effectively break through the dilemma is to promote the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control by stakeholders including local governments, new agricultural operators and traditional farmers. Accordingly, this paper discusses the interactive decision-making relationships between new agricultural operators and traditional farmers under the guidance of local governments, by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model, as well as analyzing evolutionary cooperative stability strategies and realizing the simulation of evolution processes in different scenarios by MATLAB. The results show that new agricultural operators play a leading role in agricultural non-point source pollution control, whose strategies have effects such as technology spillover. The rewards from the superior government will support local governments in taking proactive action in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control, and then local governments can offer technical support and subsidies to new agricultural operators and traditional farmers for reducing their costs. Furthermore, this paper also finds that there are green synergy effects among the groups, where the variations of parameters and strategies by one group would affect the two others. Additionally, agricultural land operation rights transfers would cause traditional farmers to take more time to cooperate in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control. In order to promote the multi-agent co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control under intensive management pattern, this paper suggests that it should be necessary to reduce their costs and improve incentives, as well as to increase the common interests among groups and enhance their green synergy effects.

scholarly journals Air Pollution Regulations in China: A Policy Simulation Approach with Evolutionary Game

2022 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 222-233
Author(s):  
Zhaopeng Chu ◽  
◽  
Chen Bian ◽  
Jun Yang ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Control Policy ◽  
Environmental Taxes ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Air Pollution Control ◽  
Environmental Consequences

In the institutional context of China’s political centralization and fiscal decentralization, this study explores the environmental regulations that make the central and local governments join efforts in air pollution control. Policy simulations in an evolutionary game show that the best approach is to internalize environmental costs and benefits in local governments’ objective function. The effectiveness of several policy instruments is examined individually and jointly, including administrative inspection, transfer payment, and environmental taxes. It is shown that in case environmental consequences are not internalized, appropriate application of policy instruments can incentivize goal-oriented local governments to choose the socially optimal strategy.

scholarly journals Measuring Environmental and Economic Performance of Air Pollution Control for Province-Level Areas in China

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (8) ◽  
pp. 1378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao Gong ◽  
Jianing Mi ◽  
Chunyan Wei ◽  
Ruitao Yang
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Air Pollution ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Air Pollution Control ◽  
Total Energy Consumption ◽  
Waste Gas ◽  
Desirable And Undesirable Outputs ◽  
Province Level

This paper proposes an improved three-stage data envelopment analysis (DEA) model to measure the environmental-economic efficiency (EEE) of air pollution control for 30 province-level areas of China during the period of 2012 to 2016. In this model, capital, labor, and total energy consumption are the three inputs, while gross domestic product (GDP) and waste gas emissions represent the desirable and undesirable outputs, respectively. This model allows the weights of economic growth and environmental protection to be adjusted as needed by policymakers; the model is adopted to evaluate the effects of government measures on environmental protection and economic growth. Ultimately, the effects from environmental factors and statistical noise are excluded from the EEEs of local governments and the managerial efficiencies are calculated. The results simultaneously reflect the local performance of air pollution control and economic development, which can be used to clarify the ranking of provinces nationwide.

scholarly journals Effects of Air Pollution Control on Urban Development Quality in Chinese Cities Based on Spatial Durbin Model

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (12) ◽  
pp. 2822 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yanchao Feng ◽  
Xiaohong Wang ◽  
Wenchao Du ◽  
Jun Liu
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Urban Development ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Eastern Region ◽  
Air Pollution Control ◽  
Spatial Durbin Model ◽  
Chinese Cities ◽  
The Impact

With the rapid development of urbanization, industrialization, and motorization, a large number of Chinese cities have been affected by heavy air pollution. In order to promote the development quality of Chinese cities, mixed regulations to control air pollution have been implemented under the lead of government. The principal component analysis and efficacy coefficient method are used to estimate urban development quality, according to the panel data of 285 prefecture-level cities in China over the period 2003–2016. On this basis, the paper uses the spatial Durbin model to study the direct impact and the spatial spillover effect of air pollution control on urban development quality in China. Results show that the control of smoke and dust has improved urban development quality in China, however, the control of sulfur dioxide has led to the decline of urban development quality in China. Furthermore, the impact of air pollution control on urban development quality in the eastern region is of great significance in statistical tests, while the situation in the central and western regions has not passed the test, implying the spatial heterogeneity among different regions. The different effects of air pollution control on urban development quality in different regions also illustrate the consciousness and supervision of local governments’ environment protection. Finally, the effects decomposition of the influencing factors based on spatial Durbin model (SDM) also supports the robust findings. Promoting the upgrading of energy consumption structure, raising awareness of environmental protection and supervision, and strengthening cooperation of different regions are suggested. Further recommendations are provided to improve the conceptual design and increase the credibility of our research. Our study not only provides new evidence on the impact of air pollution control on urban development quality in China, but also proposes a new perspective to promote urban development quality in China.

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