scholarly journals The impacts of subsidy policies and channel encroachment on the power battery recycling of new energy vehicles

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Liu ◽  
Chuanxu Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Battery Recycling ◽  
Power Battery ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

Abstract With the rapid development of new energy vehicles (NEVs), the recycling and reuse of retired power batteries has attracted extensive attention from the society and scholars. In this paper, we establish a closed-loop supply chain model composed of the government, one power battery supplier and one NEV manufacturer. Based on game theory, considering whether the battery supplier encroaches on the power battery recycling channel, we study the optimal decisions of the government and supply chain members under different government subsidy policies (no subsidy, subsidy for the NEV manufacturer and subsidy for consumers) and their impact on profits and social welfare. The results show that, whether the battery supplier encroaches on the recycling channel or not, compared with the no subsidy policy, subsidy for the NEV manufacturer is more conducive to the improvement of enterprise profits and social welfare. In addition, whether the battery collection quantity is constrained by the NEV sales quantity, when the recycling channel cost is lower than a certain threshold, the encroachment is always beneficial to the battery supplier. When the recycling channel cost is within a certain threshold range, the encroachment will achieve a win–win situation; otherwise, win–lose. When the recycling channel cost is higher than a certain threshold, the encroachment behavior has no impact on the NEV manufacturer and the battery supplier. Finally, we investigate the impact of key parameters on the enterprise profits and social welfare through numerical experiments. We also find that the environmental awareness of consumers have significant impacts on social welfare.

scholarly journals Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain Decision-Making and Coordination considering CSR and Consumer Green Preferences

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Xiaochun Chen ◽  
Rui Zhang ◽  
Bo Lv
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Green Preferences ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
The Impact

With the rapid development of the Internet and changes in consumer buying habits, many manufacturers are increasingly relying on online channels to sell their products as opposed to traditional retail channels. In this study, we innovatively investigate the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and consumer green preferences (CGP) on supply chain performance and product green level in the dual-channel green supply chain (DCGSC). Specifically, four models of DCGSC (centralized, independent CSR, cooperative CSR, and collaboration contract) are investigated. Next, we use game theory to investigate the optimal product green level, online and offline selling prices, social welfare, profits of supply chain enterprises, and the whole supply chain under the four models. We give numerical examples to demonstrate the effectiveness and viability of the four models. We find several interesting conclusions. First, increasing the attention to both CSR and CGP by supply chain enterprises is conducive to stimulating innovation and improving product green level. Second, when supply chain enterprises actively execute their CSR, they can reasonably control online and offline selling prices and increase consumer surplus and the profits of whole supply chain and social welfare are increased. Third, it is beneficial to increase the value of supply chain enterprises to enhance CSR within a certain threshold, but when CSR is higher than the threshold, the profitability of supply chain enterprises is weakened. Finally, collaboration contracts are capable of coordinating DCGSC and guaranteeing the profitability of supply chain enterprises.

scholarly journals Characteristics Numerical Research on Power Battery Impact Strength of New Energy Vehicle

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (08) ◽  
pp. 1950042
Author(s):  
Zhuhai Tao ◽  
Yang Jialin ◽  
Zhang Xianglei ◽  
Zhang Bing
Keyword(s):  
Impact Strength ◽  
Crash Test ◽  
Test Conditions ◽  
Power Battery ◽  
Average Impact ◽  
New Energy ◽  
Strength Curve ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
The Impact ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

Based on the crash test of new energy vehicles, the mechanical response data of power batteries during the collision process were collected, and the average impact strength curve of power batteries of typical new energy vehicles in China was obtained. The average impact strength curve was mathematically processed to obtain the impact strength characteristic value and tolerance by using the equivalent trapezoidal wave and the least square method, thereby determining the test conditions of the dynamic strength of the domestic new energy vehicle power battery. The differences are analyzed by comparing with ISO 12405-3 test conditions, which provides an important reference for the revision of power battery test standards in the future.

scholarly journals Economic research and suggestions on the recycling of waste power batteries for China’s new energy vehicles

2020 ◽  
Vol 165 ◽  
pp. 01028
Author(s):  
Li Zhenbiao ◽  
Li Yuke ◽  
Pan Wei ◽  
Wang Jia
Keyword(s):  
Economic Research ◽  
Hydrometallurgical Process ◽  
Analysis Model ◽  
Rare Metals ◽  
Recycling Industry ◽  
Battery Recycling ◽  
Power Battery ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Cost ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

With the rapid promotion of the number of China’s new energy vehicles in promotion and application, it is of great significance to ensure the recycling of the waste power batteries. It can not only effectively reduce the safety and environmental protection risks brought by the waste power battery, but also alleviate China’s dependence on rare metals such as cobalt and lithium, which has been widely concerned by the industry. In this paper, the cost analysis model of waste power battery treated by hydrometallurgical process is established, and the economy of recycling of ternary material battery and LFP battery is compared and analysed, and the overall economy of the whole power battery recycling industry is analysed, and the relevant conclusions are obtained, and the relevant suggestions of recycling of power battery are put forward according to the analysis results, to provide reference for industry and related management departments.

Forecast on China's New Energy Vehicle Market Demand

2014 ◽  
Vol 496-500 ◽  
pp. 2822-2826 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Shi ◽  
Bin Liu ◽  
Yong He Huang ◽  
Hua Liang Hou
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Financial Policies ◽  
The Us ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

With the rapid development of new energy vehicle in China, the volume has been the hot topic in the fields of automotive industry. A series of subsidy and financial policies has been released by the government. Peoples in this industry care about the effective of the policies especially the new energy vehicles volume and market share in China. In this paper, we analysis the development experience of developed countries such as the US and Japan, and calculate the new energy vehicles volume and market share in China from 2015 to 2020 by model. Its more effective to the government department to draw a plan of new energy vehicle development blue print.

scholarly journals Screening Contract Excitation Models Involving Closed-Loop Supply Chains Under Asymmetric Information Games: A Case Study with New Energy Vehicle Power Battery

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu
Keyword(s):  
Closed Loop ◽  
High Capacity ◽  
Chinese Economy ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Expected Return ◽  
Power Battery ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Impact ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

In closed-loop supply chain systems for power battery remanufacturing, recycling and dismantling tasks will be relegated to third-party recyclers. This has significant disadvantages, inasmuch as the asymmetric exchange of information regarding the level of recycling capacity and effort after signing a contract fiscal risks to the manufacturers. The purpose of this paper is to study the “adverse selection” of recyclers and “moral hazards” hidden in their purported effort levels, based on Information Screening Models in the principal-agent theory. Our information screening model for revenue sharing will be presented, and subsequently verified using numerical simulation to demonstrate the impact of the screening contract on the expected returns of both parties. Our results show that the sharing coefficient of the remanufacturing revenue for low-capability recyclers is distorted downwards, and only truthful reporting can retain profits. High-capacity recyclers will obtain additional information while retaining profit. At the same time, as the proportion of high-capacity recyclers in the market increases, the expected return of the entrusting party increases. One critical area where this will impact the Chinese economy is in the area of new energy vehicles. We investigate a case study of our approach in new energy vehicles, which are being used to reduced CO 2 emissions, but have environmentally hazardous batteries that must be recycled safely and economically.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Research on Cooperation Mode of the NEV Power Battery Recycling and Gradient Utilization Alliance in the Context of China’s NEV Power Battery Retired Tide

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 4165
Author(s):  
Xichen Lyu ◽  
Yingying Xu ◽  
Dian Sun
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Competition And Cooperation ◽  
Battery Recycling ◽  
Power Battery ◽  
New Energy ◽  
Single Strategy ◽  
The Government ◽  
New Energy Vehicle

Recycling and gradient utilization (GU) of new energy vehicle (NEV) power batteries plays a significant role in promoting the sustainable development of the economy, society and environment in the context of China’s NEV power battery retirement tide. In this paper, the battery recycling subjects and GU subjects were regarded as members in an alliance, and an evolutionary game model of competition and cooperation between the two types of subjects was established. Evolution conditions and paths of the stable cooperation modes between these two were explored. Suggestions were proposed to avoid entering a state of deadlock and promote the alliance to achieve the “win-win” cooperation mode of effective resource recovery and environmental sustainability. The results revealed four types of certain situations, two types of uncertain situations, and one type of deadlock situation for the evolution of alliance cooperation. The factors of the market environment are evident in not only changing the evolution paths and steady-states of the alliance but also in breaking the evolution deadlock. However, the sensitivity of the members in the alliance to different types of parameters varies greatly. It is difficult for the government to guide the formation of an ideal steady-state of cooperation or break the deadlock of evolution by a single strategy, such as subsidies or supervision. The combination of subsidy-and-supervision or phased regulation should be adopted. Only increasing subsidies is likely to weaken the function of the market and have a counterproductive effect.

scholarly journals Optimal Battery Recycling Strategy for Electric Vehicle under Government Subsidy in China

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4855 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuan Shao ◽  
Xudong Deng ◽  
Qiankai Qing ◽  
Yajuan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Electric Vehicle ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Battery Recycling ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretical Approach ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Motivated by the increasing environmental concerns about the used electric vehicle batteries in China, an electric vehicle manufacturer’s battery recycling strategy under government subsidy was studied. A consumer utility function was used to capture consumer environmental awareness associated with battery recycling and the game-theoretical approach was applied to analyze the interaction between the government and the manufacturer. It was found that, with an exogenous government subsidy, the manufacturer either recycles all the batteries, or it does not recycle any batteries if the impact of the recycling scale on costs is unremarkable; otherwise, the manufacturer recycles some used batteries when the benefit from recycling is moderate. Interestingly, an increased subsidy causes the manufacturer’s battery recycling rate to decrease if the subsidy is sufficiently large. When the government subsidy is endogenously, either full recycling, no recycling, or partial recycling can still arise. The optimal battery recycling rate and social welfare are lower in a non-cooperative game than in a cooperative game if the benefit from recycling is relatively low. The main findings were numerically justified with realistic subsidy data in China. The numerical results indicate: (1) the optimal battery recycling rate locates in a closed interval from 0 to 1 given an exogenous or an endogenous government subsidy, and it decreases with the subsidy when the subsidy is not less than 50% of the production cost of electric vehicle; (2) the social welfare first increases to a maximum value and then decreases as the subsidy increases; and (3) the optimal battery recycling rate increases significantly and the social welfare is improved when there is cooperation between the government and the manufacturer.

scholarly journals Government incentive mechanism of closed-loop supply chain based on information asymmetry

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qunli Wu ◽  
Xinxin Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Collection Efficiency ◽  
Scientific Policy ◽  
Recovery Efficiency ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Aimed at the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) composed of the manufacturer, the retailer and consumers in the waste products market, this paper studies how the government handles the adverse selection problem on the hidden recovery costs of the retailer and deals with the moral hazard problem on the level of retailer's hidden efforts. A government incentive regulation aiming at maximizing social welfare has been established based on the incentive theory in this paper. A list of contracts with transfer payments is presented to reveal the retailer's collection efficiency and motivate the retailer to make the optimal investment. Further, the impact of related factors on the recovery cost and social welfare level according to the numerical simulation are verified. The results show that under the government regulation, only by reporting the true recovery technology type information to the government can the retailer maximizes the profit. In addition, the retailer with high recovery efficiency can obtain both retained profit and additional information rent. Finally, as the retailer makes efforts to improve the recovery level, it also increases investment cost, which affects the enthusiasm of enhancing the retailer's recovery efficiency. Therefore, the government should not blindly pursue the improvement of recycling efficiency regardless of the cost, but should pay more attention to the control of recycling equipment and technology cost.The results facilitate scientific policy development, and provide a reference for promoting closed-loop supply chain operations.

scholarly journals The behavior of consumer buying new energy vehicles based on stochastic evolutionary game

Filomat ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (15) ◽  
pp. 3987-3997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Guan ◽  
Guoxing Zhang ◽  
Diyi Liu ◽  
Xu Tan ◽  
Dong Wu
Keyword(s):  
External Disturbance ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Government Support ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Support Cost ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

China?s current vehicle emissions caused by air pollution problems have become increasingly prominent. How to improve new energy vehicle market share, and effectively guide the consumer buying behavior become a problem, which the government and social have to be solved. In this paper, according to establish the stochastic evolutionary game model between the government and consumers in the car market, introducing of random factors analysis on the impact of evolutionary stability ,will obtain the stable strategy of government and automotive consumers. And on the basis of it, we study the government support, cost of vehicles, the use of cost, the utility of automobile use for the ways of evolutionary stability, with case further illustrates the external disturbance factors on consumer purchase of new energy vehicles in evolutionary game process stability. Studies show that: the increasing government subsidy policy, the reducing life cycle costs of new energy vehicles and the improving effectiveness of new energy vehicles will lead the model?s evolution to the orientation of consumer purchasing new energy vehicles.

scholarly journals A Brief Analysis and Suggestions on the Current Situation of New Energy Vehicles in China

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 103
Author(s):  
Tianzuo Guan
Keyword(s):  
Automobile Industry ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Social Economy ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Existing Problems ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
Policy Incentives ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

With continuous development of China’s economy in the past two decades, people’s living conditions have been greatly improved. The improved living quality boosts the prosperity of the automobile industry in China. However, whilst the popularity of automobiles promotes the rapid development of social economy and modern civilization, it also brings severe energy and environmental problems. The government pays great attention to these problems, and promotes the development of new energy vehicle industry by issuing various policies and encouraging consumers to actively buy new energy vehicles. However, under these policy incentives and economic incentives, the domestic new energy vehicle industry did not present the expected market response. This paper briefly describes the development status and existing problems of domestic new energy vehicle industry, and puts forward some feasible suggestions.

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