On the Ontological Status and Verifiability of Some Criminal-Law Concepts. An Experience of Deconstruction of Intentional Guilt
The author explores the problem of ontological status and ontological grounds of such criminal-law concept as «intentional guilt» by means of serial phenomenological deconstruction. It is concluded that intentional guilt is an artificial construction rather than a natural characteristic of a man. This construction consolidates different elements. Their differences have an ontological character and require improvement of the system of verification while implementing criminal legislation. The problem of verifying (confirming by experience and not simply establishing) legal characteristics of elements of the crime and their accurate assessment can be resolved on the basis of the principle of non-reduction of a relevant fact to its normative type. The author offers considering an element of a crime as a model of criminological reality. The relation between reality and this model is the relation between a relevant fact and its normative type. The substantial characters istics of a fact don’t concur with normative criterion of assessment of juridical qualities in an ontological aspect. The last should not substitute the first, because they are the grounds for verification of normative concepts.