Payment Tracking System

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-50
Author(s):  
Sakthi Sree T ◽  
Rajagopal T.K.P. ◽  
Ananthi Priya S ◽  
Ganesh M ◽  
Venkatesh V ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Tracking System ◽  
Single Point ◽  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Constant Factor ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Web Based ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Right ◽  
Management Capabilities

Payment Tracking System is a web-based application for tracking and managing the payments for various vendors. It provides a single point of contact that consolidates payment requests from the accounts department to the top management to deliver the supplier payments on time, using integrated best practices to manage operations and services. It offers integrated Transaction Management capabilities like Ledger view and Hold/Release Payments. It ensures visibility, insight, isolation and faster resolution of Payment related issues for any type of organization by providing the right information at the right time as required by the user. For both models, we design incentive resource allocation mechanisms to maximize the social welfare. Theoretically analysis shows that the proposed mechanisms are truthful for general monotonic pro?t functions and the worst-case performance on the social welfare are well-bounded within a constant factor of the optimal solution for linear pro?t functions. Simulation results also demonstrate that the performances of the proposed mechanisms are very close to the optimal solution, in terms of maximizing the social welfare.

scholarly journals PENERAPAN METODE K-MEANS UNTUK PEMETAAN CALON PENERIMA JAMKESDA

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 190
Author(s):  
M. Nanda Variestha Waworuntu ◽  
Muhammad Faisal Amin
Keyword(s):  
Data Mining ◽  
Health Insurance ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Community Service ◽  
Regional Health ◽  
The Social ◽  
Value Determination ◽  
The Right ◽  
To Receive

<p><em>Kelurahan Kemuning, one of the Social Welfare Section, there is poor community service to receive Regional Health Insurance. During this section of Social Welfare Section in Kelurahan Kemuning, there is no method that can classify the level of poverty so that the beneficiaries on target, so the Kelurahan can't prevent the inaccuracies. Therefore, poverty grouping can assist Kelurahan in making the right decision to prevent the inaccuracies of recipients of Regional Health Insurance. In this research, the application of the k-means method is implemented in an application made with 2 clusters. This study uses as many as 440 data samples. From result of calculation of Davies Bouldin Index obtained value determination of cluster amount with value 2 cluster (0,243), 3 cluster (0,256), 4 cluster (0,275). The value used is 2 clusters because the value is close to 0</em><strong><em>.</em></strong></p><p><em><strong>Keywords</strong></em><em>: </em>:<em> data mining, k-means, poverty, davies bouldin index</em> </p><p><em>Pada Kelurahan Kemuning salah satunya Seksi Kesejahteraan Sosial (KESSOS) terdapat pelayanan masyarakat miskin untuk menerima bantuan Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah (JAMKESDA). Selama ini bagian Seksi KESSOS pada Kelurahan Kemuning belum ada metode yang dapat mengelompokkan tingkat kemiskinan agar penerima bantuan tepat sasaran, sehingga pihak Kelurahan tidak dapat mencegah ketidaktepatsasaran tersebut. Oleh sebab itu, pengelompokan kemisikinan dapat membantu pihak Kelurahan dalam mengambil keputusan yang tepat untuk mencegah ketidaktepatsasaran penerima JAMKESDA. Pada penelitian ini, penerapan metode K-Means diimplementasikan pada aplikasi yang dibuat dengan 2 klaster. Penelitian ini menggunakan sebanyak 440 sampel data. Dari hasil perhitungan Davies Bouldin Index diperoleh nilai penentuan jumlah cluster dengan nilai 2 klaster (0.243), 3 klaster (0.256), 4 klaster (0.275). Nilai yang digunakan adalah 2 klaster karena nilai tersebut mendekati 0.</em></p><em><strong>Kata kunci</strong></em><em>: </em><em>data mining, k-means, kemiskinan, davies bouldin index</em>

scholarly journals Representative Committees of Peers

2021 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
pp. 401-429
Author(s):  
Reshef Meir ◽  
Fedor Sandomirskiy ◽  
Moshe Tennenholtz
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Cost ◽  
Majority Vote ◽  
Preference Profile ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Optimal Rule ◽  
The Social ◽  
Small Committee ◽  
Elected Representatives

A population of voters must elect representatives among themselves to decide on a sequence of possibly unforeseen binary issues. Voters care only about the final decision, not the elected representatives. The disutility of a voter is proportional to the fraction of issues, where his preferences disagree with the decision. While an issue-by-issue vote by all voters would maximize social welfare, we are interested in how well the preferences of the population can be approximated by a small committee. We show that a k-sortition (a random committee of k voters with the majority vote within the committee) leads to an outcome within the factor 1+O(1/√ k) of the optimal social cost for any number of voters n, any number of issues m, and any preference profile. For a small number of issues m, the social cost can be made even closer to optimal by delegation procedures that weigh committee members according to their number of followers. However, for large m, we demonstrate that the k-sortition is the worst-case optimal rule within a broad family of committee-based rules that take into account metric information about the preference profile of the whole population.

MEKANISME PASAR, DEMOKRASI PERWAKILAN DAN KRISIS EKONOMI

2007 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 104
Author(s):  
Yuni Prihadi Utomo
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Economic System ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Political System ◽  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Welfare Level ◽  
The People ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Government

The economic crisis that attacks Indonesia has yet to be solved even that several policies taken by the government to overcome the problem are not in accordance with the reform spirit and unpopular. In order that we can understand about the problem more well, then we need to reobserve the root of this economic crisis problem. This observation uses the view of capitalist economics theory with the discussion in the aspect of market mechanism and the democracy of delegation theory. In the discussion, it is mentioned that the capitalist economic system wishes to have a certain political system that allows the people s preference to the social welfare level to be optimal for itself which it is accommodated by their delegation in government. In reality, the commitment of the capitalist economic system is not the healthy democracy tradition system. Thus, the market mechanism does not yield an optimal solution for large people's welfare.

scholarly journals A Bridge between Liquid and Social Welfare in Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 1949-1956 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dimitris Fotakis ◽  
Kyriakos Lotidis ◽  
Chara Podimata
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Combinatorial Auctions ◽  
Constant Factor ◽  
Competitive Markets ◽  
Large Market ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
The Social

We study incentive compatible mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions where the bidders have submodular (or XOS) valuations and are budget-constrained. Our objective is to maximize the liquid welfare, a notion of efficiency for budgetconstrained bidders introduced by Dobzinski and Paes Leme (2014). We show that some of the known truthful mechanisms that best-approximate the social welfare for Combinatorial Auctions with submodular bidders through demand query oracles can be adapted, so that they retain truthfulness and achieve asymptotically the same approximation guarantees for the liquid welfare. More specifically, for the problem of optimizing the liquid welfare in Combinatorial Auctions with submodular bidders, we obtain a universally truthful randomized O(log m)-approximate mechanism, where m is the number of items, by adapting the mechanism of Krysta and Vöcking (2012).Additionally, motivated by large market assumptions often used in mechanism design, we introduce a notion of competitive markets and show that in such markets, liquid welfare can be approximated within a constant factor by a randomized universally truthful mechanism. Finally, in the Bayesian setting, we obtain a truthful O(1)-approximate mechanism for the case where bidder valuations are generated as independent samples from a known distribution, by adapting the results of Feldman, Gravin and Lucier (2014).

scholarly journals UČINKOVITOST NAKNADA OPĆE SOCIJALNE POMOĆI I ULOGA CENTRA ZA SOCIJALNU SKRB U BORBI PROTIV SIROMAŠTVA

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-479
Author(s):  
Martina Podobnik ◽  
Antun Ilijaš
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Workers ◽  
Social Assistance ◽  
Daily Work ◽  
Assistance Programs ◽  
The Social ◽  
General Assistance ◽  
Cash Benefits ◽  
The Right

THE EFFICIENCY OF GENERAL SOCIAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS AND THE ROLE OF SOCIAL WELFARE CENTERS IN COMBATING POVERTY The social work profession is rooted in combating poverty and the fight for human rights. Social welfare centers represent a key institution in that area, particularly the cash benefits departments in which social workers daily work with the poorest members of society. The system of social assistance benefits in Croatia includes the general and categorical social assistance programs. This paper is focused on general assistance programs, guaranteed minimum benefit and one-time allowance. The aforementioned rights are regulated by the Social Welfare Act which has been amended six times since 2011, thus bringing novelties to the area of realization of the right to general social assistance benefits. The paper presents the most important changes and provides an overview of their practical applicability. It also provides guidelines for improving efficiency of the two most important cash benefits with regard to the amount of the benefits and their targeting, efficiency with regard to beneficiary groups including children and retired persons and work activation of young persons (and) beneficiaries who are capable for work. Considering the crucial role of social workers in the deciding on the recognition of the right to benefits, special attention was paid to a critical overview the role of social workers n the cash benefits departments.

scholarly journals The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained Users

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ioannis Caragiannis ◽  
Alexandros A. Voudouris
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Differential Equations ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Price Of Anarchy ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Budget Constraints ◽  
Tight Bound ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Seminal Work ◽  
The Social

We study the efficiency of mechanisms for allocating a divisible resource. Given scalar signals submitted by all users, such a mechanism decides the fraction of the resource that each user will receive and a payment that will be collected from her. Users are self-interested and aim to maximize their utility (defined as their value for the resource fraction they receive minus their payment). Starting with the seminal work of Johari and Tsitsiklis, a long list of papers studied the price of anarchy (in terms of the social welfare—the total users’ value) of resource allocation mechanisms for a variety of allocation and payment rules. Here, we further assume that each user has a budget constraint that invalidates strategies that yield a payment that is higher than the user’s budget. This subtle assumption, which is arguably more realistic, constitutes the traditional price of anarchy analysis meaningless as the set of equilibria may change drastically and their social welfare can be arbitrarily far from optimal. Instead, we study the price of anarchy using the liquid welfare benchmark that measures efficiency taking budget constraints into account. We show a tight bound of 2 on the liquid price of anarchy of the well-known Kelly mechanism and prove that this result is essentially best possible among all multiuser resource allocation mechanisms. This comes in sharp contrast to the no-budget setting where there are mechanisms that considerably outperform Kelly in terms of social welfare and even achieve full efficiency. In our proofs, we exploit the particular structure of worst-case games and equilibria, which also allows us to design (nearly) optimal two-player mechanisms by solving simple differential equations.

scholarly journals The Impact of Selfishness in Hypergraph Hedonic Games

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (02) ◽  
pp. 1766-1773
Author(s):  
Alessandro Aloisio ◽  
Michele Flammini ◽  
Cosimo Vinci
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Price Of Anarchy ◽  
Maximum Size ◽  
Upper And Lower Bounds ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
The Social ◽  
Worst Case Ratio ◽  
Distinct Node ◽  
Hedonic Games ◽  
The Impact

We consider a class of coalition formation games that can be succinctly represented by means of hypergraphs and properly generalizes symmetric additively separable hedonic games. More precisely, an instance of hypegraph hedonic game consists of a weighted hypergraph, in which each agent is associated to a distinct node and her utility for being in a given coalition is equal to the sum of the weights of all the hyperedges included in the coalition. We study the performance of stable outcomes in such games, investigating the degradation of their social welfare under two different metrics, the k-Nash price of anarchy and k-core price of anarchy, where k is the maximum size of a deviating coalition. Such prices are defined as the worst-case ratio between the optimal social welfare and the social welfare obtained when the agents reach an outcome satisfying the respective stability criteria. We provide asymptotically tight upper and lower bounds on the values of these metrics for several classes of hypergraph hedonic games, parametrized according to the integer k, the hypergraph arity r and the number of agents n. Furthermore, we show that the problem of computing the exact value of such prices for a given instance is computationally hard, even in case of non-negative hyperedge weights.

Appointment Scheduling Under Time-Dependent Patient No-Show Behavior

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (8) ◽  
pp. 3480-3500 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qingxia Kong ◽  
Shan Li ◽  
Nan Liu ◽  
Chung-Piaw Teo ◽  
Zhenzhen Yan
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Time Of Day ◽  
Time Dependent ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Arrival Times ◽  
Functional Relationships ◽  
Robust Model ◽  
Distributionally Robust ◽  
The Right ◽  
Dependent Patient

This paper studies how to schedule medical appointments with time-dependent patient no-show behavior and random service times. The problem is motivated by our studies of independent datasets from countries in two continents that unanimously identify a significant time-of-day effect on patient show-up probabilities. We deploy a distributionally robust model, which minimizes the worst-case total expected costs of patient waiting and service provider’s idling and overtime, by optimizing the scheduled arrival times of patients. This model is challenging because evaluating the total cost for a given schedule involves a linear program with uncertainties present in both the objective function and the right-hand side of the constraints. In addition, the ambiguity set considered contains discrete uncertainties and complementary functional relationships among these uncertainties (namely, patient no-shows and service durations). We show that when patient no-shows are exogenous (i.e., time-independent), the problem can be reformulated as a copositive program and then be approximated by semidefinite programs. When patient no-shows are endogenous on time (and hence on the schedule), the problem becomes a bilinear copositive program. We construct a set of dual prices to guide the search for a good schedule and use the technique iteratively to obtain a near-optimal solution. Our computational studies reveal a significant reduction in total expected cost by taking into account the time-of-day variation in patient show-up probabilities as opposed to ignoring it. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, optimization.

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