The possibility of North Korea as statue of a nuclear state through North Korea, India and Pakistani nuclear weapon policy motives

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 170-210
Author(s):  
Sok-chun Chang
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muzaffar Ganaie

<p><i>North Korea’s nuclear programme remains a key foreign policy challenge for United States. After its first nuclear test in 2006, Pyongyang has made an impressive progress in developing a credible nuclear deterrent through series of nuclear and missile tests. The diplomatic efforts to dissuade North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have not yielded positive results so far, as Pyongyang has not only developed a credible deterrent but continues to expand and strengthen it. The failure of Hanoi Summit, latest in the series of diplomatic initiatives to end the series has depended pessimism regarding future negations. Experts are skeptical about finding a diplomatic solution to the crises and the demand to explore other alternatives <sup>_____</sup> limited surgical strike, regime change, treating North Korea as de-facto nuclear weapon state <sup>_____</sup> to end the crises has intensified in recent years. However, dealing with the threat though these tools is highly risky and diplomatic outreach is the most preferred course to end the crises.</i></p>


Author(s):  
F. Basov

This paper offers the analysis of German Policy towards the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and creating of the European Missile Defence System. Special attention is given to a dislocation of the US Tactical Nuclear Weapon (TNW) in Germany, its policy towards nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, the evolution of German stand on the European Missile Defence project.


Author(s):  
Hendra Manurung

This article aims to analyze the implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy towards North Korea over its approximately fifty-nine years of bilateral relations, since 17 June 1961. The arguments posited in this regard is that the implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy towards North Korea has been counterproductive. Under the leadership of President Joko Widodo, Indonesia actually has great potential to influence North Korea’s conducts through the close diplomatic relations that the two countries have developed. The friendship between Indonesia and North Korea began since the two states conducted reciprocal official visits 1964 and 1965. Indonesia’s foreign policy towards South Korea has often been carried out to influence the offensive decisions of North Korean leaders, especially in relation to the issue of nuclear weapon development. The key question is what should and can Indonesia do next to help create peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula by adhering to the principles of a free and active foreign policy? Why is it necessary for Indonesia to do this and how can Indonesia carry out this foreign policy towards North Korea? After becoming President since 2011, Kim Jong-un had to weaken his father’s winning coalition to consolidate domestic political stability. However, North Korea’s domestic market reforms have had the effect of eroding the Kim family’s ideological appeal. This is relevant to the expansion of political influence from Pyongyang, which prioritizes the continuation of a fragile centralized authoritarian power while maintaining sustainable domestic economic growth.AbstrakArtikel ini bertujuan menjelaskan secara analitis bagaimana implementasi kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia terhadap Korea Utara selama 59 tahun sejak 17 Juni 1961. Argumen yang ingin disampaikan tentang implementasi kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia terhadap Korea Utara adalah kontraproduktif. Indonesia di bawah kepemimpinan Presiden Joko Widodo berpotensi besar untuk mampu memengaruhi perilaku Korea Utara melalui hubungan diplomatik. Persahabatan Indonesia dan Korea Utara dimulai sejak saling kunjung di 1964 dan 1965. Orientasi politik luar negeri Indonesia di masa lalu hingga saat ini, telah sering dilakukan untuk memengaruhi keputusan ofensif para pemimpin Korea Utara, khususnya terkait dengan isu pengembangan senjata nuklir. Pertanyaannya adalah apa yang harus dan sebaiknya dilakukan Indonesia selanjutnya untuk membantu menciptakan perdamaian dan stabilitas di Semenanjung Korea dengan tetap berpegang pada prinsip politik luar negeri bebas dan aktif? Mengapa hal tersebut perlu dilakukan oleh Indonesia dan bagaimana cara menjalankan kebijakan luar negeri terhadap Korea Utara tersebut? Kim Jong-un, setelah menjadi Presiden sejak 2011, harus melemahkan posisi koalisi pemenang ayahnya untuk konsolidasi stabilitas politik dalam negeri. Bagaimanapun, reformasi pasar domestik Korea Utara telah berdampak pada pengikisan daya tarik ideologis keluarga Kim. Hal ini relevan dengan perluasan pengaruh politik dari Pyongyang memprioritaskan pada keberlangsungan kekuatan otoriter terpusat yang rentan seiring bagaimana dapat mempertahankan pertumbuhan ekonomi dalam negeri berkelanjutan.


2020 ◽  
Vol 07 (01) ◽  
pp. 121-140
Author(s):  
Diajeng Christianti ◽  
Jaka Rizkullah

Article VI of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires all state parties to disarm nuclear weapon. Following its official withdrawal from NPT in 2003, North Korea maintains to develop its nuclear weapon and conducts several nuclear tests. Moreover, it even proudly declared as a nuclear state in its Constitution's preamble. It also argues that the nuclear weapon developments and tests were conducted within their territory and, currently, North Korea is not bound by any treaty prohibiting such developments and tests. The statement is strongly opposed by the international community, particularly their neighboring states: Japan and South Korea. This article argues that the obligation to disarm nuclear weapon deriving from the NPT still binds North Korea since such obligation has reached the status of customary international law and consequently binds every state unless such state persistently objects the rule from the beginning of its formation. In this case, North Korea has failed to prove itself as a persistent objector due to the fact it used to be a party to the NPT. This article also argues that, according to 2001 ILC Articles, Japan and South Korea still have a proper legal basis to claim for reparation against North Korea despite the fact that they are not specifically affected by North Korea’s conducts.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-206
Author(s):  
Rahmah Kusumayani

Abstract Self defence known as an inherent right that is owned by states to protect its sovereignty from attack by other states. The international rules about self defence do not give any limitation about the type of weapon that can be used by states, including the threat or use of nuclear weapons to act self defence. In Practice, many requirements must be fulfilled by states when they claim the act of self defence. Since 2006, North Korea proclaimed its capability to develop nuclear weapons based on self defence argument. The Security Council concluded that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapon program is a threat to international peace and security and condemned such acts with sanctions based on act 41 UN Charter. The purposes of this study are to examine whether the North Korea’s nuclear program as an act of self defence and the UN Security Council’s sanctions to North Korea are in line with the principle of self defence in international law. The result of this research concludes that North Korea’s nuclear program does not meet the requirements as stated in article 51 UN Charter and customary international law regarding self defence. North Korea can not prove that the United States’ threat is jeopardy, and has a wide and dangerous effect for North Korea. Regarding the Security Council’s primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, states must report his act of self defence to the Security Council immediately. As therefore, sanctions given by the Security Council are in line with the principle of self defence since North Korea can not fulfil the requested requirements of self defence. Keywords: Act 51 UN Charter, Korean Nuclear Development, Principle of self defence   Abstrak Hak untuk menerapkan self defence dimiliki oleh tiap negara untuk melindungi kedaulatannya dari serangan negara lain. Peraturan internasional mengenai self defence tidak membatasi jenis senjata yang dapat digunakan oleh negara, termasuk ancaman dan penggunaan senjata nuklir dalam melakukan tindakan self defence. Dalam prakteknya banyak syarat yang harus dipenuhi oleh negara-negara ketika akan mengklaim tindakan self defence. Sejak tahun 2006, Korea Utara mendeklarasikan kesiapannya dalam mengembangkan senjata nuklir dengan alasan self defence. Dewan Keamanan menganggap bahwa program pengembangan senjata nuklir Korea Utara mengancam perdamaian dan keamanan internasional dan berdasarkan Pasal 41 Piagam PBB, Dewan Keamanan memberikan sanksi kepada Korea Utara. Tujuan penelitian ini untuk mengkaji legalitas pengembangan senjata nuklir di Korea Utara atas tindakan yang diklaim negaranya sebagai self defence serta kesesuaian penerapan sanksi Dewan Keamanan PBB dengan prinsip self defence. Hasil dari penelitian ini menyatakan bahwa program senjata nuklir Korea Utara tidak memenuhi syarat yang terdapat dalam Pasal 51 Piagam PBB maupun hukum kebiasaan internasional terkait self defence. Korea Utara tidak bisa membuktikan bahwa ancaman Amerika Serikat bersifat genting dan nyata menimbulkan efek luas dan berbahaya bagi Korea Utara. Berdasarkan tugas utama Dewan Keamanan dalam menjaga kedamaian dan keamanan internasional, negara-negara harus melaporkan tindakan self defence  kepada Dewan Keamanan dengan segera. Berdasarkan uraian diatas, sanksi yang diberikan Dewan Keamanan tidak bertentangan dengan prinsip self defence karena Korea Utara tidak bisa memenuhi hal-hal yang disyaratkan untuk melakukan tindakan self defence. Kata Kunci: Pasal 51 Piagam PBB, Pengembangan Senjata Nuklir Korea Utara, Prinsip Pembelaan Diri


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muzaffar Ganaie

<p><i>North Korea’s nuclear programme remains a key foreign policy challenge for United States. After its first nuclear test in 2006, Pyongyang has made an impressive progress in developing a credible nuclear deterrent through series of nuclear and missile tests. The diplomatic efforts to dissuade North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have not yielded positive results so far, as Pyongyang has not only developed a credible deterrent but continues to expand and strengthen it. The failure of Hanoi Summit, latest in the series of diplomatic initiatives to end the series has depended pessimism regarding future negations. Experts are skeptical about finding a diplomatic solution to the crises and the demand to explore other alternatives <sup>_____</sup> limited surgical strike, regime change, treating North Korea as de-facto nuclear weapon state <sup>_____</sup> to end the crises has intensified in recent years. However, dealing with the threat though these tools is highly risky and diplomatic outreach is the most preferred course to end the crises.</i></p>


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