scholarly journals 転向を語ること ─ 小林杜人とその周辺 / Converters Tell Their Stories: Kobayashi Morito and His Networks

Author(s):  
Hideto Tsuboi

After the 'March 15 incident' on Japanese Communist Party members in 1928, many activists converted in prison, and "conversion period" (tenkō jidai) appeared. The converted people (tenkōsha) then wrote notes in which they described the ideological and spiritual changes that occurred during their imprisonment. The change was prompted by the teachings of Buddhism, mainly Jōdo Shinshū, and the presence of chaplains (kyōkaishi) who mediated the teachings. The tenkōsha abandoned their faith in Marxism, returned to Japanese traditional familism, became devoted to the Emperor of Japan, and some started to practice agricultural fundamentalism. In this article, I will focus on a person named Kobayashi Morito (1902 -1984), who wrote about his own experience of conversion in Until He Left the Communist Party (1932) and also edited the notes of other conversion people and published them as Notes of a Converter (1933) and Thought and Life of the Converted(1935), and will analyze the stories of conversion experiences of various tenkōsha, reexamining how they accepted conversion, and at the same time focus on the contradictions and conflicts that occurred there.

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Timofey Rakov

This article analyses practices related to the cult of Lenin in the confines of the Leningrad party organisation of the RCP(b) and its influence on innerparty discussions and political disagreements. The author aims to examine how appeal to the cult and Leninism helped shape the position of the Leningrad Bolsheviks led by G. E. Zinoviev. To achieve this goal, the author refers to a variety of sources, i. e. the works of the leaders of the Leningrad party organisation, such pamphlets by G. I. Safarov and G. E. Evdokimov, minutes of district party conferences, etc. The sources listed above suggest that the terms “testament,” “heritage,” and “task” used in party discourse symbolise a set of actions and principles, following and being faithful to which allowed party members to comply with the correct political line. For representatives of the Leningrad opposition, this meant relying on the poor and middle strata of the village. The category of practice mentioned in the title of this article means that attention was paid not so much to the function of quotations or clichéd phrases but rather to what party groups implied when quoting Lenin’s statements. The term “cult”, which historiography usually employs to describe the veneration of V. I. Lenin as the leader of the party, does not reflect the entirety of this process or take into account its productive component, namely, the fact that, because of its heterogeneity, Leninism allowed members of the Communist Party to pay attention to diverse aspects of Lenin’s heritage. In the course of the polemic surrounding issues facing the party (politics in the countryside, the possibility of building socialism in a single country, etc.), the Leningrad Bolsheviks turned to Leninism as a range of ideas legitimising their political position and as a tool for identifying the Bolsheviks who, in contrast to the Leningraders, “deviated” from the correct political line.


Author(s):  
Ewing Mahoney

This chapter explores the so-called civil service ‘purge procedure’ announced in 1948. The purge procedure is important because it both empowered and potentially contained MI5. It empowered MI5 not only in the sense that it required the collection and use of information about Communist Party members and sympathizers, but also in the sense that it enabled MI5 to make the assessments about who was to work and who was not, and to work where and in what circumstances. However, it potentially constrained MI5 in the sense that these assessments would now be the subject of scrutiny, albeit to a body of officials appointed by the government who would not pass any judicial test of independence. Nevertheless, by the appointment of the Three Advisers to scrutinize its operation, the Attlee government introduced what was to be MI5’s only direct accountability until 1985.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
Willem-Jan Verhoeven ◽  
Henk Flap ◽  
Jos Dessens ◽  
Wim Jansen

Author(s):  
Gerald Horne

This chapter looks at the concerted effort to put Patterson behind bars. It was August 1950, shortly after war had erupted on the Korean peninsula, and the nation was more anxious than usual about Communists that the subpoena arrived, summoning Patterson to Washington. The inquisitors were fishing for names of Civil Rights Congress (CRC) and Communist party members. Patterson's remaining ally, Congressman Vito Marcantonio of East Harlem, then told him, “If you don't give them the names [then] you are going to be in contempt of Congress. If you [do], you're going to be in contempt of all progressive mankind. Remember, you're a Red and a Negro and what they hate more than [a] Negro is one who knows both who and how to fight.” Eventually, Patterson had to face a trial as he busily prepared to press charges against the country of his birth for perpetrating genocide against African Americans.


1983 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 256-282
Author(s):  
Bohdan Harasymiw

Siberia, apparently, is an inhospitable region as far as Communist Party members are concerned. According to T. H. Rigby, both in 1939 and in 1961, a significantly smaller proportion of the CPSU membership was to be found in the Urals and Western and Eastern Siberian regions of the RSFSR than of the general Soviet population. This is surprising, he points out, in view of the area's “relatively small rural population” and its key industries being mining and metallurgy. Beyond the suggestion “that the general comfort and pleasantness of an area is an independent factor in its party membership levels,” one is immediately intrigued by the implications this may have for the political recruitment opportunities of ethnic minorities in these regions. Does it mean that native, non-European minorities have better chances to become party members because Europeans are reluctant to move there? Or, conversely, does it mean that Europeans, because of their higher levels of education, tend therefore to displace the non-Europeans? Is there evidence of any sort of “affirmative action” on behalf of ethnic minorities in Siberia insofar as recruitment into the party, and concurrently access to the better jobs, is concerned?


1983 ◽  
Vol 93 ◽  
pp. 108-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lowell Dittmer

On 1 September 1982, 1,545 delegates and 145 alternates convened the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The meeting was announced in advance (at the seventh plenum of the 11th Central Committee, held in Beijing 4–10 August) and proceeded with well-rehearsed smoothness to its scheduled adjournment 15 days later. The meeting agenda conformed closely to established protocol, consisting of speeches and work reports, discussion and adoption of a new Party constitution, culminating in the election of new members to the Central Committee and other “standing” (i.e. permanently tenured) positions and convention of the first plenary meetings of these organs. The meeting began on 1 September with a relatively brief opening speech by Deng Xiaoping, the presiding chairman (though in a typical gesture to collective leadership there were no less than nine other presiding chairmen), and was followed by Hu Yaobang's comprehensive report and by speeches or reports by Ye Jianying, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian and others. These documents were all published as part of a general effort at greater publicity that included prior announcement of the dates of convention and adjournment, invitation of more than 70 responsible persons from democratic parties, non-Party patriots and other well-known personages from various circles to attend as observers (as had been done previously during the Eighth Congress), fairly detailed reporting of the election of deputies, their assembly and daily activities, arrangements and so forth, and even a sort of press conference that Zhu Muzhi, spokesman of the conference, held for Chinese and foreign reporters – although no foreign Communist Party members or foreign journalists were permitted to attend the Congress itself.


2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 72-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
MIKK TITMA ◽  
LIINA MAI TOODING ◽  
NANCY BRANDON TUMA

Author(s):  
Genta Nishku

Using Franz Fanon’s “On Violence,” this paper analyzes dynamics of power and violence in Lulëkuqet mbi Mure / Red Poppies on Walls, a 1976 Albanian film about WWII anti-fascist resistance, told through the story of a group of orphans in Italian-occupied Albania. Fanon’s explication that the colonizer’s power is founded on force and maintained through violence, capitalist exploitation, dehumanization and compartmentalization, elucidates the film. His argument that decolonization is possible only through greater counter-violence is critical in understanding why the orphans use violent means to liberate themselves. The children’s struggle against the fascist orphanage directors is noticed and harnessed Communist Party members. I argue that though the Party’s guidance helps the children fight their subjugation, it also curbs their revolutionary potential. Thus, the didactic and propagandistic goals of Lulëkuqet mbi Mure allow only for a strict cold war dichotomy: one is either a fascist, capitalist and colonizer, or a communist, revolted colonized subject ready to take up arms. My engagement with the film, however, demonstrates that the children’s solidarity with one another and their subtle resistance prior to the communists’ intervention, gestured toward an alternative way of building community – one closer to Fanon’s ideas of a new humanism, even if it ultimately remains unrealized in the film.


Subject The Xi administration's emphasis on ideology. Significance President Xi Jinping’s administration emphasises ideology in all areas of policymaking and public life. Communist Party members from top to bottom must frame their activities in ideological terms. Impacts Labelling economic development as a matter of national security creates the justification for more aggressive state intervention. Rooting out corruption, enforcing Party discipline and stamping out unwelcome ideas are not ‘campaigns’; they are a never-ending struggle. Ideology carries a heavy fiscal and opportunity cost, as millions of officials spend many working hours in compulsory study meetings.


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