scholarly journals The Equilibrium Mechanism of Interest Distribution in Farmland Transfer: Based on the Perspective of the Three-Party Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Hong Li ◽  
Xian Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Anhui Province ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Grain Production ◽  
Fluctuation Range ◽  
Government Contractors ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Ideal

The purpose of the paper is to study how the interests of farmland transfer be distributed among the government, contractors, and farmland transferees. The process of the paper is to analyze the evolutionary stability strategies of the government, contractors, and farmland transferees by building a three-party evolutionary game model; in order to identify the equilibrium point of the three-party evolutionary game, an example of interest distribution in a village in Anhui Province is used to analyze and simulate the three-party evolutionary game. The conclusions of the paper are as follows: the combination of a one-party subsidy, transferring farmland, and grain production is the ideal equilibrium result in the three-party game; farmland transfer rent is the a crucial factor of interest balance among the three parties; only if the farmland transfer rental price is larger than the sum of the contractor’s self-farming incomes and subsidies and lower than the grain income of the transferee can the three parties realize the equilibrium of interest distribution. The suggestions of the paper are that the government should carry out the system of “retirement allowance” and transform “subsidy” to “allowance” to protect the interests of contractors, and the government should promote farmland transfer and encourage grain production by controlling the fluctuation range of farmland transfer rent.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Model of Collaborative Innovation Between Enterprises and Colleges Under Government Participation of China

SAGE Open ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 215824402199485
Author(s):  
Nina Su ◽  
Zhuqin Shi ◽  
Xianqi Zhu ◽  
Yunsheng Xin
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Higher Learning ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Institutions Of Higher Learning ◽  
Innovation Cost ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Reasonable Range ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Ideal

The three-party evolutionary game model of government, enterprises, and institutions of higher learning is established, and the dynamic evolution process of collaborative innovation behavior is discussed under the two strategies of “incentive” and “non-incentive” chosen by the government. The results show that under the premise of stronger innovation consciousness of the government and institutions and smaller the innovation cost of enterprises, the system is easier to reach the ideal state. The incentive degree of government should be controlled within a reasonable range to prevent enterprises from falling into a bad state because of the temptation of economic interests.

scholarly journals How to Promote Compliance Management in the Electricity Market? An Analysis Based on the Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luosong Jin ◽  
Cheng Chen ◽  
Yun Li ◽  
Xiangyang Wang ◽  
Yuanyuan Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Compliance Cost ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we aim to analyze how to effectively promote compliance management in the electricity market. We construct an evolutionary game model under the two different scenarios, i.e., the scenario without governmental supervision and the scenario with governmental supervision, and explicitly describes the strategic behaviors and dynamic evolution process of power enterprises and regulators in the power market. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, we find that, in the absence of governmental supervision, the long-term stable equilibrium of power enterprises' choice of strategy “Compliance” and regulatory agencies' choice of strategy “Not bribery” is hard to be realized. Only if the government effectively supervises the compliance management of the electricity market can the ideal compliance behavior of the two stakeholders be achieved. Furthermore, we conduct a simulation study to analyze the impacts of the various model parameters on the dynamic evolution process. The specific results show that the lower compliance cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger profit loss of the power enterprises, as well as the lower inspection cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger rewards of the regulatory agencies, can promote the formation of compliance management. Besides, the larger penalty charged by the government is also conducive to the compliance management of the electricity market.

scholarly journals Profit Distribution and Stability Analysis of Joint Distribution Alliance Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Under the Background of Green and Low-Carbon

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renbin Han ◽  
Mengke Yang
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Environmental Benefit ◽  
Logistics Industry ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
The Government

Abstract Joint distribution is an advanced logistics organization model for improving the quality and efficiency of express logistics industry and achieve high-quality development of logistics, but the distribution of common profit has always been a key obstacle to the effective development of joint distribution. Based on the background of green and low-carbon, this paper explores a fairer and more reasonable profit distribution scheme. The profit game between the government and the two types of member enterprises is analyzed. By focusing on how the government plays a role in inducing the joint distribution alliance to bring the green and low-carbon requirements into the profit distribution, the strategy evolution process of the three parties, the factors affecting the profit distribution and the stability of alliance are discussed through the establishment of "government-member enterprise A-member enterprise B" tripartite evolutionary game model. Finally, the evolutionary game model is numerically simulated based on system dynamics. It is found that: (1) It is necessary for the government to guide and motivate the alliance to create internal incentives and constraints. The effect of government subsidies and rewards to member enterprises is greater than the penalties for member enterprises. (2) The member enterprises are likely to conspire together to defraud government subsidies and rewards, carry out "free riding" and other speculative activities, which makes it necessary for the government and the alliance to establish supervision mechanism, information disclosure mechanism, and property rights protection system. (3) The willingness of member enterprise to positively cooperate will increase with the increase of the additional benefit coefficient, the proportion of profit distribution and the importance of environmental benefit factor; and will decrease with the increase of the cost of promoting green distribution operations.

scholarly journals Behavioral Analysis of Subjects for Green Technology Innovation: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Yongquan Guo ◽  
Hua Zou ◽  
Zhu Liu
Keyword(s):  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Strategic Choice ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Simulation Software ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Green Technologies ◽  
Technology Application ◽  
Technology Applications ◽  
The Government

The application of green technologies can reduce environmental hazards and promote sustainability. The connotation of green technology innovation has two main aspects: the first aspect is the generation of green technology from nothing to something, and the other aspect is the improvement and upgrading of existing green technology; these two aspects are related. However, from the existing research, there are relatively few studies on the process of green technology innovation from these two aspects at the same time. If green technology is not studied from this perspective, the evolutionary process and influencing factors of green technology from generation to development cannot be clarified, which is not conducive to the development of green technology and the realization of the goal of environmental friendliness. Research considers the green innovation process from R&D to upgrading linkages and analyses the roles of government departments, green technology R&D institutions, and green technology application enterprises in green technology innovation. In addition, the green technology application enterprises are considered to promote technology enhancement through technology application feedback with green technology R&D institutions. The evolutionary game model of three subjects was established, the strategic evolution process of different subjects was analyzed, the influence of each element on the strategic choice of different subjects was explored, and the stability analysis of strategic choice was conducted using simulation software. The study shows the following: (1) The greater the government’s punishment and support to green technology R&D institutions, the more favorable it is for green technology R&D institutions to carry out green technology R&D. (2) In green technology applications, if the government has no direct interest relationship with green technology application enterprises, the enterprises will choose negative response behavior. (3) The greater the technology enhancement gains of green technology R&D institutions and the greater the feedback gains of technology applications actively carried out by enterprises in response to the government’s call, the more the government departments tend to support green technology R&D.

Study on Participant Behavior Game of Electronic Products Reverse Supply Chain Based on ECP

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 411-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingbao Wang ◽  
Zhiping Du ◽  
Hong Duan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Simulation Method ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Electronic Products ◽  
The Government ◽  
Differential Equation Method ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Abstract In this paper, a game model composed of three subjects — government, manufacturer and consumer has been built by using Evolutionary Game Theory on the basis of analyzing the trilateral game strategy of waste mobile reverse supply chain based on ECP; an evolutionary equilibrium model is to be sought for by utilizing the replication dynamic differential equation method; and the trilateral game strategy’s revolutionary trend and consistency have been analyzed by means of SD simulation method when government implements the static or dynamic reward and punishment strategy. The finding results reveal that, under the static reward and punishment strategy, the revolutionary process of trilateral game strategy is always unstable whether the initial behavior strategy is unitary or mixed. Therefore, it is more reasonable for the government to adopt the strategy of dynamic reward and punishment, and it is also stable and reciprocal for all the stakeholders when implementing this strategy.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Public Opinion Supervision of Engineering Quality in the Network Citizen Journalism Environment

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yaohong Yang ◽  
Yi Zeng ◽  
Jing Dai ◽  
Ying Liu
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Mobile Networks ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Citizen Journalism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Self Healing ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government

With the rapid development of mobile networks and citizen journalism, public opinion supervision has become an essential social supervision on engineering quality. They consider the dynamic characteristics of the spread process of public opinion and the game process of social supervision on engineering quality. The tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, contractors, and the public was constructed by coupling the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Removed (SEIR) model of public opinion spread and the evolutionary game model. Then, the influence laws of public opinion spread on the tripartite evolutionary game were analyzed and discussed through numerical simulation analysis. The results show that the public with more significant influence or authority is more able to restrain the quality behavior of government and contractors; increasing the probability of transforming ignorant into latent, the probability of converting latent into the communicator and topic derivation rate or reducing the direct immunization self-healing can improve the effectiveness of public opinion supervision; the true online public opinion can effectively restrain the quality behavior of contractors and urge the government to supervise actively. The research conclusions can provide a reference for improving the social supervision mechanism of engineering quality in the era of network citizen journalism.

scholarly journals Influence of We Media Information Dissemination on Public Emotional Cognition and Behavior under Government Responsibility Constraint

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Rongjian Xie ◽  
Dongju Liu ◽  
Yucai Jia ◽  
Peiyun Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Information Dissemination ◽  
Chaotic Behavior ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Pareto Optimum ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Responsibility ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Research Results ◽  
The Government ◽  
And Control

In recent years, We Media’s chaotic behavior has emerged one after another. How to properly supervise We Media and effectively manage its violations has become an urgent problem in the process of national governance system and governance capacity building. From the three aspects of opportunity, motivation, and control methods, this paper analyzes the relevant stakeholders and their relationships in the process of We Media information dissemination. It constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, We Media, and public participation, which focuses on the analysis of the equilibrium point of the game model and carries out simulation experiments to explore the influence of government responsibility constraints on the evolution results. The research results show that government regulation plays an important role in restricting We Media’s information release. When the government's willingness to regulate increases, We Media will be punished more if it violates rules. In order to reduce the cost of punishment and other factors, We Media will reduce the willingness to violate the rules. After the occurrence of social hot events, the public is more willing to be guided by positive information from We Media, prompting the government to choose strict supervision strategies, effectively reducing the violations of We Media and achieving the Pareto optimum. According to the research results, this paper puts forward reasonable countermeasures to realize the comprehensive governance pattern of noncompliance of We Media and correct guidance of public emotional cognitive behavior under responsibility constraints. The research results provide theoretical support and decision-making basis for We Media information management and control.

scholarly journals The Decision-Making Analysis on End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling and Remanufacturing under Extended Producer Responsibility Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11215
Author(s):  
Syed Abdul Rehman Khan ◽  
Danish Iqbal Godil ◽  
George Thomas ◽  
Muhammad Tanveer ◽  
Hafiz Muhammad Zia-ul-haq ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Third ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies ◽  
Dual Cycle ◽  
The Government

This research develops a dual-cycle ELV recycling and remanufacturing system to better understand and improve the efficiency of the ELV recycling and remanufacturing businesses. For the flawless operation of this system, the researchers employed evolutionary game theory to establish a game model between original vehicle manufacturers (OVMs) and third-party recyclers with the government involved. This research presents evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) that could promote an ELV recycling and remanufacturing system. Results show that OVMs’ expected profit difference between choosing and not choosing authorization is crucial in their ESS. The licensing fee plays a part of OVMs’ expected profit difference. Based on the results, optimal ESS could be achieved when the OVMs’ expected profit difference between choosing authorization and not choosing authorization and the third-party recyclers’ profit when paying the licensing fee are both positive. Then, the two groups’ involvement in dual-cycle ELV recycling and the remanufacturing system can be ensured. This research implicates the government to devise appropriate reward and punishment strategy to encourage OVMs and third-party recyclers to collaborate for efficient recycling and remanufacturing systems. Particularly, the government is suggested to impose strict restrictions on OVMs to carry ELV recycling and provide support to promote recycling quantity standards. Hence, the ELV recycling and remanufacturing system would be strengthened, thus improving waste management which is crucial for both environmental and resource efficiency.

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