scholarly journals Constitutional complaint in the context of the principle of the rule of law

Author(s):  
Olha Turchenko

As a direct manifestation of the implementation of the rule of law, it is necessary to consider the direction of the activities of theauthorities and their officials to ensure fundamental, inalienable human rights.Although part 1 of Article 55 of the Law “On the Constitutional Court of Ukraine” does not directly stipulate the protection offundamental constitutional human rights and freedoms, its legal nature as an individual instrument predetermines its inextricable linkwith the need to protect (restore) the rights of a specific identified person or group of persons. Even if, as a result of consideration ofthe complaint, a systemic problem of the constitutional legal order is highlighted, the protection of which, first of all, the activities ofthe Constitutional Court of Ukraine are directed, this does not change the nature of the constitutional complaint as an individual instrumentfor protecting rights.The legal specificity of a constitutional complaint is that it concerns a specific violated constitutional right belong to a specificsubject, while it also acts as a means of ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution of Ukraine.The article examines the problems of the implementation of a constitutional complaint, the essence, specifics, signs of a constitutionalcomplaint in the context of the principle of the rule of law, identifies controversial issues of a theoretical and practical natureon the implementation of the right to a constitutional complaint.In particular, the Law defines a constitutional complaint through the procedural concept of “petition”, which seems to be terminologicallyincorrect, since the concept of a complaint and a petition in the aspect of a person’s appeals exist separately from each other and have some differences. Since the Constitutional Court is legally obliged to verify the compliance of normative legal acts with theConstitution of Ukraine, it is advisable to define a constitutional complaint through a requirement, focusing on the requirement for therelevant entity to perform certain actions or refrain from them.Certain obscurity arises as to what kind of decision in the case should be considered the final decision of the court, which shouldconcern the constitutional complaint, it is seen that this can only be a decision of the court of last instance, that is, one whose appealhas already been fully implemented.In general, the introduction of the institution of constitutional complaint contributes to the rooting of the main idea of constitutionalism– the introduction of the principle of the rule of law, limitation of state power, the desire to protect human rights.

Author(s):  
Egidijus Küris

Western legal tradition gave the birth to the concept of the rule of law. Legal theory and constitutional justice significantly contributed to the crystallisation of its standards and to moving into the direction of the common concept of the rule of law. The European Court of Human Rights uses this concept as an interpretative tool, the extension of which is the quality of the law doctrine, which encompasses concrete requirements for the law under examination in this Court, such as prospectivity of law, its foreseeability, clarity etc. The author of the article, former judge of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court and currently the judge of the European Court of Human Rights, examines how the latter court has gradually intensified (not always consistently) its reliance on the rule of law as a general principle, inherent in all the Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, to the extent that in some of its judgments it concentrates not anymore on the factual situation of an individual applicant, but, first and foremost, on the examination of the quality of the law. The trend is that, having found the quality of the applicable law to be insufficient, the Court considers that the mere existence of contested legislation amounts to an unjustifiable interference into a respective right and finds a violation of respective provisions of the Convention. This is an indication of the Court’s progressing self-approximation to constitutional courts, which are called to exercise abstract norm-control.La tradición occidental alumbró la noción del Estado de Derecho. La teoría del Derecho y la Justicia Constitucional han contribuido decisivamente a la cristalización de sus estándares, ayudando a conformar un acervo común en torno al mismo. El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos emplea la noción de Estado de Derecho como una herramienta interpretativa, fundamentalmente centrada en la doctrina de la calidad de la ley, que implica requisitos concretos que exige el Tribunal tales como la claridad, la previsibilidad, y la certeza en la redacción y aplicación de la norma. El autor, en la actualidad Juez del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y anterior Magistrado del Tribunal Constitucional de Lituania, examina cómo el primero ha intensificado gradualmente (no siempre de forma igual de consistente) su confianza en el Estado de Derecho como principio general, inherente a todos los preceptos que forman el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, hasta el punto de que en algunas de sus resoluciones se concentra no tanto en la situación de hecho del demandante individual sino, sobre todo y ante todo, en el examen de esa calidad de la ley. La tendencia del Tribunal es a considerar que, si observa que la ley no goza de calidad suficiente, la mera existencia de la legislación discutida supone una interferencia injustificable dentro del derecho en cuestión y declara la violación del precepto correspondiente del Convenio. Esto implica el acercamiento progresivo del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos a los Tribunales Constitucionales, quienes tienen encargado el control en abstracto de la norma legal.


Author(s):  
Oksana Shcherbanyuk

The article considers the constitutional court procedure and constitutional control in the field of lustration.  These issues are considered through the prism of the rule of law, its understanding by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in its practice.  It is emphasized that the application of the principle of publicity and the requirements of increased publicity is due to the importance of cases heard by constitutional courts, as well as the results of judicial activity. Along with this, the issue of long-term consideration by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine of the law determining lustration is analyzed in detail. The study is updated by the fact that the European Court of Human Rights on the complaints of citizens of Ukraine found a violation of the right of the lustrated to a fair trial due to excessive time of national trials for their release.  It is concluded that the Law on Lustration should serve its most important function in establishing the rule of law in the country. In legal science there is a situation when the views of scholars on the essence of judicial procedure are contradictory, which gives rise to different understandings of this legal phenomenon by representatives of different scientific schools.  For a long time, the problem of judicial procedure was inextricably linked with the consideration of the category of the process, the essential idea of which significantly influenced the understanding of the limits of the procedure in law. The constitutional Court as the only organ of the constitutional-judicial control may be seen as a special (organized on a state basis), the carrier of the intellectual potential of theories of constitutional law.


Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lefa S Ntsoane

The availability of the mandament van spolie in cases where a statutory provision provides for despoilment has been dealt with in a recent Constitutional Court judgment, handed down on 15 May 2014 (Ngqukumba v Minister of Safety and Security 2014 (5) SA 112 (CC)). In this case the Court had to decide on the question whether the mandament van spolie, as a common-law remedy aimed to restore lost possession, can be granted by the Court despite the fact that section 68(6)(b) of the National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996 prohibits possession “without lawful cause” of a motor vehicle of which the engine or chassis number has been falsified or mutilated. The question was answered in the affirmative. The Court held that the mandament van spolie can be granted, despite the prohibition against the return of the vehicle as provided for by the Traffic Act. This is also the case despite the fact that section 31(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provides for almost the same relief as that which can be achieved by the mandament van spolie, except that the remedy provides for an urgent relief, and it is more cost-effective than resorting to the CPA. In terms of a mandament van spolie, a person who has been unlawfully despoiled of possession may apply to the Court for this remedy, claiming restoration of that possession. The main purpose of the remedy is to protect lost possession of the property by the applicant. This remedy is only concerned with whether the applicant was in factual possession (ius possessionis) of the property, whether movable or immovable, rather than the right to possess (ius possidendi). The merits of the case are therefore not considered by the Court in an application for a mandament van spolie. The aim is to prevent people from taking the law into their own hands by prohibiting the taking of possession otherwise than in accordance with the law . There are two requirements that must first be met for a successful reliance on the mandament van spolie. Firstly, the applicant must prove on a balance of probabilities that he was in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the item. Secondly, the applicant must also prove that the respondent deprived him of possession unlawfully. The first requirement will not be discussed because it was not an issue in this case. A brief analysis of the second requirement will be conducted because of the role it played in this judgment. It is, however, important to mention that these requirements were not the subject of dispute in the present case. This note carries the view that the Ngqukumba judgment strengthened the applicability of the mandament van spolie in cases of dispossession where compliance with due legal process has been compromised. The judgment is important because it promotes the rule of law and due legal process, by ensuring that no one (including organs of State) is above the law. This is particularly true, taking into account the high volume of civil claims lodged by individuals against the Minister of Police in cases where police officials failed to comply with the law. The rule of law has both a procedural and a substantive component. The procedural component of the rule of law requires every action (be it by an individual or an organ of State) to be in accordance with the relevant provisions regulating that act. This is meant to prevent the abuse of power by individuals or Government institutions. The substantive component is concerned with the protection of rights, and this includes the right to dignity, privacy and property. The purpose of this note is threefold. Firstly, the facts, arguments and the judgment will be stated briefly. Secondly, this note will analyse the applicability of the remedy in cases where a statutory provision provides for despoilment. Thirdly, suggestions for a way forward for the applicability of the remedy in cases of a conflict with a statutory provision will be given.


2020 ◽  
pp. 127-134
Author(s):  
Yu.A. Shevchenko ◽  
O.V. Kharytonova

This article is devoted to the analysis of the current legislation of Ukraine, as well as judicial practice in the context of the need to enter information in the declaration of a person authorized to perform the functions of the state or local government, namely the column "Financial Liabilities", in the form of surety, and the problem of providing a criminal legal assessment in the context of the possibility of the acts qualification under Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (hereinafter - the Criminal Code of Ukraine). These issues nowadays acquire the status of an exceptional legal problem due to the lack of a single law enforcement practice, and therefore require theoretical and practical consideration. In this regard, the article focuses on the analysis of certain provisions of the Law of Ukraine "On Prevention of Corruption", consideration of the crime under Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, as well as consideration of the judicial practice of the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court Ukraine, courts of appeal and local courts. Much of the author's attention is focused on the concept of legal nature and the institution of bail in general. In doing so, the author explored the above issues through the lens of human rights protection, based on the understanding of the essence of the principle of legal certainty, which is part of the concept of the rule of law. The conclusions suggested proposals as for improving the question that author discussed by amending national anti-corruption legislation in order to enable it to qualify the act provided for in Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine in the form of failure to enter information in the declaration column "Financial liabilities" of the persons authorized to perform the functions of state or local government in the presence of surety. In particular, the author emphasized that formulation of the norm, which defines the concept of "financial liabilities", makes it impossible to apply it in the context of qualifying a crime under Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine due to lack of legal certainty, which makes it impossible to maintain the principle the rule of law, and therefore a priori, human rights and freedoms will be violated.


Author(s):  
Tetiana Tsuvina

The article is devoted to the interpretation of the principle of rule of law in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. The concept of the rule of law, along with democracy and human rights makes up the three pillars of the Council of Europe and is endorsed in the Preamble to the ECHR. The Preamble to the ECHR states that the governments of European countries are like-minded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law. The rights most obviously connected to the rule of law include: the right of access to justice, the right to a fair trial, the legal principle that measures which impose a burden should not have retroactive effects the right to an effective remedy, anyone accused of a crime is presumed innocent until proved guilty etc. The author concludes that there is an expediency of grouping separate requirements of the rule of law in the practice of the ECtHR around concepts, which are concluded to be elements of the rule of law in a democratic society. Such elements of the rule of law in the practice of the ECHR are recognized as legality, legal certainty, fairness of a trial and the priority of human rights. Legality supposes that authorities need a legal basis for measures which interfere with a right of an individual, as well as quality requirement for the law such as accessibility, foreseeability and no arbitrariness. Legal certainty encompasses foreseeability in application of the law; non-retroactivity of legislation; the principle of res judicata; mandatory execution of court decisions and consistency of judicial practice. Fair trial requirements devoted into two groups: general requirements (access to court, independent and impartial tribunal, execution of court decisions etc.) and requirements for criminal proceedings (presumption of innocence, principle nullum crimen sine lege etc.) It is noted that the legality, legal certainty, fairness of a trial are formal requirements of the rule of law, thus the priority of human rights is a substantive (material) requirement of the rule of law. The aforementioned testifies to the natural-legal approach that the ECHR is guided by in interpreting the rule of law in its practice, understanding it primarily as the rule of human rights.


Author(s):  
Yaroslav Skoromnyy ◽  

The article presents the conceptual foundations of bringing judges to civil and legal liability. It was found that the civil and legal liability of judges is one of the types of legal liability of judges. It is determined that the legislation of Ukraine provides for a clearly delineated list of the main cases (grounds) for which the state is liable for damages for damage caused to a legal entity and an individual by illegal actions of a judge as a result of the administration of justice. It has been proved that bringing judges to civil and legal liability, in particular on the basis of the right of recourse, provides for the payment of just compensation in accordance with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. It was established that the bringing of judges to civil and legal liability in Ukraine is regulated by such legislative documents as the Constitution of Ukraine, the Civil Code of Ukraine, the Explanatory Note to the European Charter on the Status of Judges (Model Code), the Law of Ukraine «On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges», the Law of Ukraine «On the procedure for compensation for harm caused to a citizen by illegal actions of bodies carrying out operational-search activities, pre-trial investigation bodies, prosecutors and courts», Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitutional submission of the Supreme Court of Ukraine regarding the compliance of the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) of certain provisions of Article 2, paragraph two of clause II «Final and transitional provisions» of the Law of Ukraine «On measures to legislatively ensure the reform of the pension system», Article 138 of the Law of Ukraine «On the judicial system and the status of judges» (the case on changes in the conditions for the payment of pensions and monthly living known salaries of judges lagging behind in these), the Law of Ukraine «On the implementation of decisions and the application of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights».


Author(s):  
Lyudmyla Bogachova ◽  

The article defines the concept of the principle of the rule of law both in the narrow and broad sense. In the narrow sense, the principle of the rule of law is understood as the rule of law over legislation, and in the broad sense - as the rule of law over the state, state arbitrariness. Different approaches to disclosing the content of the principle of the rule of law in national and European legal doctrines are systematized. The lack of a single generally accepted concept of the principle of "rule of law" is emphasized. The decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are analyzed; attention is focused on their interpretation of the rule of law. The realization of the principle of the rule of law, primarily presupposes the domination of inalienable and inviolable human rights and freedoms over the political power of the state, and also requires quality laws and observance of the principle of legal certainty. The interpretation of the principle of the rule of law in the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine is considered. The CCU emphasizes that the rule of law is first and foremost the "rule of law in society"; characterizes the principle, linking it to the ideas of social justice, freedom and equality, without which it is impossible to imagine true human development and existence. The Constitutional Court calls justice as one of the basic principles of law, which is crucial in defining it as a regulator of social relations, one of the universal dimensions of law. Examples of application of the rule of law in the practice of the Supreme Court of Ukraine are given. Judges not only make a formal reference to the rule of law, but also try to analyze and disclose the content of its constituent elements (requirements) within a specific legal case. The main problems that hinder the effective implementation and realization of the rule of law in judicial practice are identified, namely - the lack of proper regulation and official interpretation; low quality of laws and legislative process; excessive number of conflicting laws; low level of legal awareness and legal culture of Ukrainian society, and early stage of civil society development in Ukraine. It is concluded that the rule of law is a principle whose main content is expressed in the following aspects: ensuring the rule of law over political power; subordination of state institutions to the needs of human rights protection and ensuring their implementation; priority of these rights over all other values of democratic, social, and legal state; preventing the manifestation of arbitrariness of state power, as well as ensuring compliance with the requirements of justice.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 167-171
Author(s):  
Mohammad Fadel

This work grew out of a series of lectures that were delivered over atwo-year period between 1996 and 1998 at the Centre of Islamic andMiddle Eastern Law (CIMEL) at the School of Oriental and AfricanStudies (SOAS), University of London, on the genera] subject of the rule oflaw in the Middle East and Islamic countries. Subsequently, materials wereadded dealing particularly with issues relating to human rights law. Thecontributors to this work are a combination of legal academics, human rights activists, lawyers and judges, who hale from various countries in theArab world, Iran, the United States, Great Britain and Germany.There are a total of fourteen separate chapters, of varying length andquality. The book is not lengthy - including notes and authors’ biographies,it is 180 pages long. The average length of each chapter is between ten andfifteen pages. Despite the diversity of countries surveyed, all the essays areconcerned with generic questions regarding the rule of law, whether in atheoretical sense, viz., whether the notion that legitimate governmentalaction is limited to those acts that are deemed lawful by a pre-existing setor rules, or in a practical sense, viz., assuming that the formal legal regimeof a given state recognizes the rule of law in a theoretical sense, whetherthe coercive apparatus of the state in fact recognizes legal limitations onits conduct.Perhaps the most interesting (it is certainly the most lengthy, at 35 pages),and most important, essay in this work is the very fiit one, authored byAdel Omar Sherif, an Egyptian judge, wherein the author provides a digestof the landmark decisions of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court.While the work can be criticized for taking on the appearance of a meresurvey of decisions, without taking a critical perspective to the Court’sprecedents, it is nonetheless a very valuable contribution for those lawyersand scholars who cannot read Arabic but nonetheless wish to gain insightinto Egypt’s legal culture. The modest task of relating the decisions ofEgypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court is especially important given thecliches regarding the absence of effective judicial institutions in the Arabworld. Sherifs contribution effectively dispels that myth. His article revealsthe Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court to be a vibrant institution thattakes its constitutional duties seriously, and discharges those duties withintegrity, and when it finds that the government has acted unlawfully, it willstrike down the offensive legislation, or rule against the government ...


Author(s):  
Pál Sonnevend

AbstractModern constitutionalism is based on the paradigm that courts are inherently entitled and obliged to enforce the constitution of the respective polity. This responsibility of courts also applies in the context of the European Union to both the CJEU and national constitutional courts. The present chapter argues that in the face of constitutional crises the CJEU and the Hungarian Constitutional Court shy away from applying the law as it is to the full. The reasons behind this unwarranted judicial self-restraint are most different: the CJEU aims to avoid conflicts with national constitutional courts whereas the Hungarian Constitutional Court has been facing a legislative power also acting as constitution making power willing to amend the constitution to achieve specific legislative purposes or to undo previous constitutional court decisions. Yet both courts respond to expediencies that do not follow from the law they are called upon to apply. It is argued that rule of law backsliding requires these courts to abandon the unnecessary self-restraint and exploit the means already available.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (12) ◽  
pp. 1499-1520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peer Zumbansen

On 14 October 2004, theBundesverfassungsgericht(BVerfG – German Federal Constitutional Court) voided a decision by theOberlandesgericht(Higher Regional Court) Naumburg, finding a violation of the complainant's rights guaranteed by theGrundgesetz(German Basic Law). The Decision directly addresses both the observation and application of case law from the European Court of Human Rights under the Basic Law's “rule of law provision” in Art. 20.III. While there is a myriad of important aspects with regard to this decision, we may limit ourselves at this point to the introductoryaperçucontained in the holdings of the case. One of them reads as follows:Zur Bindung an Gesetz und Recht (Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG) gehört die Berücksichtigung der Gewährleistungen der Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten und der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im Rahmen methodisch vertretbarer Gesetzesauslegung. Sowohl die fehlende Auseinandersetzung mit einer Entscheidung des Gerichtshofs als auch deren gegen vorrangiges Recht verstoßende schematische “Vollstreckung” können gegen Grundrechte in Verbindung mit dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip verstoßen


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