كتاب التطور الثقافي: تغير دوافع الشعوب وإعادة تشكيل العالم Book :Cultural Development: Changing peoples' motivations and reshaping the world

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (first) ◽  
pp. 214-224

يعرف هذا الكتاب القارئ بنظرية التحديث التطورية Evolutionary Modernization Theory لرونالد إنجلهارت التي تنبثق عنها مجموعة من الفروض يقوم صاحب النظرية باختبارها مستخدماً قاعدة بيانات ميدانية فريدة من نوعها تم جمعها من مسح القيم العالمي World Values Survey ومسح القيم الأوربية European Values Survey ما بين عامي 1981 و 2014. ويُعد هذا الكتاب امتداداً للفكر الاجتماعي-السياسي والفكر الاقتصادي-التنموي الذي ظهر بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية متمثلاً في نظريات التحديث والتغير الثقافي، ويتبنى المؤلف النظرة الكونية لخريطة العالم الثقافية ويبرز أولوية المتغير الثقافي على وجه التحديد. و تم تصميم هذا الكتاب على نحو يساعد القارئ على تفهم كيف تتغير قيم الناس وأهدافهم، وكيف يؤدي ذلك إلى تغيير العالم. This book is known as Ronald Engelhart’s Evolutionary Modernization Theory, which gives rise to a set of hypotheses that the theory owner tests using a unique field database collected from the World Values ​​Survey and the European Values ​​Survey between 1981 and 2014. This book is an extension of the socio-political and economic-developmental ideas that emerged after the Second World War represented in theories of modernization and cultural change, and the author adopts the global view of the cultural map of the world and highlights the priority of the cultural variable specifically. This book is designed to help the reader understand how people’s values ​​and goals change, and how this changes the world

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alisa Remizova ◽  
Maksim Rudnev

Several large international surveys, including the World Values Survey and the European Values Study, have been using the moral attitudes scale (MAS) to measure individual and country differences for decades. However, the validity of the instrument has been barely assessed. The current study addressed the concurrent and content validity of four popular MAS items (justifiability of homosexuality, suicide, prostitution, and euthanasia). A sample of 493 Russians completed both MAS and the four validated multi-item scales. Results demonstrated that, except for the homosexuality item, the MAS items had low concurrent validity, explaining less than 50% of the variance of the corresponding multi-item scales. The MAS items underestimated the justifiability of homosexuality, prostitution, and suicide, and overestimated the justifiability of euthanasia. The MAS homosexuality item appeared to be a precise measure of attitude towards male (but not female) homosexuality, responses to the prostitution and suicide items overlooked the positive arguments and the euthanasia item tapped more into attitudes towards active euthanasia of a dying person. The four items showed strong dependence on the overall justifiability. We conclude that separate MAS items should be used with caution, given the detected content bias and the items’ strong link to non-specific overall justifiability.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Lettinga ◽  
P.O. Jacquet ◽  
J-B. André ◽  
N. Baumard ◽  
C. Chevallier

AbstractAlthough humans cooperate universally, there is variability across individuals, times and cultures in the amount of resources people invest in cooperative activities. The origins of such variability are not known but recent work highlights that variations in environmental harshness may play a key role. A growing body of experimental work in evolutionary psychology suggests that humans adapt to their specific environment by calibrating their life-history strategy. In this paper, we apply structural equation models to test the association between current and childhood environmental harshness, life-history strategy and adult cooperation in two large-scale datasets (the World Values Survey and the European Values Study). The present study replicates existing research linking a harsher environment (both in adulthood and in childhood) with a modulated reproduction-maintenance trade-off and extends these findings to the domain of collective actions. Specifically, we find that a harsher environment (both in adulthood and in childhood) is associated with decreased involvement in collective action and that this association is mediated by individuals’ life-history strategy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 32-52
Author(s):  
Lidia Okolskaya

The aim of the paper is to analyze parental values in Russia and 33 other countries, and explore how they’ve changed between 1990 and 2017–2020. Russian dynamics are shown on 7 waves, international — on 2 waves. We used a combination of data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Study. We found that in 1990 the Russian value agenda in regards to children was essentially directed towards survival. By 2017–2020 certain changes had occurred: Russians no longer considered survival values to be as important (such as hard work, thrift, obedience); self-expression values (e.g., independence and imagination) became more popular; humanistic values lost much of their importance for Russians. In 33 countries humanistic values remained as popular as in 1990, while survival values seem to be less important. Russian parental values change in the same direction as do Russian personal values.


Author(s):  
Anna M. Almakaeva ◽  
Aigul M. Mavletova

In their version of modernization theory, R. Inglehart and K. Welzel suggest that younger cohorts socialized under conditions of existential security are the main drivers of post-materialist values and modernization process. In this paper, we test this thesis based on five waves of the World Values Survey fielded in Russia and covering the period from 1990 to 2017. We use age-period-cohort analysis, which disentangles the effects of age, time period and cohorts. We implement a method of measuring emancipative values proposed by K. Welzel. His emancipative values consist of four different indices: «autonomy», «equality», «choice», and «voice». The results show that younger cohorts in Russia do have a higher level of emancipative values as suggested by the theory. The basis for the transformation of values is three indices out of four: «autonomy», «choice», and «voice». «Equality» is the only index that showed neither age nor cohort differences. Acknowledgment. This article is supported by the Russian Science Foundation under grant no. 18-18-00341 «Transformation of values and subjective quality of life: A regional perspective».


Author(s):  
Sjoerd Beugelsdijk ◽  
Mariko J. Klasing

Diversity research has shown that ethno-linguistic, religious, and genetic diversity are related to a variety of socio-economic outcomes. We complement this literature by focusing on a dimension of diversity so far ignored in diversity research for lack of data: Diversity in key human values. Using data from all available waves of the World Values Survey and the European Values Study we develop a multi-item indicator of value diversity. This measure reflects the extent to which key human values are shared among the inhabitants of a country. Our newly developed measure is available for up to 111 countries and three decades (1981-2014). We conclude by comparing our newly developed measure of value diversity with existing measures of social diversity and relating it to various indicator of socio-economic performance.


2008 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-164
Author(s):  
O. M. Balakireva ◽  
◽  
◽  

The author presents the comparative results of studies of the system of value, involved orientations of the population in the frame of the international studi` es “World Values Survey” (1996, 2006) and “European Values Survey” (1999).


2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 235-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Inglehart ◽  
Pippa Norris

AbstractIn seeking to understand the root causes of the events of 9/11 many accounts have turned to Samuel P. Huntington's provocative and controversial thesis of a 'clash of civilizations', arousing strong debate. Evidence from the 1995-2001 waves of the World Values Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS) allows us, for the first time, to examine an extensive body of empirical evidence relating to this debate. Comparative analysis of the beliefs and values of Islamic and non-Islamic publics in 75 societies around the globe, confirms the first claim in Huntington's thesis: culture does matter, and indeed matters a lot, so that religious legacies leave a distinct imprint on contemporary values. But Huntington is mistaken in assuming that the core clash between the West and Islamic worlds concerns democracy. The evidence suggests striking similarities in the political values held in these societies. It is true that Islamic publics differ from Western publics concerning the role of religious leadership in society, but this is not a simple dichotomous clash — many non-Islamic societies side with the Islamic ones on this issue. Moreover the Huntington thesis fails to identify the most basic cultural fault line between the West and Islam, which concerns the issues of gender equality and sexual liberalization. The cultural gulf separating Islam from the West involves Eros far more than Demos.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pál Czeglédi

AbstractThe paper uses data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Study on individuals in Hungary and its neighbouring countries to examine the effects of political borders on different beliefs, as opposed to that of ethnic differences or historical borders. The focus on Hungary and its neighbours is explained by the fact that parts of the Hungarian ethno-linguistic community can be found in all these countries, which makes it possible to separate the effect of culture from that of the current political community. By applying a cultural gravity model which is concerned with the differences in beliefs between all possible pairs of individuals in the sample, the paper finds that out of five areas of beliefs, it is the beliefs regarding work, markets, and democracy whose differences are robustly affected by political borders, giving some support to the approach which argues that values are shaped through the dialogue occurring within a political community.*


2021 ◽  
pp. 226-238
Author(s):  
Enrico Letta

European integration started after the Second World War as an effort to bring peace in the Old Continent and to promote the unity of its peoples in a categorical rejection of nationalism. Hence, the very reason of making a united Europe was internal in its roots. Without denying the extraordinary achievements of the European project, today we can no longer give traditional answers to the fundamental question: ‘Why make Europe?’ If yesterday the underlying reason was clear to everyone—peace, in fact—today it is no longer the case. One of the ‘positive’ aspects of Brexit—and there are very few!—is having awakened Europe from a dangerous, deterministic, and almost dogmatic inertia of giving ‘Just because’ as the answer. So why should we continue to build a united Europe? Why do we need the European Union in the twenty-first century? In a nutshell the answer is that from the hegemon it was until the twentieth century, Europe must become a beacon for the world as a value-based global power. This is the essence of the new role that Europe is called to play in the world. In order to do this, we can no longer just look at internal causes for making Europe, but must also take into account the external context. In other words, we should adopt a mentality whereby European values coincide with European strategic interests. This shift is the key to making Europe live up to its global ambitions.


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