scholarly journals Drone Delivery and the Takings Clause

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-176
Author(s):  
Brian M. Miller

Amazon, Inc.’s fledgling drone shipping service, “Prime Air,” and similar services, may pose a new threat to private property rights. Companies that ship by drone would likely have to fly the drones over private land. But who owns the low-altitude airspace above private land? That issue is unsettled, but the common law supports the view that low-altitude airspace belongs to the landowners beneath. If that is correct, companies like Amazon have two main options to get drone shipping off the ground: (1) pay the landowners on the intended routes for an easement through their low-altitude airspace, or (2) count on the government to compel easements through these spaces. The second option presents a Takings Clause problem. Because forced easements of flight intrude on landowner rights, landowners burdened by drone easements could potentially prove a per se taking. But even if drone easements are not per se takings, case law and the “character of the government action” factor in the Penn Central analysis give landowners a fighting chance to prove a regulatory taking. Overall, the Takings Clause could be a valuable tool for both economic efficiency and equity, requiring beneficiaries of drone easements to compensate those burdened by the easements. If drone shipping takes off in the U.S., current law may ensure that the negative externalities will not fall solely on the surface landowners.

2016 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brightman Gebremichael

AbstractExpropriation of private land rights involves two contradictory interests: there is a public need for land; and landholders expect security of tenure and protection of their private property rights. A satisfactory expropriation policy must strike a balance between these interests. Legislation must therefore only authorize the government to expropriate land rights for a clear and limited public purpose under the supervision of an independent body. The author argues that Ethiopia's rural land laws have defined the public purpose for the expropriation of rural land rights in different ways depending on the nature of the landholders. For peasants and pastoralists the public purpose requirement is defined vaguely and broadly, whereas for investors the concept is limited to projects implemented by government. The author argues that the protection of private property rights and security of tenure are further undermined by a legislative failure to authorize affected people to appeal to an independent body on the basis that the public purpose requirement has not been satisfied.


Author(s):  
Daniel Halliday

This chapter considers various arguments both for and against taxing inherited wealth, each of these being associated with some or other type of libertarian outlook. Libertarianism in the Lockean guises (‘left’ and ‘right’ varieties) is distinguished from its classical liberal alternative, which downplays the Lockean emphasis on private property rights in favour of a more defeasible case for small government and low taxation. These different perspectives generate a variety of quite different arguments about inheritance, some more persuasive than others. Some attention is paid to the common claim that inheritance taxes ‘punish’ virtue and generosity. It is then argued that a Rignano scheme may be particularly attractive in light of certain left-libertarian commitments and as a way of accommodating a classical liberal concern about perpetual savings.


2021 ◽  
pp. 263-277
Author(s):  
Kateryna Nekit

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on human rights. Many rights have been restricted to prevent the spread of infection. The restrictions on private property rights during the pandemic were not so obvious, but no less significant. The massive closure of restaurants, cafes, cinemas and other crowded places has resulted in significant losses for business owners. The question arose about the admissibility of such restrictions on the rights of owners, as well as the need to compensate for the losses caused. The purpose of this article is to study the criteria developed by international practice under which the restriction of property rights is allowed, and approaches to resolving issues of compensation for losses caused to owners when it is necessary to ensure a balance of private and public interests in Ukraine. The article also analyzes approaches to resolving issues of compensation for losses caused to owners as a result of restrictions on their rights, developed in the case law of the United States and Great Britain.


2021 ◽  
Vol 257 ◽  
pp. 02043
Author(s):  
Shengteng Qu ◽  
Yang Zhang

The property right of small water conservancy projects (hereinafter referred to as SWCP) currently can be defined as three different forms: public property rights, private property rights, and a combination of public and private property rights. The main participants are the government, farmers, and other organizations. The interests and demands of different subjects are different, so the property rights structure of the SWCPs are also different. In order to explore the evolutionary law of the property right structure of SWCPs in the case of conflicting demands of multiple stakeholders, a game model for the evolutionary law of each main body of SWCPs was proposed in this paper. By analyzing the feasibility of the game of multi-stakeholder appeal conflicts, a multi-stakeholder game model was established. The game and evolution of each stakeholder were analyzed, and the evolution of the property rights of SWCPs under the game of each subject was simulated and analyzed. The research results show that if the incentives and constraints of cooperation between farmers and cooperatives, associations and other organizations are greater than the cost of cooperation, farmers will participate in the cooperation and invest in elements actively, thus promoting the integration of elements, thereby contributing resource complementarity among participants and leaving more cooperation surplus. If the benefits of cooperation between the government and farmer organizations plus the total benefits of the incentive and restraint mechanism are greater than the total cost of active cooperation, furthermore, the incremental benefits of the incentive and restraint mechanism are not lower than the incremental costs of participating in the cooperative, then, farmer organizations are easier to get succeed. The research results have certain reference significance for the option of the property rights and management modes of SWCPs.


Author(s):  
Yingyi Qian

China’s reform worked and produced one of the most impressive growth in the largest developing and transition economy in the world in the past twenty-two years. That China has managed to grow so rapidly despite the absence of many conventional institutions such as rule of law and secure private property rights is puzzling. To understand how reform works in a developing and transition economy that has great growth potential, it is not enough to study the conventional “best-practice institutions” as a desirable goal. One should also study how feasible, imperfect institutions have evolved to complement the initial conditions and to function as stepping stones in the transition toward the goal. Underlying China’s reform is a serial of institutional changes concerning the market, firms, and the government in the novel form of “transitional institutions.” These institutions succeed when they achieve two objectives at the same time: to improve economic efficiency by unleashing the standard forces of incentives and competition on the one hand, and to make the reform a win-win game and thus interest compatible for those in power on the other.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 397-425
Author(s):  
Tamar Megiddo ◽  
Eyal Benvenisti

AbstractThis Article examines the authority of states to settle individual private property claims in post–conflict negotiations towards settlement. We analyze this question by exploring the limits of states’ authority to take or limit private property rights for the public good. We argue that this authority rests on two cumulative justifications: the inclusion of the property owners among the public that stands to benefit from the public good, and their representation by the government that decides on the taking of the property. In post–conflict settlement, the negotiating states may redistribute both private property and the public good between and within their respective communities. Their authority to redistribute continues to rests on the same justifications of inclusion and representation. Hence, their authority extends only to the redistribution of property of owners who are members of the respective communities that negotiate the agreement, and who are represented by a negotiating government.


Author(s):  
Dian Khoreanita Pratiwi ◽  

The state is responsible for protecting the entire Indonesian nation through the implementation of housing and settlement areas so that people are able to live and live in decent and affordable houses in a healthy, safe, harmonious and sustainable environment throughout Indonesia. Article 28H paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution stipulates that everyone has the right to live in physical and spiritual prosperity, to have a place to live, and to have a good and healthy environment and have the right to obtain health services. Then Article 28H paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution states that everyone has the right to have private property rights and these property rights may not be taken over arbitrarily by anyone. The research method used is empirical juridical research, which is to see the extent of the government's ability to provide housing for the poor. As for the results of the research, that the implementation of government programs in meeting housing needs for the poor, where the government has launched several programs, which include the construction of flats, special houses, assistance for the construction of infrastructure, facilities and utilities, housing financing assistance, and self-help housing stimulus assistance. Even though there have been many programs, not all residents have a decent place to live.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Scott Timcke

This chapter introduces the concern of the book with unfreedom and class rule in contemporary American capitalism as seen in the digital realm. Class struggle is the first and last force shaping developments in communication. Computers are built using commodity chains and a labour process, both organized by the supremacy of a private property rights regime. Subsequently, as data and code are central to almost every facet of contemporary life, capitalist ideology with its conceptions of suitable social relations are reflected in the uses and programming. It is thus appropriate to worry about when, as opposed to whether, automated decision-making algorithms and their ilk will be used by corporations to optimize for profit at the expense of people. Capitalism is not about 'markets' or even private property per se. Rather it is a political order that consolidates decision-making power over the use, circulation and consumption of resources in a wealthy minority in ways that are opaque. As communication is a component of class formation it is also inflected by the structural antagonisms and contradictions inherent in capitalist societies. The chapter focuses on the results of systems, relationships and structure as they move in history along with the concepts and methods required to achieve that aim.


Author(s):  
Christina Scriven

A large literature on institutions has developed that claims that institutions influence long-run growth and development; thus, it becomes critical to carefully examine what institutions influence which outcomes to better understand factors that influence long-run economic growth across countries. Douglass North terms institutions as the rules of the game and this paper will work to further examine these rules by looking at private property rights institutions, which are the rules and regulation protecting citizens against the power of the government and elites , and contracting institutions, which are the rules and regulations governing contracts between ordinary citizens. The paper Unbundling Institutions , published in the Journal of Political Economy by Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson in 2005, seeks to conceptualize the different factors within the institutional framework and provide some semblance of which of these factors provide the most relevant analysis. The paper finds that property rights institutions have a strong influence on long-run economic growth, investment, and financial development, while contracting institutions have a more limited impact on those same factors. My presentation will give a concise background on the development of the new institutional approach and explain the reasoning for the conceptual divide between property rights and contracting institutions. Using a two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) approach and the instrumental variable approach, the presentation will address issues of causality and correlation. Identifying the link to the policy arena will provide context as to why this area is of particular importance.


Google Rules ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 65-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanne Elizabeth Gray

This chapter provides an examination of Google’s US copyright case law, covering disputes over Google’s use, without permission, of copyrighted content in Google Search, Google Images, Google Books, YouTube, and its phone operating system Android. When resolving Google’s copyright disputes, US courts have considered the public benefits of Google’s services and have exhibited a willingness to limit private property rights in favor of the public interest in accessing information and content. These decisions have legitimized Google’s activities, and they have gifted Google private gains that fuel its information empire.


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