How Reform Worked in China

Author(s):  
Yingyi Qian

China’s reform worked and produced one of the most impressive growth in the largest developing and transition economy in the world in the past twenty-two years. That China has managed to grow so rapidly despite the absence of many conventional institutions such as rule of law and secure private property rights is puzzling. To understand how reform works in a developing and transition economy that has great growth potential, it is not enough to study the conventional “best-practice institutions” as a desirable goal. One should also study how feasible, imperfect institutions have evolved to complement the initial conditions and to function as stepping stones in the transition toward the goal. Underlying China’s reform is a serial of institutional changes concerning the market, firms, and the government in the novel form of “transitional institutions.” These institutions succeed when they achieve two objectives at the same time: to improve economic efficiency by unleashing the standard forces of incentives and competition on the one hand, and to make the reform a win-win game and thus interest compatible for those in power on the other.

Competitio ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Kovacs

This contribution addresses the question of what are the main constituents of an innovative fiscal policy in the context of sustainability. We apply the concept of sustaining and disruptive innovation to fiscal policy. On the one hand, innovative fiscal policy is able to be sustaining whereby public finance will incrementally improve without leaving its decisive structure. On the other hand, innovative fiscal policy should be disruptive as well in the context of long term sustainability, whereby the structure of public finances can be profoundly restructured as a reaction to future challenges. By using the Finnish recovery in the early 1990s, we can refine our argument about the use and necessity of the mixture of fiscal rules and independent institutions in favour of fiscal sustainability. We also shed light on the key sources of the expansionary consolidation that emerged in the aftermath of the fiscal adjustment in the early 1990s. We emphasise that innovative fiscal policy with a mixture of legislated fiscal rules and independent fiscal anchor is more likely to be associated with sustainability if the economy has weaker growth potential which does not provide enough social trust towards the consolidation efforts of the government. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classification: E61, E62, Q01


Author(s):  
Tirthankar Roy

The eighteenth-century economy of the Indian subcontinent was an uneven one. On the one hand, there were present a rich indigenous commercial tradition; territorial states that respected private property in land and trade; a literate elite running the fiscal administration; and rich cities that were home to highly skilled artisans. But much of that wealth was confined to the riparian, deltaic, and seaboard regions. The greater part of peninsular India consisted of drylands, poor peasants, few roads, slow traffic, few towns, forests, waterless uplands, and uninhabited deserts. With such divergent initial conditions, the onset of globalization and the emergence of British power led to a variety of trajectories, as Chapter 2 shows.


2012 ◽  
Vol 22 (02) ◽  
pp. 1250032 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDRE WAGEMAKERS ◽  
SAMUEL ZAMBRANO ◽  
MIGUEL A. F. SANJUÁN

We present an analog circuit implementation of the novel partial control method, that is able to sustain chaotic transient dynamics. The electronic circuit simulates the dynamics of the one-dimensional slope-three tent map, for which the trajectories diverge to infinity for nearly all the initial conditions after behaving chaotically for a while. This is due to the existence of a nonattractive chaotic set: a chaotic saddle. The partial control allows one to keep the trajectories close to the chaotic saddle, even if the control applied is smaller than the effect of the applied noise, introduced into the system. Furthermore, we also show here that similar results can be implemented on a circuit that simulates a horseshoe-like map, which is a simple extension of the previous one. This encouraging result validates the theory and opens new perspectives for the application of this technique to systems with higher dimensions and continuous time dynamics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 257 ◽  
pp. 02043
Author(s):  
Shengteng Qu ◽  
Yang Zhang

The property right of small water conservancy projects (hereinafter referred to as SWCP) currently can be defined as three different forms: public property rights, private property rights, and a combination of public and private property rights. The main participants are the government, farmers, and other organizations. The interests and demands of different subjects are different, so the property rights structure of the SWCPs are also different. In order to explore the evolutionary law of the property right structure of SWCPs in the case of conflicting demands of multiple stakeholders, a game model for the evolutionary law of each main body of SWCPs was proposed in this paper. By analyzing the feasibility of the game of multi-stakeholder appeal conflicts, a multi-stakeholder game model was established. The game and evolution of each stakeholder were analyzed, and the evolution of the property rights of SWCPs under the game of each subject was simulated and analyzed. The research results show that if the incentives and constraints of cooperation between farmers and cooperatives, associations and other organizations are greater than the cost of cooperation, farmers will participate in the cooperation and invest in elements actively, thus promoting the integration of elements, thereby contributing resource complementarity among participants and leaving more cooperation surplus. If the benefits of cooperation between the government and farmer organizations plus the total benefits of the incentive and restraint mechanism are greater than the total cost of active cooperation, furthermore, the incremental benefits of the incentive and restraint mechanism are not lower than the incremental costs of participating in the cooperative, then, farmer organizations are easier to get succeed. The research results have certain reference significance for the option of the property rights and management modes of SWCPs.


1978 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 450-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Furniss

This paper attempts to throw new light on what one might terra the ‘operational component’ of social democratic thinking, functional socialism, by focusing on the creation. organization, and transformation of property rights. I argue that while democratic socialism does provide a political and philosophical schema that justifies distribution rules not sanctioned in ‘the market’,1 the novelty of the solution (and thus the necessary difference from existing advanced industrial societies, including the United States) is exaggerated. In addition. the tension between the attenuation of private property rights and their arrogation by the state on the one hand and citizen control over state activities on the other is not sufficiently perceived. My main purpose is to delineate and explore these problems. I also suggest ways in which the argument might be strengthened.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 655-658
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Akanpaadgi ◽  

This research paper sought to review the way and manner the conversion of polytechnics in Ghana to technical universities were done to ascertain whether the process conformed to standard best practice. The inequality in terms of placement of polytechnic graduates in the public sector as compared to the traditional university graduates, lack of direct academic progression for polytechnic graduates with Higher National Diploma, low enrollment and the departure of experienced staff from the polytechnics to the traditional universities due to poor conditions of service leaving the polytechnics with less staff compelled the government to initiate the reform. Institutional reform has been a long-standing practice in the educational sector; however, the implementation of new policies remains a challenge to many public institutions in Ghana. The one-size-fits-all approach to managing change must give way to a multi-faceted approach that takes into consideration the diversity of the various stakeholders affected by the change. The adoption of an appropriate change model and proper engagement of stakeholders as well as handling the transition as a project rather than treating it like the usual work of the ministry of education would have eased the tension and agitations which characterized the conversion process. Despite the conversion period spanning almost four years, the stakeholders are yet to reap the full benefits of the reform.


Taxation ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 60-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Brennan

Does the fact that considerations of distributive justice entitle governments to interfere with the distribution (of income/wealth/consumption) that emerges from market interactions imply that the property rights structure on which that market distribution is based has no normative authority in structuring government/citizen interactions? That claim is one implied by Nagel and Murphy in their book The Myth of Ownership. Chapter 3 proposes that this claim is false; but insists that denying that claim does not entail denying the legitimacy of public redistribution through the tax-transfer process. One central claim is that the concept of horizontal equity—that individuals should pay taxes in relation to their aggregate returns from market activity—may be thought of as a principle that appropriately reconciles the competing normative claims of the private property rights structure on the one hand with other requirements of distributive justice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 397-425
Author(s):  
Tamar Megiddo ◽  
Eyal Benvenisti

AbstractThis Article examines the authority of states to settle individual private property claims in post–conflict negotiations towards settlement. We analyze this question by exploring the limits of states’ authority to take or limit private property rights for the public good. We argue that this authority rests on two cumulative justifications: the inclusion of the property owners among the public that stands to benefit from the public good, and their representation by the government that decides on the taking of the property. In post–conflict settlement, the negotiating states may redistribute both private property and the public good between and within their respective communities. Their authority to redistribute continues to rests on the same justifications of inclusion and representation. Hence, their authority extends only to the redistribution of property of owners who are members of the respective communities that negotiate the agreement, and who are represented by a negotiating government.


Author(s):  
Dian Khoreanita Pratiwi ◽  

The state is responsible for protecting the entire Indonesian nation through the implementation of housing and settlement areas so that people are able to live and live in decent and affordable houses in a healthy, safe, harmonious and sustainable environment throughout Indonesia. Article 28H paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution stipulates that everyone has the right to live in physical and spiritual prosperity, to have a place to live, and to have a good and healthy environment and have the right to obtain health services. Then Article 28H paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution states that everyone has the right to have private property rights and these property rights may not be taken over arbitrarily by anyone. The research method used is empirical juridical research, which is to see the extent of the government's ability to provide housing for the poor. As for the results of the research, that the implementation of government programs in meeting housing needs for the poor, where the government has launched several programs, which include the construction of flats, special houses, assistance for the construction of infrastructure, facilities and utilities, housing financing assistance, and self-help housing stimulus assistance. Even though there have been many programs, not all residents have a decent place to live.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-176
Author(s):  
Brian M. Miller

Amazon, Inc.’s fledgling drone shipping service, “Prime Air,” and similar services, may pose a new threat to private property rights. Companies that ship by drone would likely have to fly the drones over private land. But who owns the low-altitude airspace above private land? That issue is unsettled, but the common law supports the view that low-altitude airspace belongs to the landowners beneath. If that is correct, companies like Amazon have two main options to get drone shipping off the ground: (1) pay the landowners on the intended routes for an easement through their low-altitude airspace, or (2) count on the government to compel easements through these spaces. The second option presents a Takings Clause problem. Because forced easements of flight intrude on landowner rights, landowners burdened by drone easements could potentially prove a per se taking. But even if drone easements are not per se takings, case law and the “character of the government action” factor in the Penn Central analysis give landowners a fighting chance to prove a regulatory taking. Overall, the Takings Clause could be a valuable tool for both economic efficiency and equity, requiring beneficiaries of drone easements to compensate those burdened by the easements. If drone shipping takes off in the U.S., current law may ensure that the negative externalities will not fall solely on the surface landowners.


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