scholarly journals Agendas in legislative decision‐making

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-274
Author(s):  
Sean Horan

Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats: the so‐called Euro–Latin and Anglo–American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features—history‐independence and persistence—are common in legislative settings. I then characterize the social choice rules implemented by sophisticated voting on agendas with these two features. I also characterize the rules implemented by more specialized formats (called priority agendas and convex agendas) whose structure is closely related to the prevailing rules for order‐of‐voting used by legislatures. These results establish a clear connection between structure and outcomes for a wide range of legislative agendas.

1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradford Jones ◽  
Benjamin Radcliff ◽  
Charles Taber ◽  
Richard Timpone

That individual preferences may he aggregated into a meaningful collective decision using the Condorcet criterion of majority choice is one of the central tenets of democracy. But that individual preferences may not yield majority winners is one of the classic findings of the social choice literature. Given this problem, social choice theorists have attempted to estimate the probability of Condorcet winners, given certain empirical or theoretical conditions. We shall estimate the probabilities of Condorcet winners and intransitive aggregate orders for various numbers of individuals with strong or weak preference orders across various numbers of alternatives. We find, using computer simulation, a stark contrast between these estimates assuming strong individual preferences and the estimates allowing for individuals' indifference between pairs of alternatives. In contrast to earlier work, which depends on the strong-preference assumption, we suggest that the problem is most acute for small committee decision making and least acute for mass elections with few alternatives.


2020 ◽  
pp. 57-76
Author(s):  
William MacAskill ◽  
Krister Bykvist ◽  
Toby Ord

We introduce and discuss the problems of intertheoretic incomparability and merely ordinal theories. We then introduce the analogy between decision-making under moral uncertainty and social choice, and explain how this analogy can help us to overcome these problems. The rest of the chapter is spent fleshing out how this idea can help us to develop a theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty that is applicable even when all theories under consideration are merely ordinal, and even when there is neither level-nor unit- comparability between those theories. We consider whether My Favourite Theory or My Favourite Option might be the right theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty in conditions of merely ordinal theories and incomparability, but reject both of these accounts. We defend the idea that, when maximizing choice worthiness is not possible, one should use the Borda Rule instead.


Author(s):  
Nikos Karanikolas ◽  
Pierre Bisquert ◽  
Patrice Buche ◽  
Christos Kaklamanis ◽  
Rallou Thomopoulos

In the current article, the authors describe an applied procedure to support collective decision making for applications in agriculture. An extended 2-page abstract of this paper has been accepted by the EFITA WCCA congress and this manuscript is an extended version of this submission. The problem the authors are facing in this paper is how to reach the best decision regarding issues coming from agricultural engineering with the aid of Computational Social Choice (CSC) and Argumentation Framework (AF). In the literature of decision-making, several approaches from the domains of CSC and AF have been used autonomously to support decisions. It is our belief that with the combination of these two fields the authors can propose socially fair decisions which take into account both (1) the involved agents' preferences and (2) the justifications behind these preferences. Therefore, this article implements a software tool for decision-making which is composed of two main systems, i.e., the social choice system and the deliberation system. In this article, the authors describe thoroughly the social choice system of our tool and how it can be applied to different alternatives on the valorization of materials coming from agriculture. As an example, that is demonstrated an application of our tool in the context of Ecobiocap European project where several decision problems are to be addressed. These decision problems consist in finding the best solutions for questions regarding food packaging and end-of-life management.


Author(s):  
Jack Knight ◽  
James Johnson

This chapter examines three ways that political argument can affect democratic decision making and, thus, significantly mitigate the force of the social choice challenge. By engaging in political argument, relevant agents can settle the dimensions that, in any instance, structure their disagreements. This causal effect not only dampens the prospects that collective decision making will generate cyclical outcomes, it thereby reduces the opportunities for strategic manipulation that such instability presents. Once the analytical argument has established the possibility that voting, augmented by argument, could produce normatively legitimate decisions, the chapter considers two ways in which democratic argument can enhance the quality of such decisions: diversity and reflexivity.


1991 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-274
Author(s):  
Masudul A. Choudhury

In this paper, the decision-making character of shura, the consultativedemocratic concept in an Islamic social order, will be shown to clearly definethe determination of both state variables (socioeconomic variables) and policyvariables and the simulative interactions between them. These variables willthen be shown to configure the consumption, production, and distributionmenus in an Islamic political economy. They will thus be shown as clearlydefined variables that help to formulate the social choice, the social welfarefunction, and the institutional decision-making problems in an Islamic politicoeconomicorder.Shuratic Decision Making in the Perspective ofOrganizational TheoryThe Islamic shuratic (i.e., based on shura) decision-making process isthe centerpiece of organhtional behavior in Islamic institutions. The followingis a technical explanation of this process in light of modem organizationaltheory:’(a) Shura is structured into representative decision makers fromvarious walks of life (“sharees”).(b) “The abstract nature of each individual task” is carried outby ijtihad and the interpretations and implementation of theShari’ah (Islamic law) to various socioeconomic problems ...


1988 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. W. Kostal

The historiography of work-related accidents in nineteenth-century Ontario is a product of two complementary but as yet unsynthesized lines of inquiry. On the one hand, legal historians have focused on the genesis of judge-made and statutory law respecting the liability of employers for the work-related accidents of their hired labor. Considerable light has been shed on political and ideological as well as formally “legal” factors that shaped judicial and legislative decision making concerning personal injuries at work. However, the legal historiography of the Victorian Ontario workplace pertains mainly to the law and those who made the law, rather than those subject to it. These studies of the dynamics of legal change, important as they are, lack a firm basis in tangible sociohistorical experience.


2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 743-744
Author(s):  
Louise Barrett ◽  
Peter Henzi

Fast and frugal heuristics function accurately and swiftly over a wide range of decision making processes. The performance of these algorithms in the social domain would be an object for research. The use of simple algorithms to investigate social decision-making could prove fruitful in studies of nonhuman primates as well as humans


Author(s):  
Steven R. Brown

Q methodology was introduced in 1935 and has evolved to become the most elaborate philosophical, conceptual, and technical means for the systematic study of subjectivity across an increasing array of human activities, most recently including decision making. Subjectivity is an inescapable dimension of all decision making since we all have thoughts, perspectives, and preferences concerning the wide range of matters that come to our attention and that enter into consideration when choices have to be made among options, and Q methodology provides procedures and a rationale for clarifying and examining the various viewpoints at issue. The application of Q methodology commonly begins by accumulating the various comments in circulation concerning a topic and then reducing them to a smaller set for administration to select participants, who then typically rank the statements in the Q sample from agree to disagree in the form of a Q sort. Q sorts are then correlated and factor analyzed, giving rise to a typology of persons who have ordered the statements in similar ways. As an illustration, Q methodology was administered to a diverse set of stakeholders concerned with the problems associated with the conservation and control of large carnivores in the Northern Rockies. Participants nominated a variety of possible solutions that each person then Q sorted from those solutions judged most effective to those judged most ineffective, the factor analysis of which revealed four separate perspectives that are compared and contrasted. A second study demonstrates how Q methodology can be applied to the examination of single cases by focusing on two members of a group contemplating how they might alter the governing structures and culture of their organization. The results are used to illustrate the quantum character of subjective behavior as well as the laws of subjectivity. Discussion focuses on the broader role of decisions in the social order.


2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Mladenovic

Is there a sense in which society makes rational decision in a democratic way that is similar to individual rational decision-making? Social choice theory claims that rational social choice is not possible. Or, at least, that if possible, then the social choice must be dictatorial. I shall present a deliberative solution to the social choice problem. This solution is called deliberative, because it is based on the assumptions of deliberative democracy.


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