We accept many definitions for games, most not so grandiose as those of Napoleon treated by Byron. Often when I demonstrate the simulation of Anasazi settlement discussed in chapter 7 of this volume someone will say, "This is just a game isn't it?" I'm happy to admit that it is, so long as our definition of games encompasses child's play—which teaches about and prepares for reality—and not just those frivolous pastimes of adults, which release them from it. This volume is based on and made possible by recent developments in the field of agent-based simulation. More than some dry computer science technology or another corporate software gambit, this technology is in fact provoking great interest in the possibilities of simulating social, spatial, and evolutionary dynamics in human and primate societies in ways that have not previously been possible. What is agent-based modeling? Models of this sort are sometimes also called individual-oriented, or distributed artificial intelligence- based. Action in such models takes place through agents, which are processes, however simple, that collect information about their environment, make decisions about actions based on that information, and act (Doran et al. 1994:200). Artificial societies composed of interacting collections of such agents allow controlled experiments (of the sort impossible in traditional social research) on the effects of tuning one behavioral or environmental parameter at a time (Epstein and Axtell 1996:1-20). Research using these models emphasizes dynamics rather than equilibria, distributed processes rather than systems-level phenomena, and patterns of relationships among agents rather than relationships among variables. As a result visualization is an important part of analysis, affording these approaches a sometimes gamelike and often immediately engaging quality. OK, I admit it—they're fun. Despite our emphasis on agent-based modeling, we do not mean to imply that it should displace, or is always superior to, systems-level models based on, for example, differential equations. On the contrary: te Boekhorst and Hemelrijk nicely demonstrate how these approaches may be complementary. Even more strongly, we do not argue that these activities should become, ahead of empirical research, the principal tool of social science.