scholarly journals Differential Game Analysis of the Green Innovation Cooperation in Supply Chain under the Background of Dual-Driving

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Guiju Zhu ◽  
Jialing Li ◽  
Yi Zhang ◽  
Haiyun Liu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Dynamic Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Change ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
Innovation Cooperation ◽  
The Government

Taking government environmental regulation and consumer’s green preference into a unified analytical framework, this study constructed a differential game model. With the joint effect of supplier and manufacturer green innovation efforts on the dynamic change of the product’s green level, it compared and analyzed the long-term dynamic equilibrium strategies of green innovation cooperation in a supply chain under decentralized and centralized decision-making situations. Accordingly, a scientific and reasonable profit-distribution contract was then proposed. On this basis, it further carried out a numerical simulation analysis on the dual-driving effects of the government and market. The results showed that the scientific and reasonable profit-distribution contract under the centralized decision-making situation, which was designed by using the Rubinstein bargaining game model, could effectively ensure that the supply chain members’ sharing profits would realize "Dual Pareto Improvements." With the increase of the environmental regulation’s intensity, the product’s green level kept rising and tended to be stable. However, the overall equilibrium profit of the supply chain was characterized by "U" fluctuation, which first descended and then ascended. In addition, the product’s green level, the green innovation investment and equilibrium (distributed) profits of supply chain members, and the overall profits of supply chain all increased with the consumers’ green preference.

Study on the Allocation of Carbon Emissions Based on the Supply Chain Profit Distribution

2013 ◽  
Vol 712-715 ◽  
pp. 3067-3071
Author(s):  
Guo Jun Ji ◽  
Yang Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Quantitative Model ◽  
Distribution Model ◽  
Bilateral Negotiation ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
Core Issue ◽  
The Government

Control and allocation of carbon emissions for government has become an important way to reduce carbon emissions. How to allocate the carbon emissions reasonably and orderly is a core issue. Based on the supply chain profit distribution model, this paper by introducing the government how to allocate carbon emissions, a quantitative model of the carbon emissions allocation of government is built, and the carbon emissions of enterprises by the bilateral negotiation between government and enterprise are analyzed. Our conclusions provide the decision-making for the relevant departments to design the allocation of carbon emissions.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals Research on cooperation strategy between government and green supply chain based on differential game

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 828-855 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jingwei Zeng ◽  
Baizhou Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Bottom Line ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Cooperation Strategy ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Government Promotion

Abstract Based on the “three bottom line” and stakeholder theory, the paper considers the relationship and cooperation strategy between the government and the supplier and manufacturer of the green supply chain. By constructing the dynamic differential game model, the paper discusses the differences in the optimal effort level, green degree of product, reputation and the optimal benefit under the three situations of noncooperation, government promotion and collaborative cooperation. The results show that the optimal effort level, green degree of product, reputation and the optimal benefit in collaborative cooperation are obviously higher than the situations of non-cooperation and government promotion, and the cooperation of the three parties can promote the development of green supply chain. Government promotion is better than noncooperation. The government plays an active role in improving the optimal benefit and reputation of green supply chain. Finally, the reliability of the proposed proposition is verified by an example analysis, which provides an important reference for improving the efficiency of green supply chain.

scholarly journals Profit Distribution and Stability Analysis of Joint Distribution Alliance Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Under the Background of Green and Low-Carbon

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renbin Han ◽  
Mengke Yang
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Environmental Benefit ◽  
Logistics Industry ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
The Government

Abstract Joint distribution is an advanced logistics organization model for improving the quality and efficiency of express logistics industry and achieve high-quality development of logistics, but the distribution of common profit has always been a key obstacle to the effective development of joint distribution. Based on the background of green and low-carbon, this paper explores a fairer and more reasonable profit distribution scheme. The profit game between the government and the two types of member enterprises is analyzed. By focusing on how the government plays a role in inducing the joint distribution alliance to bring the green and low-carbon requirements into the profit distribution, the strategy evolution process of the three parties, the factors affecting the profit distribution and the stability of alliance are discussed through the establishment of "government-member enterprise A-member enterprise B" tripartite evolutionary game model. Finally, the evolutionary game model is numerically simulated based on system dynamics. It is found that: (1) It is necessary for the government to guide and motivate the alliance to create internal incentives and constraints. The effect of government subsidies and rewards to member enterprises is greater than the penalties for member enterprises. (2) The member enterprises are likely to conspire together to defraud government subsidies and rewards, carry out "free riding" and other speculative activities, which makes it necessary for the government and the alliance to establish supervision mechanism, information disclosure mechanism, and property rights protection system. (3) The willingness of member enterprise to positively cooperate will increase with the increase of the additional benefit coefficient, the proportion of profit distribution and the importance of environmental benefit factor; and will decrease with the increase of the cost of promoting green distribution operations.

Model of Collaborative Knowledge Innovation with Distributor Participation in Supply Chain

2011 ◽  
Vol 201-203 ◽  
pp. 773-778 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xu Mei Zhang ◽  
Na Li Shen ◽  
Xiao Ping Mao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Boundary Condition ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Innovation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Knowledge Innovation ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Selection For ◽  
Collaborative Knowledge

Considering the influence of distributor participation, collaborative knowledge innovation is studied by building the game model from the decision-making viewpoint of manufacturer. Changes of market demand due to the collaborative innovation and the behaviors of participators are also analyzed. The results show that distributor participation can spur manufacturer to increase product innovation investment and be available to realize the higher level of innovation, and that the degree of distributor participation is not only affected by its own cost of the collaborative innovation, but also the investment of manufacturer. Furthermore, the research gets the boundary condition of different decision selection for manufacturer and its distributor.

scholarly journals Differential game model and Coordination model for green supply chain based on green technology research and development

Heliyon ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. e07811
Author(s):  
A.K.M. Mohsin ◽  
Sayed Far Abid Hossain ◽  
Hasanuzzaman Tushar ◽  
Mohammed Masum Iqbal ◽  
Alamgir Hossain
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Research And Development ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Technology Research ◽  
Coordination Model
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