Game Behavior Analysis of Social Proportion on Low Carbon Energy Technology Innovation Risk
With the prominence of energy crisis and environmental pollution problem, low carbon energy technology innovation is becoming the key of global economy sustainable development. But, for the particularity of technology, the low carbon energy technology innovation has enormous risk. Therefore proportion of low carbon energy technology innovation risk through social channels slowly becomes the crux to promoting the development of low carbon energy technology innovation. As the core subjects in risk proportion of technological innovation, enterprises and social risk-sharing organizations all start to select and adjust their strategy in exploration and trial and error and to seek equilibrium point of interest, thus form a dynamic game process. In this paper, the premise of bounded rationality assumptions of evolutionary game theory has been used as an analytical tool to construct evolutionary game model of social proportion of technological innovation risk, and thus to the stability analysis for both the main strategy of evolution. Results of the evolutionary game analysis show that the participation of a third promoting force play a decisive role in the operation and development of social proportion system of technological innovation risk, thus this paper raised conceptions and recommendations for the government that they should take part in the risk prevention system of low carbon energy technology innovation as a conductor and coordinator.