Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Government Supervision and Private Sector Ecological Technology Innovation Behavior for Water Environment Treatment PPP Projects on the basis of Public Participation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huimin Li ◽  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Lelin Lv ◽  
Qing Xia ◽  
Lunyan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Water Environment ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government ◽  
Innovation Behavior

Ecological technology innovation with environmental benefits as the core has become an inevitable choice for water environment treatment PPP projects (WETP-PPP), and government supervision and public participation are essential driving factors for eco-technological innovation. To explore the influence of the public participation on the behavior of government and private sector in the WETP-PPP, this study constructed an asymmetric evolutionary game model of government supervision and private sector ecological technology innovation behavior under public participation. The main contribution of this study is to explore the mutual evolutionary regularity of the private sector and government supervision department and the influence of public participation level on public and private behavior in different scenarios. The results showed that the government can reduce the supervision cost by increasing the public's active participation and improving environmental regulation measures to achieve a win-win situation of economic and environmental performance.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Supervision Behavior for Public-Private Partnership Projects with Public Participation

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Congdong Li ◽  
Xiaoli Li ◽  
Yu Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
The Public ◽  
Private Behavior ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Participation Level ◽  
The Government

The public can directly or indirectly participate in the PPP (public-private partnership) projects and then has an impact on the project profit and public or private behavior. To explore the influence of the public participation of the PPP projects supervision behavior, this paper analyzes the mutual evolutionary regularity of the private sector and government supervision department and the influence of public participation level on public and private behavior based on evolutionary game theory. The results show that the supervision strategy is not chosen when the supervision cost of government supervision department is greater than the supervision benefit; it can make private sector consciously provide the high-quality public products/services with the improvement of public participation level. Therefore, the government should reduce the cost of public participation and improve the public participation level and influence through the application of the Internet, big data, and other advanced technologies, in order to restrain the behavior of the private sector and improve the supervision efficiency.

scholarly journals The Relationship among Government, Enterprise, and Public in Environmental Governance from the Perspective of Multi-Player Evolutionary Game

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (18) ◽  
pp. 3351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yingxin Chen ◽  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Pandu R. Tadikamalla ◽  
Xutong Gao
Keyword(s):  
Public Participation ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Industrial Wastes ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Research Results ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government ◽  
Positive Effect

Environmental governance is an important component of the national governance system. China’s current environmental problems are particularly complex. How to let the government, enterprises, and the public participate in environmental governance is the key to enhance the ability of environmental governance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the interaction and influencing factors among enterprise pollution control, government supervision, and public participation are analyzed, and the empirical analysis is carried out based on China’s 30 provincial panel data from 2009 to 2018. The research results show that government supervision has a positive effect on the environmental governance and can urge enterprises to actively perform pollution control. The effect of government supervision is constrained by the income and cost of enterprises, and the penalties for passive pollution control should be raised. At the same time, improving the government’s reputation loss can effectively stimulate the government’s environmental supervision behavior. Public participation significantly promotes the governance effect of three industrial wastes, and the enthusiasm of public participation is closely related to participation cost and psychological benefits. Public participation can replace government supervision to a certain extent. The interaction between government and public has a positive effect on environmental governance. The research results will help to build an effective environmental governance system and improve environmental governance performance and public satisfaction.

scholarly journals Green Finance: Fostering Sustainable Development in India

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 3798-3801
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Green Infrastructure ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Financial Flows ◽  
The Public ◽  
Green Finance ◽  
The Government ◽  
Public And Private Sector

Green finance plays a pivotal role in achieving inclusive, resilient and cleaner economic growth by creating environmental benefits. It helps in increasing the flow of finance from the public, private and nonprofit sectors to sustainable development priorities. Recognising the significance of green finance, UN Environment has been working in the alignment of the financial system of the countries to channelize the financial flows for attaining 2030 sustainable development goals. To build economic development in a sustainable manner, India also needs a national green finance strategy. It requires green infrastructure funding of about $4.5 trillion by 2040. The contribution made by both public and private sector organisations/banks will play a crucial role in green financing. The present study therefore mainly explores the various green financing initiatives taken by the public and private sector organisations/banks in India. The study showcases the various challenges in the area of green financing in India and also recommends measures to face those challenges. The study is descriptive in nature and is based on secondary data taken from various government reports published by the Government of India and other published reports of public and private sector organisations and banks in India.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

Public-Private-Academic Cooperation as a Trust Building Mechanism

2016 ◽  
pp. 199-223
Author(s):  
Nicholas Virzi ◽  
Juan Portillo ◽  
Mariela Aguirre
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Trust Building ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
National Competitiveness ◽  
Working Together ◽  
The Government ◽  
Innovation And Entrepreneurship

The chapter will be a case study from an Ordoliberal perspective of the conception, implementation and policy output of the newly created Private Council of Competitiveness (PCC) in Guatemala, a country wracked by mistrust of the public sector by the private sector. The PCC was founded as a private sector initiative, in conjunction with academia, to work with the government to spawn new efforts aimed at augmenting Guatemala's national competitiveness, by fomenting innovation, entrepreneurship and closer ties between academia and the public and private sectors. The chapter utilizes first hand interviews with the members of the PCC and key public sector players, academics, and other top representatives from the private sector to show how working together built the trust necessary to make the PCC a successful working body with the potential to produce important initiatives in matters of competitiveness, innovation and entrepreneurship.

scholarly journals The Loss of Object Promised in Built Operate Transfer Scheme

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 12094-12097
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Infrastructure Development ◽  
Transfer Scheme ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Points Of Interest ◽  
The Government ◽  
Business Entities

Infrastructure development requires relatively large funds. The limited funding owned by the government encourages the government to cooperate with the private sector. The collaboration scheme is known as the collaboration of business entities (PPPs) or built operate transfer (BOT) schemes both concerning public and private law. Existing regulations encourage renegotiation as an effort to find points of interest for the parties.

scholarly journals What are the Crisis and Issues of Governance in Pakistan? An Analysis

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-59
Author(s):  
Malik M. Hafeez ◽  
Rais Nouman Ahmed ◽  
Muhammad Danyal Khan ◽  
Muhammad Asif Safdar
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Social Services ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Policy Decision ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Government ◽  
Public And Private Sector ◽  
Administrative Structures

Governance is quite distinguishable from the government that deals with executive, its mode of appointment or election, state institutions and their functioning powers that are documented in constitution and laws there under while governance deals with policy, decision-making and government's effectiveness. Government has constitutional and legal duties and limitations in dealing with civil society, media, press and private sector. Government owes responsibility of the development of undeveloped areas and facilitates the residents to have equal opportunity, rule of law, standardized education and health services, employment opportunities, maintain security, law and order of the country. Whereas, governance deals with principles of solutions to the problems of the public and private sector. Good governance ensures socio-economic stability, rule of law, meritocracy and welfare of citizens through social services and developments.  Both government and governance work together to deal with political and administrative structures as well as establishment of cooperative network and connection between the different sectors of the state to resolve the shared public disorders, complications and problems however, good governance is the prerequisite for administrative, political, socio-economies solutions and human development. This paper will explore the elements of good governance and identify the issues of governance in Pakistan with conclusion of proposed solutions.

scholarly journals The Impact of Privatization of IDBI Bank in Indian Economy

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (12) ◽  
pp. 59-63
Author(s):  
Vishal Kumar ◽  
Soumak Ganguly ◽  
Payal Ghosh ◽  
Manisha Pal
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Government Control ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government ◽  
Public And Private Sector ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Share Value

Privatization refers to the public shares and Assets which are sold to the private sector in the economy. It decreases the power of government control and creates the other policies method. Privatization leads to cutting short the capital and revenue expenditure, which leads to an increase in share value in the market. During the pre-privatization period, the government used to pay less amounts of dividends to its shareholders due to its complex cost structure. Privatization leads to cutting short the capital and revenue expenditure, which leads to an increase in share value in the market. It also gave information about Public and Private sector banks. Our objective is to compare the pre and post-privatization performance like other banks of developing countries shows that privatization resulted in significant gains in profitability and efficiency. To evaluate the impact of privatization in the Indian banking sector and the relationship between privatization and Indian Economic growth by using a case study of IDBI bank condition of Indian private sector banks is analyzed using the financial statement of IDBI Bank with the help of different research methodologies.

scholarly journals Behavioral Analysis of Subjects for Green Technology Innovation: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Yongquan Guo ◽  
Hua Zou ◽  
Zhu Liu
Keyword(s):  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Strategic Choice ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Simulation Software ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Green Technologies ◽  
Technology Application ◽  
Technology Applications ◽  
The Government

The application of green technologies can reduce environmental hazards and promote sustainability. The connotation of green technology innovation has two main aspects: the first aspect is the generation of green technology from nothing to something, and the other aspect is the improvement and upgrading of existing green technology; these two aspects are related. However, from the existing research, there are relatively few studies on the process of green technology innovation from these two aspects at the same time. If green technology is not studied from this perspective, the evolutionary process and influencing factors of green technology from generation to development cannot be clarified, which is not conducive to the development of green technology and the realization of the goal of environmental friendliness. Research considers the green innovation process from R&D to upgrading linkages and analyses the roles of government departments, green technology R&D institutions, and green technology application enterprises in green technology innovation. In addition, the green technology application enterprises are considered to promote technology enhancement through technology application feedback with green technology R&D institutions. The evolutionary game model of three subjects was established, the strategic evolution process of different subjects was analyzed, the influence of each element on the strategic choice of different subjects was explored, and the stability analysis of strategic choice was conducted using simulation software. The study shows the following: (1) The greater the government’s punishment and support to green technology R&D institutions, the more favorable it is for green technology R&D institutions to carry out green technology R&D. (2) In green technology applications, if the government has no direct interest relationship with green technology application enterprises, the enterprises will choose negative response behavior. (3) The greater the technology enhancement gains of green technology R&D institutions and the greater the feedback gains of technology applications actively carried out by enterprises in response to the government’s call, the more the government departments tend to support green technology R&D.

scholarly journals Government Supervision Mode Selection in the Promotion Period of Prefabricated Construction Using Evolutionary Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Shuwei Jing ◽  
Zhuangyi Zhang ◽  
Junai Yan
Keyword(s):  
Behavior Pattern ◽  
Mode Selection ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Practical Case ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Supervision Mode ◽  
Minimum Probability ◽  
The Government ◽  
Speculative Behavior

Aiming at the speculative behavior of some developers who seek private interests in the promotion period of prefabricated construction, this research combines the actual situation, objectively and reasonably determines the parameters in the model, and builds an evolutionary game model to study the choice of government supervision mode in different situations, from the perspective of government supervision. The results showed that the choice of government supervision mode has great connection with the probability of identifying developers’ speculative behavior when the government adopts node supervision. When the probability is greater than the developers’ speculative value, the government will choose node supervision, while the developers will not adopt speculative behavior. Conversely, there will be a periodic behavior pattern in the evolutionary system, and the choice of government supervision mode is related to the value of each parameter. At the same time, the minimum probability of identifying speculative behavior that keeps the optimal situation stable is obtained. On this basis, the paper takes a practical case to discuss the influence of different parameter variations on the choice of government supervision mode and makes numerical simulations; then it puts forward some specific suggestions for government to restrain the speculative behavior of developer.

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