scholarly journals Il dolore e la sofferenza umana alla luce della ragione e della fede cristiana

2012 ◽  
Vol 61 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Evandro Agazzi

Il dolore e la sofferenza sono realtà negative la cui evidenza non può essere dissolta da sottili disquisizioni filosofiche. L’essere umano cerca di “dare una ragione e un senso” alla realtà che lo circonda, ma non riesce a farlo per la zona della realtà costituita dal male (ossia non trova una risposta razionale alla domanda “perché il male?”). Nell’ambito puramente “mondano” il male rimane un enigma, ma diventa un autentico problema quando si ammetta l’esistenza di Dio: “problema del male” e “problema di Dio” si condizionano mutuamente. “Se Dio esiste, da dove viene il male?” Non può venire da lui (tutto ciò che esiste è di per sé buono), ma è solo prodotto dal cattivo uso che l’uomo fa del suo libero arbitrio (male “morale”) e Dio “tollera” questo male perché rispetta il libero arbitrio umano. Dolore e sofferenza (male detto talora “fisico”) sono conseguenza (come espiazione) del male morale e Dio, pur essendo infinitamente buono e onnipotente, non li elimina perché è anche sommamente giusto. Questa la risposta più classica della teodicea. Essa tuttavia non spiega per davvero il dolore dell’innocente. In conclusione, il male rimane sostanzialmente inintelligibile utilizzando le categorie della razionalità umana e l’unica risorsa per una filosofia davvero razionalista (ossia che ritiene che una ragione deve esserci per ogni aspetto della realtà), è quella di ammettere che tale “ragione” supera le limitatezze della ragione umana e con ciò si apre verso l’accettazione della razionalità divina. La tesi che dolore e sofferenza umana sono espiazione del male morale è esplicitamente respinta da Gesú nel Vangelo ed egli ha compiuto molte opere miracolose per alleviare questi mali. D’altro canto ha liberamente accettato per se stesso il dolore, la sofferenza e la morte, mostrando così concretamente che anche Dio può soffrire, ma la sua resurrezione mostra nello stesso tempo l’onnipotenza di Dio, offrendo una risposta non concettuale, ma concreta alla compatibilità di dolore e onnipotenza divina. L’uomo è così invitato a combattere assieme a Dio dolore e sofferenza mediante opere effettive, e nello stesso tempo a dare un senso escatologico al dolore e al male presente nel mondo fondandosi sulla bontà e onnipotenza di Dio. Gesù ha anche rotto la spontanea convinzione che il male compiuto debba essere espiato infliggendo altro male (la pena) a chi lo commette. Due mali non si compensano, bensì si sommano. La compensazione del male consiste nel perdono, che ne spezza la spirale esterna, mentre il pentimento ripara la ferita interna che la colpa infligge all’animo di colui che la commette. Tutto ciò rientra nella nuova visione dei rapporti che debbono legare gli uomini fra di loro e con Dio, ossia la prospettiva dell’amore, anche se rimane pur sempre misterioso per la ragione umana perché l’amore debba passare attraverso il dolore come sua prova. ---------- Pain and suffering are negative realities whose evidence cannot be dissolved by subtle philosophical arguments. The human being tries to “find a reason and a sense” for the whole of reality surrounding him, but is unable to do this for that portion of reality constituted by evil (i.e. he cannot answer the question, “why evil?”). On the purely mundane plane evil remains an enigma but becomes a real problem when the existence of God is admitted: “problem of evil” and “problem of God” are mutually interrelated. If God exists “from where does evil come?” It cannot come from God (everything that exists is good in itself) but is produced by man when he makes bad use of his free will (moral evil) and God “tolerates” this evil because he respects human free will. Pain and suffering (often called “physical evil”) are the consequence of moral evil (are its expiation) and God, though being infinitely good and omnipotent, does not eliminate them because he is at the same time infinitely just. This is the most classical answer of theodicy. It does not really explain, however, the suffering of the innocent. In conclusion, evil remains essentially unintelligible by using the categories of human reason, and the only way out for a genuinely rationalist philosophy (i.e. a philosophy according to which there is a reason for whatever exists) is that of admitting that such a “reason” oversteps the limits of human rationality and in such a way opens itself to the admission af a divine rationality. The claim that pain and suffering are the expiation of moral evil is explicitly rejected by Jesus in the Gospel, and he has accomplished several miraculous works in order to diminish their impact. On the other hand, he has freely accepted pain, suffering and even death for himself, concretely showing in such a way that God himself can suffer, but his resurrection shows at the same time the omnipotence of God, thereby offering not a conceptual but a concrete answer to the question of the compatibility of pain with divine omnipotence. Hence man is invited to fight with God against pain and suffering by dong good works and at the same time to give a positive eschatological sense to the pain and evil that are present in the world, relying on God’s goodness and omnipotence. Jesus has also broken the spontaneous conviction that the evil committed must be compensated by another evil (the punishment) inflicted on the person who has committed it. Two evils do not compensate each other, but they sum up. The compensation of evil consists in forgiveness, that breaks the external spiral of evil, while repentance heals the internal wound that the wrong action produces in the soul of the person committing it. All this is part of the new perspective regarding the relations that humans must entertain among themselves and with God, that is, the perspective of love, though it still remains mysterious for human reason why love should pass through pain as its test.

2020 ◽  
Vol IV (4) ◽  
pp. 15-34
Author(s):  
Igor Gasparov

The article considers contemporary free will defences, proposed by A. Plantinga, R. Swinburne, according to which the existence of a world in which there is free will is something more valuable than the existence of a world in which there is no free will. It is shown that contemporary forms of free will defences share with atheistic arguments from evil an anthropomorphic model of God, in which God is thought as an individual among other individuals, although endowed with attributes such as omniscience and omnipotence to an excellent degree. It has also been shown that another important point of similarity between contemporary free will defences and atheistic arguments from evil is that both attempt to assess what our world would be like if created by such an individual. In contrast to atheistic arguments from evil, contemporary free will defences argue that divine omnipotence and omniscience are subject to some greater restrictions, as usually assumed, especially due to God's desire to give some of his creations the ability of free choice, which logically implies the possibility and even necessity of the existence of evil. It is demonstrated that classical theism does not share the anthropomorphic model of deity typical for many contemporary philosophers of religion. Classical theism rejects both the anthropomorphic model of deity and the unaccountability of free will to God as the supreme good. On the contrary, it assumes that free decision was initially an opportunity for the voluntary consent of man which had an innate aspiration towards God as his supreme good. Nevertheless, due to the creation of man out of nothing, this consent could not be automatic but implied forming a virtuous character, and man's transition from a state in which he was able not to sin, to a state in which he would be not able to sin.


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 658-672
Author(s):  
Pavel L. Likhter

The research is devoted to topical issues of law in the field of neuromarketing. The transition from commodity economy to economy of impressions is largely due to application of modern methods of monitoring brain functioning in order to increase efficiency of production and trading strategies. Due to the potential ability to influence the decision-making process of clients, neuromarketing attracts mixed opinions from lawyers and psychologists. The current legislation does not provide an appropriate level of regulation of neuroscience and their results in the market. At the same time, the precontractual impact on the consumer may contain signs of distorting the principles of freedom of contract, good faith, and reasonableness. The article proposes to consider the rational behavior of an individual - one of the main presumptions of civil law - from a new perspective, given the current results of neuropsychological research and ethical and legal aspects of social relations. The results of the work allow to speak about fundamental possibility of limiting the dynamic form of free will in a contractual obligation (up to the refusal of a transaction) if there are conditions related both directly to the psychophysiological characteristics of the counterparty and the pe-culiarities of neuromarketing effects under a specific contract. The relevance of hierarchical concepts of autonomy of will is noted; these are the situations when an individual choice is subject to legal protection, if it reflects a genuine will, consistent with the essential goals and values of the person. The absence of defects in awareness and voluntariness in such cases is a key aspect of principles of freedom of contract and reasonableness associated with a conscious decision when entering an obligation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-330
Author(s):  
SARAH MORTIMER

AbstractThe debate over counsels of perfection was a crucial aspect of the formation of political and ethical thought in the sixteenth century. It led both Protestants and Catholics to consider the status of law and to consider how far it obliged human beings, rather than simply permitting particular actions. From Luther onwards, Protestants came to see God's standards for human beings in absolute terms, rejecting any suggestion that there were good works which were merely counselled rather than commanded, and therefore not obligatory. This view of ethics underpinned the Protestant theological critique of Catholic doctrines of merit but it also shaped the distinctively Protestant account of natural law. It enabled Luther and his allies to defend magisterial control over the church, and it also formed a crucial element of Protestant resistance theory. By examining the Lutheran position on counsels, expressed in theological and political writings, and comparing it with contemporary Catholic accounts, this article offers a new perspective on Reformation theology and political thought.


1990 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Talbott

According to some theists, God will never completely destroy moral evil or banish it from his creation entirely; instead, he will eventually confine moral evil to a specific region of his creation, a region known as hell, and those condemned to hell, having no hope of escape from it, will live out eternity in a state of estrangement from God as well as from each other. Let us call that the traditional doctrine of hell. Elsewhere I have argued that any form of theism which includes such a doctrine, even one that tries to preserve consistency by denying the universal love of God, is in fact logically inconsistent. But moderately conservative theists, as I have called them, have an argument for the traditional doctrine that some have found convincing, one that emphasizes libertarian free will. The argument is this. Because God is perfectly loving, he wills the good for every created person and wills the redemption of all who have fallen into evil; but because he has also given his loved ones the gift of freedom and some of them in fact exercise their freedom to reject him forever, it is simply not within his power, even as an omnipotent being, to redeem all of those who fall into evil. According to moderately conservative theists, therefore, the following hypothesis, which I shall call the Rejection Hypothesis (RH), is at least possibly true:(RH) Some persons will, despite God's best efforts to save them, freely and irrevocably reject God and thus separate themselves from God forever.


2003 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS

This paper argues that if creatures are to have significant free will, then God's essential omni-benevolence and essential omnipotence cannot logically preclude Him from creating a world containing a moral evil. The paper maintains that this traditional conclusion does not need to rest on reliance on subjunctive conditionals of free will. It can be grounded in several independent ways based on premises that many will accept.


2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Boyce ◽  

2011 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 505-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Shabo

Many believe that we are not morally responsible for what we cannot help doing. Call this ‘the Traditional View of Responsible Agency.’ Some forty years ago, Harry Frankfurt (1969) challenged this view, thereby initiating a new stage of the free-will debate. In contrast to the previous stage, in which debate centered on how best to accommodate the Traditional View, contemporary theorists have focused on whether this view should be accepted at all. If the link between moral responsibility and avoidability is severed, an important threat to compatibilism is neutralized.In the wake of Frankfurt's challenge, a tremendous literature has sprung up, with many ingenious responses matched by equally thoughtful extensions of Frankfurt's original argument. Quite recently, an altogether new line of response has been proposed. This new approach, versions of which have been advanced by Maria Alvarez (2009) and Helen Steward (2009), attempts to support the Traditional View indirectly, by appealing to the conditions for action, rather than to the conditions for moral responsibility per se.


1982 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank B. Dilley
Keyword(s):  

Recently Steven E. Boër gave another turn to the discussion of the free will defence by claiming that the free will defence is irrelevant to the justification of moral evil. Conceding that free will may be of real value, Boër claims that free will could have been allowed creatures without that leading to any moral evil at all. What I shall hereafter refer to as the ‘Boër reform’ is the suggestion that God could have allowed creatures to exercise free choices but have intervened with ‘coincidence miracles’ to prevent all the intended evil from actually occurring. What is important to the free will defence, according to Boër, is the ability to choose freely and not the ability to succeed in effecting what we have intended to accomplish. It is no intrusion on the freedom of our wills for God to prevent us from accomplishing what we tried to do with our free wills as long as we were free to try.


Perichoresis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 81-95
Author(s):  
Esperança Valls-Pujol

AbstractThis paper examines the astrological and religious thinking of Moshe ben Nahman (also known as Ramban or Nahmanides) and the intellectual connections in this field with two of the most outstanding Christian thinkers of his time, Ramon Llull and Arnau de Vilanova. Nahmanides, like many medieval scholars, admitted an astral influence, but he did not accept astrology as a divinatory science. He incorporated astrological doctrines in his exegetical works, assuming that Israel is not determined by any star because it only responds to God. Yet the study of medieval medicine and its application cannot be separated from astrology practice because it was considered that the stars had a direct influence not only on the development of the human body, from birth to death, but also in the disease processes which affect it. Ramban and his disciple Solomon ben Adret accepted and practiced astrological medicine. Llull and de Vilanova also devoted themselves to this discipline. All of them agree on the influence of the stars on humankind but condemned astral magic. Like Ramban, Llull rejects other astrological methods considered non-scientific in his time, such as prediction through horoscope. Thus, these thinkers tried to develop an astrology that was not in contradiction with divine omnipotence or free will.


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