Research on Social Capital Selection of Public-Private-Partnership Project

Ukraine has geographical conditions for development of different industries affected by natural and climatic factors. It is necessary to optimize the mechanisms of risk insurance. Modifications of the risk insurance, ways to improve its effectiveness are outlined. Selection of a multi-risk solution for the insurer for strategic findings of it as a player is appropriate based on business environment or the nature of the business of the insurers. Algorithms for minimizing uncertainty in relation to the national economy as a whole, based on risk matrices, with zones 0 and FGK algorithms are determined. Insurance mechanisms with elements of game theory are formed. The optimization measures allow concluding hybrid multi-risk contracts and formation of a model of public-private partnership with state support.

Download Full-text

KEMISKINAN PADA MASYARAKAT NELAYAN DI CILINCING

The Indonesian Journal of Public Administration (IJPA) ◽

10.52447/ijpa.v2i1.433 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 3 (2) ◽

pp. 59-68

Author(s):

Sidi Rana Menggala

Keyword(s):

Social Capital ◽

Social Policy ◽

Political Parties ◽

Public Participation ◽

Organic Farming ◽

Policy Formulation ◽

Public Private Partnership ◽

Sustainable Farming ◽

Private Partnership

ABSTRACT The concept of community is a network, which not only consists of NGOs, but also whole elements of public private partnership, political parties, and other social volunteers. This network works hand by hand to set and enhance a partnership and public participation towards pro-social policy formulation. Social capital is strengthened by moral supports from public elements (governance actors) which aims to attain social developments, one of them is a concept of Sustainable Farming, which is Organic Farming. Keywords: Social Capital, Sustainable Farming ABSTRAK Konsep masyarakat merupakan sebuah jejaring (network) yang tidak hanya terdiri LSM, namun melibatkan segenap elemen dari pemerintah, perusahaan, partai politik hingga relewan-relawan pekerja sosial. Jejaring ini bergerak secara bersamaan dan berupaya menerapkan melalui proses keterlibatan dan partisipasi penduduk hingga akhirnya melahirkan kebijakan-kebijakan yang ro-sosial. Kapital sosial diperkuat dukungan moral dari segenap elemen penduduk dengan tujuan pembangunan sosial. Salah satu wujudnya adalah melalui konsep Pertanian Berkelanjutan, yakni pertanian organik. Kata-Kata Kunci: Kapital Sosial, Pertanian Berkelanjutan

Download Full-text

Causal relationships of moral hazard and adverse selection of Ghanaian Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) construction projects

Journal of Engineering Design and Technology ◽

10.1108/jedt-12-2017-0137 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 16 (3) ◽

pp. 439-460 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

De-Graft Owusu-Manu ◽

A.S. Kukah ◽

David John Edwards ◽

Erika Anneli Pärn ◽

Hatem El-Gohary ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Moral Hazard ◽

Adverse Selection ◽

Construction Projects ◽

Public Private Partnership ◽

Likelihood Method ◽

Parameter Estimates ◽

Causal Relationships ◽

Private Partnership ◽

Content Type ◽

Selection Of

PurposeThe purpose of this paper was to assess the causal relationship(s) between moral hazard and adverse selection of public–private partnership (PPP) construction projects. Structural equation modelling (SEM) was used to explore the cause and effect relationship between moral hazard and adverse selection problems in PPP construction projects in Ghana. The study produced a framework to predict, estimate and depict the complex causal relationships (i.e. the directionality) between moral hazard and adverse selection.Design/methodology/approachTo test the proposed framework, a quantitative methodology was used, in which, data were collected using research questionnaires that targeted a sample of 280 PPP stakeholders in Ghana. In total, 210 useable questionnaires were retrieved, representing a response rate of 75 per cent.FindingsThe interrelationships between the eight causes and the nine effects of moral hazard and adverse selection were established using the model. The tested framework showed the degree of association and isolation of the unobserved variables on the indicator factors. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to evaluate the fit of items to latent constructs. Because the fit of each model was good and the item loadings were adequate, it was assumed that the indicators of the different variables factors were fitting. Furthermore, a diagnostic fit analysis was conducted using the robust maximum likelihood method to test the statistical significance of the parameter estimates.Practical implicationsThis novel research is one of the few studies investigating the causal relationships between moral hazard and adverse selection of PPP construction projects. The research concluded with future studies that seek to validate the model developed in other countries and/or other industries.Originality/valueThe research findings will serve as a guide for construction stakeholders in the PPP sector on the causes and effects of adverse selection and moral hazard and how to mitigate these.

Download Full-text

An Ordinal Game Theory Approach to the Analysis and Selection of Partners in Public–Private Partnership Projects

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications ◽

10.1007/s10957-015-0844-3 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 169 (1) ◽

pp. 314-343 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

Jamal Ouenniche ◽

Aristotelis Boukouras ◽

Mohammad Rajabi

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Public Private Partnership ◽

Theory Approach ◽

Private Partnership ◽

Selection Of

Download Full-text

Risk Management in the Malaysian Build Operate Transfer Projects

iRASD Journal of Economics ◽

10.52131/joe.2021.0303.0051 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 3 (3) ◽

Author(s):

Usman Ahmad ◽

Kashif Akram ◽

Erum Fatima ◽

Muhammad Hussain

Keyword(s):

Risk Management ◽

Research Method ◽

Public Private Partnership ◽

Infrastructure Development ◽

Private Partnership ◽

Selection Of ◽

Extreme Risks

In Malaysia, Public Private Partnership (PPP) is one of the tools to develop infrastructure. Although, there are various forms of PPP projects but Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) is commonly used in infrastructural projects. Despite, the benefits of adopting PPP, there are a few issues that require focus of the practitioners and researchers such as; risk management in PPP projects. Therefore, this study describes the process of risk management in Malaysian BOT Projects as this PPP arrangement is applied in infrastructure development. The study has employed the exploratory sequential research method to achieve the objective. The results of the study concludes that most of the extreme risks are allocated to SPV thus selection of SPV is crucial for BOT projects.

Download Full-text

GVK–MIAL: Partner Selection for Public-Private Partnership

Asian Case Research Journal ◽

10.1142/s0218927519500184 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 23 (02) ◽

pp. 427-456

Author(s):

Sanjeev Ganguly ◽

Satyasiba Das

Keyword(s):

Partner Selection ◽

Public Private Partnership ◽

Early Years ◽

Private Partnership ◽

The Public ◽

Partnership Model ◽

Selection For ◽

The Government ◽

The Right ◽

Selection Of

The unprecedented growth of air traffic during the early years of industrial and economic reform in India led to the government’s decision to open Indian airspace to private and international operators. During this period, inadequate infrastructure and management’s inability to expand had created congestion in most of the airports. The urgent requirements for modernization and expansion with limited funds left the government in the dilemma of selecting the right kind of inter-organizational collaboration. After much deliberation and consideration, the government considered adopting the public-private partnership model. Without any prior experience and executional history, selection of partners was the key challenge before the government. The case summarizes one of the most significant public-private partnership projects in India and provides managerial insights into partner selection and execution challenges of large infrastructural projects typical to many developing countries.

Download Full-text

System Dynamics Analysis of Evolutionary Game Strategies between the Government and Investors Based on New Energy Power Construction Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Project

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su10072533 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 10 (7) ◽

pp. 2533 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

Lei Gao ◽

Zhen-Yu Zhao

Keyword(s):

Social Capital ◽

System Dynamics ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Public Private Partnership ◽

Behavioral Strategies ◽

Private Partnership ◽

System Evolution ◽

Power Construction ◽

New Energy ◽

The Government

The public-private-partnership (PPP) is a new mode for the government and social capital to jointly invest in public infrastructure projects. In particular, PPP projects for new energy power construction have been strongly supported in some countries in recent years, because it can not only reduce financial pressure on the government, but also promote the development of new energy. Current scholars study the economic benefits of PPP projects for new energy power construction from a macro perspective, and they rarely study behavioral strategies of the government and social capital as a game process of project construction from a micro perspective. This paper will fill this gap. This study firstly built an evolutionary game model of the government and investors based on new energy power construction PPP projects. Secondly, taking China’s typical new energy power construction PPP project–waste incineration power generation as an example, the system dynamics (SD) model was proposed to simulate the evolutionary process of game players’ behavioral strategies. Finally, the effects of key factors in the construction of PPP project on the strategies’ stability were studied. The results show that: (1) there is no evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the game system between the government and investors, and system evolution is characterized by periodic behavior. (2) When the government implements dynamic bounty measures, the system evolution process is still a closed loop with periodic motion. However, when the government implements dynamic punishment measures, there is a stable ESS in the hybrid strategy of the game system. (3) The government can increase unit fines when making dynamic strategic adjustments, which will not only promote the active cooperation of investors, but also reduce the probability of government supervision, thereby reducing costs.

Download Full-text