friend of partial endurance adds the claim that microphysical discoveries aside there is no reason to regard the spatial parts of persisting objects as perduring rather than enduring. In particular, arguments from intrinsic change provide no such reason. So he opts for partial endurance, not because our ordinary practice commits us to it, but because it is a metaphysical picture of persistence which we tend to favour, as is shown by the fact that if it was discovered that some objects perdured while others partially endured we would have some tendency to say that the real persisters were the partial endurers. I want to endorse and concentrate on the straightforward view. That view is attractively free of substantive physical and metaphysical commitments. For example, even if it turned out as a matter of physics that persisting objects were representable in a pure field theory, or that they flickered, or both, we could still make the distinction between changes that were substantial in F-important respects and those that were not and so have a basis for distinguishing cases where an F survives change from cases in which it does not. In eschewing substantive physical or metaphysical commitments the straightforward view provides a minimalist construal of the ordinary concept of persistence, i.e. a minimalist construal of the constraints we observe in reidentifying particulars through change. We simply take such reidentifications to be legitimate so long as the changes in question are not substantial in important respects, where this varies depending on the sort of particulars in question. So also our ordinary practice of reidentification has no explicit or implicit commitment to pure endurers, to bare particulars, to substrata, to fusions of space-time regions and properties or indeed to any metaphysical model of a persisting particular. It is this very minimalism of the straightforward view which makes it well suited to deal with the fundamental epistemological problem about persistence, namely the problem of what right we have to represent the world as made up of persisting objects as opposed to properties distributed over space-time. In broad terms the answer will be that in representing the world as made up of persisting objects there is less commitment to specific world hypotheses than various theorists of persistence might have thought. Our question is: By what right do we represent the world