scholarly journals Separation of powers according to the new amendments to the constitution of Georgia-problems and prospects

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-91
Author(s):  
George Goradze

The article looks at the last amendments to the Constitution of Georgia. By this amendments Georgia moves into parliamentary system. However, there are some questions: Does this system comply with European standards of parliamentary system? How will this system work in Georgia? Is a parliamentary system ideal model for Post-Soviet countries and particularly for Georgia? The article is divided into two parts: The first part looks at the new redaction of the Constitution of Georgia and the new system of governance which will be established by this constitutional changes. By analysis the author comes to the conclusion that new amendments to the constitution will serve as a guarantee of a long-standing stay in the government for the ruling political party; In the second part of the article the author discusses the negative aspects of a parliamentary system in general. Here main question is “how will the Parliament control the executive branch and its leader who is the head of the ruling party and the parliamentary majority, as well? It may be vice versa.” In the author’ opinion one of the ways for a parliamentary system is to elect a non-party president through a universal suffrage.

1969 ◽  
pp. 336
Author(s):  
Cheryl Saunders

The author considers whether the parliamentary system is an effective institution by examining its capacity to handle its five traditional functions. Those Junctions are: maintaining the government, passing laws, controlling government expenses, monitoring the government of the day, and setting long range policies. She concludes that parliaments are incapable of performing these functions on a consistent basis. This incapacity stems from a variety of factors including party discipline, the passive nature of members of parliament, and the fact that there is no separation of powers in the parliamentary system. To remedy these shortcomings she calls for changes which are aimed at giving parliament greater independence from the executive branch. She notes that these changes may require a radical departure from traditional political theory in countries that have adopted parliamentary systems. However, the parliamentary system has not changed in over 300 years. If it is to serve its citizens effectively in the future, perhaps a radical departure from tradition is required.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Sisay A. Temesgen

Abstract The Ethiopian Federal Democratic Republic (EFDR) Constitution is promulgated in 1994. Under Article (45) of the EFDR the country is restructured from presidential to parliamentary system of government. Since then, the country has been ravaged by the gross violation of the liberty of citizens and the crisis of national unity and consensus among the diversified ethnic groups. The impact of the parliamentary system in aggravating those critical challenges and the comparative advantage of presidantialism is the most ignored political research topic. In this Article, I investigated that the blurry separation of powers of the parliamentary structure of the country has created fusion of powers which has undermined the system of checks and balances. Thus, the executive organ of the government has enabled to concentrate unchecked and unaccountable power which has manifested in the gross violation of the liberty of citizens. Likewise, Article (73) of EFDR has declared that the prime minister and council of ministers of the country to be appointed by the legislators. This has deprived their boarder popular base and authenticity; and equivocally undermined their potency and decisiveness in addressing the existing crisis of national unity and consensus. Comparatively, the presidential structure of government is defined by the firm separation of powers and genuine system of checks and balances. The direct popular election of the president enables the president and council of ministers to secure broader popular base and authenticity. Thus, it is advantageous over parliamentarian structure in terms of protecting the liberty of citizens and addressing the crisis of national unity and consensus in Ethiopia.


1992 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Troper

It suffices to examine two of the most important texts which form the basis of France's constitutional system, the Declaration of Human Rights of 1789, and the Law of June 3, 1958, in order to become convinced that separation of powers is one of those immutable principles which imposes itself as self-evident on every liberal constituent body. Article 16 of the Declaration of 1789 proclaims that “any society in which the protection of rights is not ensured, nor the separation of powers established, has no constitution”. The constitutional Law of June 3, 1958, for its part, authorizes the government to establish a constitutional project, provided that five principles be respected; among these principles appears, immediately following the necessity of universal suffrage, the separation of powers.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahir Tokatlı

In this book, the author examines the development of the Turkish constitution since 1921 in terms of its horizontal separation of powers, and concludes that Turkey’s recent constitutional changes do not imply a presidential system at all. Contrary to the widespread assumption in journalism and academia, the governmental system has persisted in conforming to a parliamentary system. Using a reconceptualisation of the typology of systems of government, this thesis is reinforced and at the same time provides a further contribution to the field of comparative politics by affirming the benefits of the basic dichotomous typology, by elaborating a distinctive subtypification and by rejecting semi-presidentialism as an autonomous type.


Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1(64)) ◽  
pp. 37-58
Author(s):  
Łukasz Jakubiak

Elements of Presidentialism in the Constitutional System of France’s Fifth Republic The Fifth French Republic was created as a modified parliamentary system, but due to constitutional changes and tendencies revealed in political practice, the functioning system of government was quite significantly modified. The purpose of this article is to analyze the elements of the presidential system that were introduced in 1958, thus in the original text of the constitution, resulted from its subsequent amendments, or can only be seen in the practice of exercising power in the conditions of the politically homogenous executive branch, i.e. outside of cohabitation periods. The author draws attention to two different ways of defining the term “presidentialism” in the French context (as a formal constitutional structure or as a pro-presidential configuration of the semi-presidentialism of the Fifth Republic), and argues that the regime initiated in 1958 is still based on at least some pillars characterizing the parliamentary model. Hence, its subsequent modifications were only to highlight presidentialism as one of the possible variants of political practice under the Fifth Republic, and not to accept presidentialism as a constitutional system of government.


Author(s):  
Gillian E. Metzger

This chapter examines how political control over government is exercised today in the UK, the US, and France, focusing on control of the executive branch by the legislature and control of the administrative executive by the political executive. These three jurisdictions were chosen because they are paradigmatic examples of different political regimes: parliamentarism, separation of powers presidentialism, and semi-presidentialism. In theory, these different institutional structures should affect how political control is understood and wielded. In the traditional Westminster parliamentary model, for example, the government is formed from the leadership of the majority party in Parliament and it is the government that controls policy-making. By contrast, the traditional account of a separation of powers regime posits a separate legislature and executive as institutional rivals. Semi-presidential regimes combine a popularly elected presidential-type executive with a legislatively-dependent cabinet executive.


Subject Burundi constitutional reform Significance President Pierre Nkurunziza's third term has been marred by accusations of state-sponsored extrajudicial killings, a regional refugee crisis and international ostracism. Recently, he has launched a campaign to amend the constitution to allow him to run for the presidency again. The government has also hinted at other significant constitutional changes and restructurings of laws governing parties and politics. This would further contract Burundi’s democratic space, already in peril since a 2015 coup attempt and contested presidential election. Impacts Nkurunziza’s plans will face little opposition either from non-partisans within the ruling party or from the formal opposition. Despite deteriorating conditions, most international donors will provide only minimal levels of aid to meet basic needs. Without significant intervention, assassinations and disappearances linked to the regime will likely continue.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kamil Jonski

AbstractDue to its unique role in the separation of powers framework, judiciary is typically among the first targets of illiberal take-overs. The popular perception of the judicial system – translating into its legitimacy – might prove to be its ultimate safeguard or primary source of vulnerability. This paper employs cross-country survey data to uncover to what extent the idea of separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive is embedded in public perception. It analyses the data on trust in the judiciary (or the legal system) the Police and the national government. Assuming that separation of powers is well embedded in the public opinion, one could expect that courts and the police would be assessed separately (i.e., not highly correlated confidence levels). Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that confidence in the police and in the government – Montesquieu executive branch – would be higher than between the police and the judiciary. On the contrary, if respondents assessed institutional performance within functional clusters, courts and the police would be assessed jointly (i.e., highly correlated confidence levels). Evidence form WVS and European Social Survey suggests, that the latter is the case. Interestingly, the finding holds in both democratic and non-democratic systems, indicating serious vulnerability for liberal (constitutional democracy) design.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (10) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Emad Wakaa Ajil

Iraq is one of the most Arab countries where the system of government has undergone major political transformations and violent events since the emergence of the modern Iraqi state in 1921 and up to the present. It began with the monarchy and the transformation of the regime into the republican system in 1958. In the republican system, Continued until 2003, and after the US occupation of Iraq in 2003, the regime changed from presidential to parliamentary system, and the parliamentary experience is a modern experience for Iraq, as he lived for a long time without parliamentary experience, what existed before 2003, can not be a parliamentary experience , The experience righteousness The study of the parliamentary system in particular and the political process in general has not been easy, because it is a complex and complex process that concerns the political system and its internal and external environment, both of which are influential in the political system and thus on the political process as a whole, After the US occupation of Iraq, the United States intervened to establish a permanent constitution for the country. Despite all the circumstances accompanying the drafting of the constitution, it is the first constitution to be drafted by an elected Constituent Assembly. The Iraqi Constitution adopted the parliamentary system of government and approved the principle of flexible separation of powers in order to achieve cooperation and balance between the authorities.


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