Critical Analysis on the Comparative Advantage of Presidentialism over Parliamentary System on Liberty and National Unity in Ethiopia

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Sisay A. Temesgen

Abstract The Ethiopian Federal Democratic Republic (EFDR) Constitution is promulgated in 1994. Under Article (45) of the EFDR the country is restructured from presidential to parliamentary system of government. Since then, the country has been ravaged by the gross violation of the liberty of citizens and the crisis of national unity and consensus among the diversified ethnic groups. The impact of the parliamentary system in aggravating those critical challenges and the comparative advantage of presidantialism is the most ignored political research topic. In this Article, I investigated that the blurry separation of powers of the parliamentary structure of the country has created fusion of powers which has undermined the system of checks and balances. Thus, the executive organ of the government has enabled to concentrate unchecked and unaccountable power which has manifested in the gross violation of the liberty of citizens. Likewise, Article (73) of EFDR has declared that the prime minister and council of ministers of the country to be appointed by the legislators. This has deprived their boarder popular base and authenticity; and equivocally undermined their potency and decisiveness in addressing the existing crisis of national unity and consensus. Comparatively, the presidential structure of government is defined by the firm separation of powers and genuine system of checks and balances. The direct popular election of the president enables the president and council of ministers to secure broader popular base and authenticity. Thus, it is advantageous over parliamentarian structure in terms of protecting the liberty of citizens and addressing the crisis of national unity and consensus in Ethiopia.

Author(s):  
Charles Manga Fombad

One reason why dictatorships flourished in Africa until the 1990s was that constitutions concentrated excessive powers in presidents. The democratic revival of the 1990s led to the introduction of new or substantially revised constitutions in a number of countries that for the first time sought to promote constitutionalism, good governance, and respect for the rule of law. A key innovation was the introduction of provisions providing for separation of powers. However, in many cases the reintroduction of multipartyism did not lead to thorough constitutional reform, setting the scene for a subsequent struggle between opposition parties, civil society, and the government, over the rule of law. This reflects the complex politics of constitutionalism in Africa over the last 60 years. In this context, it is important to note that most of the constitutions introduced at independence had provided for some degree of separation of powers, but the provisions relating to this were often vaguely worded and quickly undermined. Despite this, the doctrine of separation of powers has a long history, and the abundant literature on it shows that there is no general agreement on what it means or what its contemporary relevance is. Of the three main models of separation of powers, the American one, which comes closest to a “pure” system of separation of powers, and the British, which involves an extensive fusion of powers, have influenced developments in anglophone Africa. The French model, which combines elements of the British and American models but in which the executive predominates over the other two branches, has influenced developments in all civilian jurisdictions in Africa, particularly those in francophone Africa. The common denominator among the models is the desire to prevent tyrannical and arbitrary government by separating powers but doing so in a manner that allows for limited interference through checks and balances on the principle that le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir. The combined Anglo-American (common law) and French (civil law) models received during the colonial period remain applicable today, but despite its adoption in the 1990s, the effectiveness of the doctrine of separation of powers in limiting governmental abuse has been curtailed by the excessive powers African presidents still enjoy and the control they exercise over dominant parties in legislatures. South Africa in its 1996 Constitution, followed by Kenya in 2010 and Zimbabwe in 2013, entrenched a number of hybrid institutions of accountability that have the potential not only to complement the checks and balances provided by the traditional triad but also to act where it is unable or unwilling to do so. The advent of these institutions has given the doctrine of separation of powers renewed potency and relevance in advancing Africa’s faltering constitutionalism project.


2009 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Cottier

Direct effect of international agreements – WTO – Current jurisprudence and theories – Implications for separation of powers and checks and balances – Justiciability – Criticism of current standards: precision and reciprocity – Reversal of dual concept in EU external relations


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-91
Author(s):  
George Goradze

The article looks at the last amendments to the Constitution of Georgia. By this amendments Georgia moves into parliamentary system. However, there are some questions: Does this system comply with European standards of parliamentary system? How will this system work in Georgia? Is a parliamentary system ideal model for Post-Soviet countries and particularly for Georgia? The article is divided into two parts: The first part looks at the new redaction of the Constitution of Georgia and the new system of governance which will be established by this constitutional changes. By analysis the author comes to the conclusion that new amendments to the constitution will serve as a guarantee of a long-standing stay in the government for the ruling political party; In the second part of the article the author discusses the negative aspects of a parliamentary system in general. Here main question is “how will the Parliament control the executive branch and its leader who is the head of the ruling party and the parliamentary majority, as well? It may be vice versa.” In the author’ opinion one of the ways for a parliamentary system is to elect a non-party president through a universal suffrage.


2021 ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter looks at the Japanese experience with judicial review. The Supreme Court of Japan does not enforce those parts of the Japanese Constitution, like Article 9, which prohibits war making; Article 21, which protects freedom of speech; or Article 89, which forbids taxpayer money from being used to hire Shinto priests. The Supreme Court of Japan thus refuses to enforce important articles in the Constitution of Japan. It does rubber stamp and thus legitimize actions taken by the political branches of the government. Why has judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation failed to take root in Japan? Japan does not need either a federal or a separation of powers umpire, since Japan is, firstly, a unitary nation-state with no need for a federalism umpire; and, secondly, a parliamentary democracy with a weak upper house of the legislature. Moreover, Japan has never atoned for the wrongs it committed during World War II nor has it truly admitted to even having done the horrible things that Japan did. A nation cannot get rights from wrongs judicial review and a Bill of Rights unless it admits it has done something wrong. Finally, the Japanese Constitution contains an inadequate system of checks and balances. As a result, the Supreme Court of Japan may not have the political space within which it can assert power.


1968 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 1013-1024

The third ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) took place in Cairo, July 13–17, 1964. The Council examined 21 applications from “freedom fighter” organizations for representation in that body. The government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) was represented at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, but when it was announced that Moise Tshombe, the new Congolese Prime Minister, would attend the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, objections were raised by a number of Heads of State and Ministers. As a result Mr. Tshombe announced that the Congolese government would not take part in the Assembly.


2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 290-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Epstein

AbstractThe design of new constitutions is fraught with challenges on both issues of structural design and individual rights. As both a descriptive and normative matter it is exceedingly difficult to believe that one structural solution will fit all cases. The high variation in nation size, economic development, and ethnic division can easily tilt the balance for or against a Presidential or Parliamentary system, and even within these two broad classes the differences in constitutional structure are both large and hard to measure. The only confident claim is that some system of separation of powers coupled with checks and balances is needed. Deciding which system, however, is far harder. In contrast, that same level of doubt does not arise in connection with the correct specification of individual right. Strong systems of negative rights on matters of liberty, property, religion, and speech are preferable across a wide range of social organizations. On the other hand, any effort to create systems of positive entitlements will fail because of the negative effects that they have on wealth creation and the inability to define or limit the scope of the relevant entitlements.


Al-Albab ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 265
Author(s):  
Masnur Alam

This article was motivated by recent development in Indonesian society whose religious and cultural diversity has raised a lot of racial issues that lead to tension and suspicion among communities in the Sungai Penuh, Kerinci Regency, Jambi province on Sumatra Island. The impact could potentially trigger conflict, damage, inconvenience and could further threaten national unity and national integration. This article gives an overview that religion (Islam) has a very positive philosophy that in fact humans are created in religious and cultural diversity. Diversity is the law of God, something that is commonplace, rule of time, a must, and divine grace to be grateful for, a form generosity from God to humans as the strength, the reason to do good. The government together with the community has been able to build harmony in diversity, creating peace, moderation, compassion, love of peace, tolerance, avoiding conflict, so as to build the country as planned. In socializing the attitude of harmony, the government can do it through formal and non-formal ways, eventually people can implement it in their daily lives. Thus, the government and the public can establish harmony in diversity, creating peace, security, order, justice, tranquility, comfort as well as brotherhood and compassion. The government together with the community can come together, foster mutual cooperation to achieve the goals the country’s development. This paper also recommends to religious communities with diverse cultures to always build harmony as one of the solutions in creating peace and free from conflict, as well as serving as capital to build the country, nation, state and religion.


Significance The five seats obtained by its allies, the Gran Alianza por la Unidad Nacional (Grand Alliance for National Unity) will cement the majority further. This concentration of power will improve the government’s ability to implement policies, but may jeopardise El Salvador's separation of powers and political checks and balances. Impacts Concerns about democratic and media freedoms may increase as Bukele strengthens his position. Prices will pick up this year, fuelled by recovering demand, higher oil prices and low interest rates. Remittances will remain resilient on the back of US economic recovery, supporting strengthening private consumption.


This book examines one of the critical measures introduced by African constitutional designers in their attempts to entrench an ethos of constitutionalism on the continent. Taking a critical look at the different ways in which attempts have been made to separate the different branches of government, the book examines the impact this is having on transparent and accountable governance. Beginning with an overview of constitutionalism in Africa and the different influences on modern African constitutional developments, it looks at the relationship between the legislature and the executive as well as the relationship between the judiciary and the political branches. Despite differences in approaches between the various constitutional cultures that have influenced developments in Africa, there remain common problems. One of these problems is the constant friction in the relationship between the three branches and the resurgent threats of authoritarianism which clearly suggest that there remain serious problems in both constitutional design and implementation. The book also studies the increasing role being played by independent constitutional institutions and how they complement the checks and balances associated with the traditional three branches of government.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 709-730 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indri Dwi Apriliyanti ◽  
Stein Oluf Kristiansen

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to illuminate the hidden process of collusion among power holders in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in an emerging economy, which endures despite comprehensive reforms towards democracy and good governance. Why are mechanisms of checks and balances not functioning in the way they should? Design/methodology/approach The analysis is based on in-depth interviews with board members, executives, politicians, bureaucrats and representatives from auditing boards involved in the management of SOEs in Indonesia. Findings The findings reveal practices of collective conservatism, reciprocal opportunism and normalisation of corruption. The costs of getting into powerful positions are so high that conglomerate business owners gain control over the management of SOEs. The authors use the terms “wall-building and gatekeeping” to explain such cases. Research limitations/implications There is a continuous process of wall building and gatekeeping occurring among business oligarchs, bureaucrats and elected politicians in Indonesia. New entrants into the system are co-opted by the established elite. Practical implications This study shows collusion, rent-seeking and corruption among political and business elites as well as top officials in the government hinder good governance reforms in state-owned Indonesian enterprises. Social implications Collusion and illicit business practices in SOEs are clearly grounded on wall building and gatekeeping. Tackling this problem is a precondition for good governance and an improved legal and regulatory business environment in Indonesia. The ideal separation of powers and the checks and balances for good governance apparently need more than a democracy to break through. A further strengthening of the free press and critical academics will be one crucial contribution. Originality/value There is generally a lack of understanding of the context of corruption, such as the influence of institutional and organisational structures. The topic of corruption is also under-researched due to the difficulty of finding empire evidence. This paper contributes to explaining why new political and organisational structures, such as a democratically elected parliament and a particularly designed corruption eradication commission, are not able to hinder rent-seeking practices and illicit political business in state agencies.


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