scholarly journals Elementy prezydencjalizmu w systemie ustrojowym Francji okresu V Republiki

Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1(64)) ◽  
pp. 37-58
Author(s):  
Łukasz Jakubiak

Elements of Presidentialism in the Constitutional System of France’s Fifth Republic The Fifth French Republic was created as a modified parliamentary system, but due to constitutional changes and tendencies revealed in political practice, the functioning system of government was quite significantly modified. The purpose of this article is to analyze the elements of the presidential system that were introduced in 1958, thus in the original text of the constitution, resulted from its subsequent amendments, or can only be seen in the practice of exercising power in the conditions of the politically homogenous executive branch, i.e. outside of cohabitation periods. The author draws attention to two different ways of defining the term “presidentialism” in the French context (as a formal constitutional structure or as a pro-presidential configuration of the semi-presidentialism of the Fifth Republic), and argues that the regime initiated in 1958 is still based on at least some pillars characterizing the parliamentary model. Hence, its subsequent modifications were only to highlight presidentialism as one of the possible variants of political practice under the Fifth Republic, and not to accept presidentialism as a constitutional system of government.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahir Tokatlı

In this book, the author examines the development of the Turkish constitution since 1921 in terms of its horizontal separation of powers, and concludes that Turkey’s recent constitutional changes do not imply a presidential system at all. Contrary to the widespread assumption in journalism and academia, the governmental system has persisted in conforming to a parliamentary system. Using a reconceptualisation of the typology of systems of government, this thesis is reinforced and at the same time provides a further contribution to the field of comparative politics by affirming the benefits of the basic dichotomous typology, by elaborating a distinctive subtypification and by rejecting semi-presidentialism as an autonomous type.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 45
Author(s):  
Zen Zen Zanibar

The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia was amended for four times between 1999 and 2002) in the reformation era. These constitutional changes have altered the principles and the structure of the Indonesian primary state‟s institutions. Broadly speaking, all of the power branches – i.e. legislative, executive and judiciary organs– are now interrelated horizontally in running the country and none of them is superior to the others. Such constitu-tional system is generally found in countries that employ a presidential system. However, by reviewing the authority hold by the legislatures, it is found that some characteristics of a parlia-mentary system are also applied in Indonesia


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-91
Author(s):  
George Goradze

The article looks at the last amendments to the Constitution of Georgia. By this amendments Georgia moves into parliamentary system. However, there are some questions: Does this system comply with European standards of parliamentary system? How will this system work in Georgia? Is a parliamentary system ideal model for Post-Soviet countries and particularly for Georgia? The article is divided into two parts: The first part looks at the new redaction of the Constitution of Georgia and the new system of governance which will be established by this constitutional changes. By analysis the author comes to the conclusion that new amendments to the constitution will serve as a guarantee of a long-standing stay in the government for the ruling political party; In the second part of the article the author discusses the negative aspects of a parliamentary system in general. Here main question is “how will the Parliament control the executive branch and its leader who is the head of the ruling party and the parliamentary majority, as well? It may be vice versa.” In the author’ opinion one of the ways for a parliamentary system is to elect a non-party president through a universal suffrage.


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 365
Author(s):  
Dinoroy Margonda Aritonang

AbstractThe option to pick a suitable governmental system is greatly determined by political stability and effectivity considerations. Presidential system used in Indonesian constitutional system is designed along with the format of multiparty which highly requires coalitions among political parties in the parliament. This feature is actually an original or a real character of parliamentary system. It stems from and is developed well in the system. In this article, it will be described the problems based on empirical experiences of Indonesian Presidential cabinet which is struggling with the multiparty system.IntisariPemilihan model pemerintahan amat ditentukan oleh pertimbangan terhadap stabilitas dan efektiftas dari pemerintahan. Sistem Presidensil yang diterapkan di Indonesia didesain dengan format multiapartai, yang amat menghendaki koalisi dalam partai politik di parlemen. Ciri ini sebenarnya amat cocok (lahir dan tumbuh subur) dalam sistem parlementer. Dalam tulisan ini dideskripsikan mengenai problematika yang berangkat dari pengalaman empiris cabinet pemerintahan yang telah berlangsung di Indonesia dalam desain presidensil yang multipartai.


Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1(64)) ◽  
pp. 21-36
Author(s):  
Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski

Originality and Permanence of the French Fifth Republic The case of the Fifth Republic encourages reflection on comparative constitutionalism both because of the originality of de Gaulle’s constitutional work and the fact that during its validity the 1958 Constitution had to face new challenges – a change in the balance of political powers, European integration and the growth of the judiciary. The last two trends were universal in nature. The Fifth Republic proved an original and permanent constitution, giving the French democracy stability and efficiency. The constitutional system has not evolved either towards parliamentarianism or a presidential system like that of the USA. If there were significant amendments to the constitution, this happened in the area of external challenges. But also, in this area, where the constitutional judiciary became more dynamic and the guarantee of independence of the common judiciary increased, the Fifth Republic retained its originality, expressing the specificity of the French legal tradition.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peshraw Mohammed Ameen

In this research we dealt with the aspects of the presidential system and the semi-presidential system, and he problematic of the political system in the Kurdistan Region. Mainly The presidential system has stabilized in many important countries, and the semi-presidential concept is a new concept that can be considered a mixture of parliamentary and presidential principles. One of the features of a semi-presidential system is that the elected president is accountable to parliament. The main player is the president who is elected in direct or indirect general elections. And the United States is a model for the presidential system, and France is the most realistic model for implementing the semi-presidential system. The French political system, which lived a long period under the traditional parliamentary system, introduced new adjustments in the power structure by strengthening the powers of the executive authority vis-à-vis Parliament, and expanding the powers of the President of the Republic. In exchange for the government while remaining far from bearing political responsibility, and therefore it can be said that the French system has overcome the elements of the presidential system in terms of objectivity and retains the elements of the parliamentary system in terms of formality, so it deserves to be called the semi-presidential system. Then the political system in the Kurdistan Region is not a complete parliamentary system, and it is not a presidential system in light of the presence of a parliament with powers. Therefore, the semi-presidential system is the most appropriate political system for this region, where disputes are resolved over the authority of both the parliament and the regional president, and a political system is built stable. And that because The presence of a parliamentary majority, which supports a government based on a strategic and stable party coalition, which is one of the current problems in the Kurdistan region. This dilemma can be solved through the semi-presidential system. And in another hand The impartiality of the head of state in the relationship with the government and parliament. The head of state, with some relations with the government, can participate in legislative competencies with Parliament.


1982 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 421-460 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Bowman ◽  
Michael Wallerstein

The 1891 civil war that led to the downfall of President José Manuel Balmaceda is without doubt one of the most visible episodes of Chilean history. Already the subject of a voluminous bibliography by 1894 (Echeverría y Reyes, 1894), the “revolution's” importance to historians of Chile actually increased over time as a new generation of scholars came to view it not merely as a discrete event of limited intrinsic interest but as an important key to understanding Chile's subsequent political and economic development. In retrospect, the conflict came to be seen as a “crucial watershed” in Chilean history (Blakemore, 1974: 243), marking the replacement of a presidential system—1833-1891—notable in nineteenth-century Latin America for political stability, by a parliamentary system—1891-1924—notorious for political and monetary disorder.


Author(s):  
Tommaso Pensabene Lionti

<p>El 4 de diciembre de 2016 los italianos fueron llamados a participar, a través de la votación, en el <em>referéndum</em> concerniente una ley constitucional que (en caso de resultado positivo), habría modificado de manera radical el ordenamiento constitucional italiano. Entre las múltiples modificaciones que la reforma quería introducir, se enfocan lo significativos cambios que la misma habría producido en materia de procedimiento legislativo. En efecto, al final de la reforma, el sistema parlamentario italiano habría cambiado, transitando desde el llamado “bicameralismo paritario” hasta un sistema monocameral “asimétrico o diferenciado”. En consecuencia, habría cambiado el procedimiento legislativo, estructurándose en múltiples procedimientos, o variantes procedimentales, de los cuales se describe la disciplina, haciendo hincapié sobre algunos relevantes aspectos problemáticos. Se subraya, también, que la reforma, a través de la modificación del procedimiento legislativo, junto con la nueva disciplina constitucional de los decretos-leyes y de la nueva repartición de las competencias normativas entre el Estado y las Regiones, habría producido cambios importantes sobre las mismas características de las leyes y de los actos con fuerza de ley. En conclusión, se plantean las posibles razones, políticas y jurídicas, que han llevado al resultado negativo del <em>referendum</em> constitucional.</p><p>On December 4, 2016, Italians were called upon a <em>referendum</em> to approve a constitutional law that would (if successful) radically change the Italian constitutional system. Among the many changes that the reform intended to pursue, we are focusing on the significant changes it would bring in the legislative procedure. As a result of the reform, in fact, the Italian parliamentary system would be changed, passing from "bicameralism equal" to a "asymmetric or differentiated" monocameral system. Consequently, the legislative process would have changed, articulating into multiple procedures or procedural variants, of which the discipline is described, focusing on some relevant problematic profiles. It should also be noted that the reform, with the modification of the legislative procedure, together with the new constitutional discipline of the decree-law and the new division of normative competences between the State and the Regions, would have produced important changes in the features of laws and acts with force of law. Finally, we are questioning about the possible reasons, policies and legal issues, that have led to the negative outcome of the constitutional <em>referendum</em><em>.</em></p>


Author(s):  
Stephen Skowronek ◽  
John A. Dearborn ◽  
Desmond King

Since its founding of the republic, Americans have devised a variety of different ways to reconcile unity with depth, separation with checks, and presidentialism with republicanism. This chapter surveys the succession of informal institutional and organizational improvisations that periodically altered practical working relationships within the American constitutional system. These extra-constitutional contrivances created several distinctive “systems” of administration, each of which preserved the republican idea of inter-branch collaboration. Nineteenth-century remedies were party-based; twentieth-century remedies were administration-based. The move from one system to the next marked a profound change in the operation of government at large, but at every turn, a more powerful presidency was corralled into novel arrangements that reaffirmed collective responsibility. The origins of our beleaguered republic lay in the 1970s, when that spirit of accommodation began to break down. Presidents grew more independent in their political and institutional powers, and they asserted their right to unitary control over the executive branch more vigorously. In the congressional pushback, collaboration gave way to a constitutional face-off.


1961 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerhard Loewenberg

Although universal male suffrage as the basis for a representative assembly existed in Germany half a century earlier than in Great Britain, the Reichstag never occupied as important a position in the German constitutional order as the House of Commons did in the British. Neither in its representative function of integrating the community (in Friedrich's terms), nor in its deliberative function as a lawmaking and supervisory body, did the Reichstag ever achieve the significance that would warrant describing the German system of government, either under the Second Empire or the first Republic, as a parliamentary system. The popularly elected Reichstag under Bismarck, in form so advanced for its time, existed under a constitutional system whose “artfully manufactured chaos” permitted, in reality, the exercise of authoritarian government with little parliamentary interference. When, during the latter years of the first World War, the Reichstag demonstrated an increasing ability to call governments to account, this apparent development of a parliamentary system gained a fleeting constitutional recognition during the last days of the Empire and paved the way for the provisions of the Weimar Constitution under which the Government was to be responsible to the Reichstag. Nevertheless, the republican Reichstag never actually fulfilled its constitutional functions, and in difficult times fell victim to the habits of the authoritarian past, manifesting themselves in the autonomy of the army and the bureaucracy, and the irresponsible behavior of the political parties and the President. “Surely the new constitution granted the Reichstag unquestioned leadership in the formation of policy,” a political analyst of the Weimar epoch has written.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document